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1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Man makes monarchies and establishes republics, but the township is a gift from the hand of
God -Alexis Tocqueville

Local government and local participation are integral and fundamental components of
American democracy. From their founding days, local governments have been an avenue in which
individuals could engage in political participation and practice self-government. Through this
process, citizens can develop a deeper understanding of democracy and the democratic process.
In his observations of early America, Tocqueville (2003) observes that “political life took
root” in local governments (78). It was in town hall meetings that citizens gathered to discuss
policies that impacted their respective localities. Echoing Tocqueville, Mill (1971) explains that
local governments are “schools of democracy,” providing a myriad of opportunities for
participation and for nurturing an understanding of democratic values. Participation, Mill (1963)
argues, should be “practiced” at the local level and is the only way “the people will ever learn how
to exercise it on a larger scale” (186).
Tocqueville (2003) emphasizes that citizens are involved in local government “because he
helps to run it” (82). This suggests that local elections are essential to American democracy for
two reasons. First, they provide participatory opportunities. Local elections are held regularly and
frequently. Voting in local elections allows citizens to assert their policy preferences and their
voices heard. Second, local elections are the way in which citizens govern their localities. The
winners at the ballot box impact localities in three ways. First, it directly alters or sustains the
composition of local governing boards. Second and related to the first, it determines what public
policies that are pursued. Third, it influences the quality of local government services. This directly
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impacts citizens’ daily lives. By casting a ballot, citizens hold elected officials accountable for
decisions made while in office. The act of voting, then, is the primary method of influencing local
government.
Despite the importance and potential impact of voting, voter turnout is not high at any level
of American government. This is particularly true in local elections. At the national level, voter
turnout in the United States is low compared to other industrialized democracies (Powell 1980;
Powell 1986), and voter turnout for local elections is abysmal (Bullock 1990; Verba et al. 1995;
Sharp 2003).
In local elections, eligible voters are inundated with a variety of additional complexities in
order to cast a ballot. These difficulties - existing only at the local level - increase the cost of voting
and the burden placed on the voter. For example, local elections are often held at different times
of the year than national or statewide elections. Most local elections are non-concurrent (off-year
or odd numbered year) elections and/or held during non-traditional months, such as May. Holding
elections non-concurrently is a primary reason for low voter turnout at the local level (Wood 2002;
Hajnal and Lewis 2003). When an election is held non-concurrently, the public tends to pay less
attention to it and fewer resources are dedicated to turnout efforts (Hajnal and Lewis 2003).
Aside from the timing of elections, there is consensus in urban literature that two
institutional structures, which are a result of the reforms, have a negative impact on turnout. Both
nonpartisan elections and council-manager forms of government decrease voter turnout (Wood
2002; Karning and Walters 1983; Alford and Lee 1968). This is especially prevalent in nonconcurrent elections (Hajnal and Lewis 2003).
While it has been argued that low turnout can be an indicator of satisfaction and stability
in a democracy (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Weisberg and Grofman 1981), it can also
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be a sign of an unhealthy democracy. High participation ensures that public policies will reflect
the will of the people and not the interests of a select few (Hudson 2010). As Lijphart (1997) points
out, “unequal participation spells unequal influence” (1). Low voter turnout could create a bias in
the system as political participation influences ‘who gets what’ (Crosnell paraphrased in Sharp
2003), and ‘who gets what’ is often a zero-sum game in local politics (Kaufmann 2007). Moreover,
local governments with high political participation have better policy congruence between the
public and office holders (Verba and Nie 1972; Hansen 1975; Berry, Portney, and Thomson 1993).
If high participation is essential for a healthy democracy, what can be done to encourage voters to
vote more often?
One solution offered by scholars is for polities to lower the cost of voting. In theory, if the
costs of voting are reduced, then voter turnout should increase (Downs 1957; Aldrich 1993). One
approach to reducing the costs of voting would be for the governing systems to alter their election
laws. Election laws dictate the time, place, or manner of conducting elections, such as early voting
laws, absentee ballot laws, same day voter registration, etc. Polities with election laws that lower
the costs of voting, or lower the burdens placed on the voter, are characterized as having liberal
voting laws. Similarly, polities that have election laws that increase the costs of voting, or increase
the burden of voting, are considered to have conservative voting laws. These types of laws are
more restrictive in nature as the voter often has a higher cost associated with casting a ballot.
Scholars have posited that states with liberalized voting laws have higher turnout rates than
states with more conservative voting laws (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1980; Powell
1986; Teixeira 1987). Empirical evidence supports this assertion. Political systems with more
conservative voting laws have lower turnout rates (Rusk 1970; Converse 1972; Powell 1980;
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Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira 1987; Jackman 1987; Dubin and Kalsow
1996; Timpone 1998). This suggests that election laws directly influence voter turnout.
A specific election law that is perceived to lower the cost of voting is early voting. Over
half of the states have adopted some method of early voting. The various methods of early voting
laws will be discussed in more detail below. The variety of early voting laws found among the
states allows scholars to examine the impact that each method has on voter turnout at different
levels of government. In this study, I seek to determine how in-person early voting, a specific type
of early voting, affects voter turnout in local elections. The next section highlights the significance
of local governments in American political life.
Importance of Local Government
Local governments have been and still are a significant and fundamental part of democracy
in America. The reason for this is twofold: 1) local governments are an indispensable element of
American democracy and 2) an important American philosophy is one of localism.
First, localities are an indispensable element of American democracy because they help
maintain security. Mill (1963) illustrates this when he asserts that localities are the “safety-valve
of democracy” (186). The independence granted to local governments prevents despotism (Syed
1966). Similarly, Tocqueville (2003) states that “the strength of free nations resides in the
township…Without town institutions a nation can establish a free government, but has not the
spirit of freedom” (73). Tocqueville suggests that it is only through local governments - and the
institutions that compromise them - that a nation can experience genuine freedom. Localities not
only develop democracy, according to Tocqueville, but also sustain it (Gannett 2005). Localities
sustain American democracy because they are the oldest form of government, they are the
governing system closest to the people, they protect and promote democracy, and they foster
political participation.
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Citizens have a strongly held belief that they ought to manage their own affairs. This belief
stems from the notion that sovereignty resides ultimately with the people. The subsequent outcome
of this creed is a deep and meaningful attachment to their community. This attachment is the basis
of localism advanced by Thomas Jefferson.
Jefferson was the first champion of local government. He believed that the smaller the
locality, the more likely it was to be democratic (Syed 1966). Democracy, according to Jefferson,
thrives in small homogenous units of government because it better promotes and cultivates
political participation and an interest in politics. Smaller units of government were more effective
at addressing the needs and demands of its citizens, thereby making them more efficient.
The Jeffersonian ideal is still an inherent and central part of American political tradition
(Rourke 1964; Syed 1966). His idea of localism underscores the right of localities to self-govern
“as an expression of the sovereignty of the individual, derived from the doctrine of the sovereignty
of the people” (Syed 1966, 5). This sovereignty is the basis for the autonomy found in local
governments. The self-governing nature of local governments compels citizens to play a large role
in the direction of public policies as well as who is elected as the decision makers. For example,
citizens have direct influence on determining policy issues, such as park locations, trash collection,
and the quality of public schools. Citizens can participate and advance their policy stances on any
of these issues by attending meetings, voting, contacting their elected officials, etc. Accordingly,
citizens develop a political attachment to their community by doing so.
Progressive Reforms
As the population in the United States expanded, “cities were no longer occasional
aberrations set in a cluster of comfortable commercial centers and flourishing farm communitiesthey had become typical, a chosen way of life” (Wood 1979, 34). The development of and
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movement to cities produced its own set of troubles. The most predominant problems that emerged
at the local level were government corruption and the control party machines exhibited both in and
out of government.
It appeared that the Jeffersonian ideal of a “republic-in-miniature” had vanished. The wave
of migration to cities revealed the need for the provision of services that local governments failed
to offer ((Welch and Bledsoe 1988, Chapter 1; Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). Party
machines seized the opportunity and stepped in to deliver these services, which were mainly social
services, such as jobs, food, and/or money to those in need or new residents. In return, these
individuals provided a vote, which helped the party secure seats in office. The party machine even
assisted local businesses by offering avenues for business growth and development (Welch and
Bledsoe 1988, Chapter 1; Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). Because the party machine
controlled government, it could, for the right price per se, furnish a business with items such as
liquor licenses and/or government contracts.
The party machine flourished until the early 20th Century. While there had always been
reform voices present, they often failed to make their desired impact on government. However, the
Progressive Era gave birth to a reform movement that affected all levels of government. Reformers
highlighted the corruption found in American politics and businesses. They were able to
successfully pass reforms at the national and state level that included popular election of U.S.
Senators, the initiative and referendum, the regulation of liquor sales, the elimination of child
labor, and the establishment of the Food and Drug Administration (Welch and Bledsoe 1988). In
1984, the National Municipal League was formed, which encouraged cities to engage in good
government practices (Welch and Bledsoe 1988).
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In particular, reformers advocated for a myriad of policy changes at the local level. First,
they believed that local government would be more efficient if it was run like a business and by
experts (Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). To achieve this efficiency, they pushed for city
managers. Second, they proposed the non-partisan ballot, which removed any form of party
identification on the ballot (Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). Without party identification
on the ballot, they argued, voters would be able to make better decisions because they would think
about the interests of the city as a whole and not just the political interests asserted by the party
machine. Likewise, reformers also recommended at large elections instead of district (or ward)
elections (Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). They believed candidates in an at large election
would appeal to the needs of the entire city and not just the needs of a single district.
In essence, proponents of the reforms sought to eliminate political corruption and restore
good governance within the American political system. Because of the sovereign nature of local
governments, localities determined which policies, if any, to adopt. Therefore, not every local
government adopted the policies advocated by the reformers. These localities are commonly
referred to as non-reform cities. The local governments that adopted reform policies are known as
reform cities.
The reforms are the principal reason for the variation of local government structures and
local electoral systems. The governmental structures of reform cities tend to have weak political
organization because they have adopted at least one of the following measures: non-partisan
elections, non-concurrent elections, at-large districts, and/or a council-manager form of
government. Aside from the lack of political organization, by having a manager there is likely an
absence of a mayoral candidate on the ballot. Therefore, it is difficult for citizens to blame
government failures on a specific elected individual. In at-large district elections, voters are often
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selecting between candidates they don’t know and/or have less knowledge about compared to
candidates from their own neighborhood or district. These factors diminish the excitement of the
electoral process and negatively impact voter turnout.
On the other hand, non-reform cities embrace features where political organization can
occur more easily. Features of non-reform cities include partisan elections, single district elections,
and/or a mayor-council form of government. In contrast to reform cities, the electoral process in a
non-reform city often is filled with excitement. Their elections have a mayor, thereby creating a
high-profile race. Council candidates typically are elected by districts, thereby they tend to be from
the neighborhood of the voters electing them. This creates higher levels of name recognition and
knowledge about the candidate. And, the party label is present in these elections as they tend to be
partisan elections. These factors increase the excitement of the electoral process, and in so doing,
increasing turnout at the polls.
This variation of institutional structure found among municipalities influences voter
turnout in municipal elections. Previous research indicates that cities that have adopted reform
structures depress voter turnout (Caren 2007; Welch and Bledsoe 1988; Bridges 1997; Oliver
2001; Oliver and Ha 2007; Wood 2002). Among the various aspects of the reforms, three key
features have been shown to negatively affect voter turnout in municipal elections: non-partisan
elections, mayor-council form of government, and non-concurrent elections (Wood 2002; Hajnal
and Lewis 2003; Karning and Walters 1983; Alford and Lee 1968). While a thorough discussion
of the reforms can be found in Chapter 2, the purpose here is to merely mention what factors
influence voter turnout in local elections. Next, I discuss the various types of local governments
and provide a definition of local government.

9
Defining Local Governments
In the United States, the structure of local governments is not only complex but diverse.
First, the types of local governments vary from state to state. For example, Connecticut and Rhode
Island do not have a county structure. And, a number of states do not possess any form of township
governments. Second, states often use differing classification systems to organize their sub county
governments; therefore, the level of home rule given to local governments varies. The amount of
home rule given to a locality determines what functions it can or cannot perform. For instance, in
Michigan, there are townships and charter townships. Townships are a statutory unit of
government whose powers are determined by the State of Michigan, whereas charter townships
have greater amount of home rule as their charter outlines the duties, responsibilities, and rights.
The different classification systems create diversity among local governments not only between
the states, but within a state.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2012), there are 89,004 local government entities,
including both general purpose and special purpose governments. To be classified as a local
government, the U.S. Census Bureau (2012) states that the locality needs to possess all three of
the following attributes: 1) existence as an organized entity, 2) governmental character (e.g. the
ability to elect officials), and 3) substantial autonomy (e.g. controlling its own affairs independent
of another government structure). This provides a basic definition of local government.
Using this definition, there are five types of local government systems within the United
States. There are three general purpose governments: counties, municipalities, towns/townships.
Plus two special purpose governments: special districts and school districts. Table 1.1 provides a
detailed breakdown of the number of local governments by categories of each local government
system.
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Table 1.1 Number of Local Governments in the U.S. by Category
General Purpose Governments
Special Purpose Governments
Counties
3,031 Special Districts
Municipalities
19,522 School Districts
Towns/Townships
16,364
Total
38,917 Total

37,203
12,884
50,087

* Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2012

The vast number of local governments and the multifaceted differences between them
creates difficultly in furnishing a definition of local government. Below, I provide a descriptive
analysis of the various forms of local government using the definition provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau. The hope here is to provide insight and clarification on the complex local government
system found in the United States. I conclude this section by offering a definition of local
government.
Special Purpose Governments
Special purpose governments include both special districts and school districts. The
legislation that governs both types varies from state to state. However, special purpose
governments have administrative and fiscal autonomy from general purpose governments. These
governments typically have a single objective. For example, school districts deal with matters
related to local education while special districts handle services including hospitals, water,
cemetery upkeep, and mosquito abatement. Next, I provide a descriptive analysis of both special
districts and school boards.
Special Districts
By definition, “special district governments are independent, special-purpose
governmental units (other than school district governments), that exist as separate entities with
substantial administrative and fiscal independence from general-purpose local governments” (U.S.
Census Bureau 2012). Typically, special districts are created as a single purpose service provider.
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These services range from social services, such as fire protection, to the more monotonous
services, such as waste management. They are independent, autonomous entities that can tax, float
bonds, and can have a property requirement for voters (Burns 1994). Special districts have more
flexible geographical boundaries. Therefore, it is not uncommon to see special districts overlap
with other local government systems (Burns 1994). Unsurprisingly, citizens belonging to the same
municipality or county government may not receive services by the same special district and/or
have multiple special districts providing services. Ultimately, special districts provide citizens with
the ability to self-govern, but the additional layer of local government adds to the complexity of
it.
School Districts
School boards have been around since 1837 when Massachusetts created the first state
school board (Danzberger 1992; 1994). Later, in 1891, Massachusetts enacted legislation giving
local school boards financial and administrative authority, which allowed school boards to meet
the needs of their district more effectively (Danzberger 1992). The Massachusetts structure became
the primary type of school board system found among the various New England states and
eventually became the system found largely within the United States (Land 2002).
The school board is important as a local governing entity as it is the primary way in which
education is controlled in the United States (Johnson 1988). Education is a topic that everyone is
familiar with and cares about (Chubb and Moe 1990). Citizens, through school boards, determine
who teaches their children, how the children are taught, where they are taught, and what they are
taught. While there is often disagreement among some of these policy areas - such as school prayer,
sex education curriculums, and/or school dress policies - everyone within the community believes
they have a say in the matter of local education. Thus, local schools are community based because
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citizens believe they “could and should be able to govern their own educational affairs” (Chubb
and Moe 1990).
While both types of special purpose governments are comprised of elected officials from
the community, they can only govern affairs that pertain to their jurisdiction. This is an important
distinction to make when examining local governments. This is not to suggest that special purpose
governments are not a form of local government, but rather to illustrate their limited role in local
matters. The next section highlights the role of general purpose governments, which provide a
broader and more extensive range of services and functions.
General Purpose Governments
Counties, towns/townships, and municipalities are all types of general purpose
governments. Unlike special districts, general purpose governments engage in a variety of public
policies, have diverse economies, and need to manage an array of conflict over a range of issues.
At the same time, they need to provide good governance that is expected by residents, who are
often their friends and neighbors. Below is a brief overview of each type of general purpose
government.
Counties
In the United States, 48 states have county governments. Connecticut and Rhode Island are
the exceptions since a functioning county government system is absent in both of these states (U.S.
Census Bureau 201). Of all general purpose governments, county governments are the largest,
geographically speaking. Generally, the duties performed by county governments are similar and
state mandated (Marschall 2010). Examples of their duties include keeping records on births,
deaths, and land deeds; conducting elections; and assessing property.
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Most county governments are comparable in their functions, but there are exceptions. For
example, Alaska has boroughs. A borough in Alaska can fall into two different classifications:
incorporated or unincorporated. Incorporated boroughs are independent regional units of
government with home rule powers, while unincorporated boroughs are extensions of the state
government and not a political subdivision of the state. Therefore, in Alaska, not all boroughs are
created equal. The specific classification of boroughs gives some greater autonomy than others.
As mentioned, Connecticut and Rhode Island lack county government structures.
Interestingly, both these states are organized into geographical regions referred to as counties.
However, without a functioning county government, the primary purpose of the county structure
in Rhode Island and Connecticut is simply organizational. In these states, towns play a greater role
in the provision of services.
Some areas have even consolidated their county and municipal structures. When a
municipality and a county government join forces, it is then considered to be a consolidated
government structure. The result of a consolidation is a combined governmental entity with both
county and municipal responsibilities. The reasons for consolidation often include creating more
efficient government, increasing accountability, and/or creating cost savings. If the county and
municipal governments have been consolidated, they are considered by the U.S. Census Bureau to
be a municipal entity.
Despite variations, county structures among the states and their roles are similar. They
provide services to their constituents, although the level and number of services provided differ
from county to county. All county governments have elected boards and are held accountable by
their voters. Additionally, all other general purpose governments are typically found within the

14
borders of county governments. Thus, towns, townships, and municipalities are commonly referred
to as sub-county governments.
Towns/Townships
Townships are only found among 20 states within the United States (U.S. Census Bureau
2012). They are found predominately in the Northeast and Midwest and are largely absent in the
West and South. There are also different types of townships: civil, judicial, congressional, and
charter. Civil townships are the most familiar. They are political subdivisions of the state, are
independent governmental units, and have geographical boundaries. Judicial townships are a
political subdivision of a county and found primarily in the West. Congressional townships were
created without consideration to boundaries. Therefore, they often overlap with other political
jurisdictions. Charter townships tend to have a greater amount of home rule because their powers
and duties are outlined in their charter. This gives them more autonomy than a statutory township
whose powers come from the state.
Township governments and town governments differ. Townships, if given similar powers
and functions as a municipality, tend to have municipal structures. Otherwise they have an elected
board. The duties of a township can vary. For example, in the Northeast, townships govern schools,
while in the Midwest, townships are service providers. In general, townships tend to encompass
broad authority and carry out similar duties as municipalities. Towns tend to be governed by the
town meeting. In states without a county structure, towns tend to be the primary local government
system. The principle difference between towns/townships and municipalities are their means of
incorporation.
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Municipalities
Currently, there are 19,522 municipal governments in the United States (U.S. Census
2012). The U.S. Census Bureau (2012) defines municipal government as:
political subdivisions within which a municipal corporation has been established to provide
general local government for a specific population concentration in a defined area, and
includes all active government units officially designated as cities, boroughs (except in
Alaska), towns (except in the six New England states, and in Minnesota, New York, and
Wisconsin), and villages.
For this study, local government will be defined as municipalities. Unlike other types of
general purpose governments, such as counties and townships, municipalities can be found all
across the United States. As mentioned, the states of Connecticut and Rhode Island do not have
counties, and the township form of government is absent in over half of the states. But, every state
contains at least one municipal government (U.S. Census Bureau 2012).
Aside from the sheer number of municipal governments found among all 50 states,
municipalities are the lowest level of government, and therefore, the government system closest to
the people. Municipalities are physically closer since they are more geographically proximate to
their residents. Aside from geographic proximity, municipal government boards are comprised of
friends, neighbors, and/or family members. Those who govern the municipality are people who
residents see at church, PTA meetings, and even the local grocery store. Residents have more direct
contact with municipal elected officials and/or administrators than elected officials at the state or
national level. Municipalities also give meaning to citizenship. Municipalities have the power to
zone. The ability for municipalities to zone permits them to create geographical boundaries
demarcating their municipal boarders. Through zoning, municipalities can define who is, and who
is not, a resident of their community. Citizenship then is conferred by municipalities through
zoning - a special power given only to municipal governments.
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In short, municipalities can make their own decisions independent of another government
system, such as the state or federal government. They are autonomous entities where its citizens
determine the manner in which they are governed and by whom they will be governed. They
provide all the basic services expected by a local government. Municipalities also give meaning to
citizenship. The preceding aspects of municipalities make them the closest form of government to
the people. Aside from the features discussed above, data availability is greater and more
accessible for municipalities. These are the reasons for defining local governments as
municipalities for this project. The next section discusses how the dynamics of local elections are
similar among localities but differ from national and state elections. I also address the different
approaches to increasing voter turnout in municipal elections.
Local Elections and In-Person Early Voting
Local elections have vastly different dynamics than state or national elections. Yet, the
dynamics among the various types of local government and their elections are very similar. First,
all local governments practice self-government. This ability to self-govern is a long standing
tradition in the United States. Because citizens believe that “sovereignty ought to be diffused to
the point of ultimate residence in the individual himself” (Syed 1966, 21), they, in turn, have given
local governments a sizeable amount of autonomy. This autonomy keeps the citizen close to the
local governing structure. Since it is the local citizens who govern themselves, they develop a
sense of community and create a meaning of citizenship.
Second, in local elections, their political context and the impact of their issues tend to be
alike. This differentiates them from state or national elections. Unlike state and national elections
where the candidate is not personally known by the community, candidates in local elections tend
to be neighbors, friends, co-workers, or members from the same organization. This creates a
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similar political context among all local elections. Likewise, the issues present in local elections
tend to impact citizens more directly than state or national issues. Citizens at the local level care if
their trash is picked up, worry about the quality of their water, and are concerned with where the
local park or library will be located. The trade-offs of local public policies tend to be more apparent
creating a zero-sum game (Kaufmann 2007). For example, if a tax levy for a public school fails, it
could mean a layoff of teachers, reduced extra-circular activities, and/or have no buses to transport
students for that school year. A failed property tax increase could lead to less police and fire
protection or the closing of parks and/or libraries. Therefore, citizens should have the desire to
influence government though elections, however, turnout for local elections are lower than any
other type of election.
Voter turnout in local elections is paradoxical. It is where government is closest to those
governed and where many first become politically active. Yet, it is also where political
participation, specifically voting, is the lowest. If high participation is an indicator of a healthy
democracy, then what can be done to increase participation at the local level?
There are various ways to foster voter turnout in local elections. For example, local
governments could simplify their ballot, reduce the number of elections held, and/or reduce the
number of elected officials. Another possible approach to increasing turnout include making
Election Day a holiday, which would ensure everyone has the ability to cast a ballot. Creating
easier access to the ballot by easing the registration process through practices such as same day
registration could also increase voter turnout.
A particular approach to increasing voter turnout at the local level is to alter the laws
governing their elections. Previous research suggests that election laws impact voter turnout (Rusk
1970; Converse 1972; Powell 1980; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira 1987;
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Jackman 1987; Dubin and Kalsow 1996; Timpone 1998). For example, holding local elections
concurrently would increase turnout (Wood 2002). Expanding the number of days an individual
can cast a ballot (known as early voting) has also been shown to increase voter turnout at the
municipal level (Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007). However, there are a variety
of early voting practices found among the states. The next section discusses the various forms of
early voting - in particular the method of early voting known as in-person early voting.
Early Voting
Early voting policies differ from state to state. These differences include no excuse
absentee voting, in-person early voting, and/or vote by mail elections. Table 1.2 provides a detailed
description of the various forms of early voting used by the states.
Over half of the states within the United States have adopted in-person early voting, yet
much of the research done thus far on early voting and municipal elections is on vote by mail
elections. Studies on vote by mail elections in Oregon and California have shown that early voting
does increase turnout at the municipal level (Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007).
Because these studies are on vote by mail laws, it leaves unanswered questions about the effects
of in-person early voting laws on municipal elections.
In-Person Early Voting versus Vote by Mail
Making the distinction between vote by mail elections and in-person early voting is
important because there are considerable differences between vote by mail laws (VBM) and inperson early voting laws. First, VBM laws are only found in two states, Oregon and Washington,
while in-person early voting laws can be found in 32 states (NCSL). Since more states have inperson early voting laws than VBM laws, scholars need to understand what effects in-person early
voting have on voter turnout in municipal elections.
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Table 1.2: Methods of Early Voting Used by States
No Excuse Absentee Voting
State(s) permit any qualified voter to vote absentee
without offering an excuse.
In Person Early Voting
State(s) allow any qualified voter to cast a ballot in
person during a designated period prior to Election
Day. No excuse or justification is required.
Vote By Mail Elections
State(s) automatically mail a ballot to every eligible
voter (no request or application is necessary), and the
state does not use traditional poll sites that offer inperson voting on Election Day.
In Person Early Voting & No State(s) allow any qualified voter to cast a ballot in
Excuse Absentee Voting
person during a designated period prior to Election
Day and permit any qualified voter to vote absentee.
Both can be done without offering an excuse or
giving a justification.
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures website

Secondly, the role of the government, and subsequently the burden placed on the voter, are
vastly different between these two methods of early voting. Vote by mail laws, by their nature,
require state governments to play a more active role in the voting process. In a vote by mail system,
the state government mails all registered voters their ballot for each election even if they have
decided not to vote in that particular election. If the voter opts to vote, it is up to the voter to
complete the ballot and return it via mail.
Alternatively, the burden to vote remains completely upon the individual in states with inperson early voting. While in-person early voting laws allow one to cast a ballot prior to Election
Day, the voter must still make the decision to vote, locate the early voting center, and then go to
the early voting center to cast a ballot. The costs of voting are much higher in in-person early
voting states than states that have vote by mail elections. Therefore, it is necessary for scholars to
know how in-person early voting laws affect municipal elections despite the previous work done
by scholars on the effects of vote by mail systems.
With a few exceptions (Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007), early voting
studies have not focused on voter turnout in municipal elections. As discussed in the following
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section, I hypothesize that in-person early voting has a significant positive impact on municipal
turnout.
General Argument
According to the ICMA (2002), 77 percent of municipalities have non-concurrent (odd
numbered years) elections. In addition to non-concurrent elections, many municipal governments
hold elections in months that are atypical, such as May. Previous research on early voting has
almost entirely focused on voter turnout in concurrent election years - where there is a presidential
or statewide election (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Lyons and Scheb 1999; Dyck and Gimpel
2005; Karp and Banducci 2001; Burden et al 2009; Gronke et al 2007; Neeley and Richardson
2001; Stein 1998; Gronke et al 2005; Leighley and Nagler 2009). Consequently, the majority of
the early voting studies fail to include the years, or months, that the majority of municipalities
conduct their elections. By examining non concurrent election years, I can isolate the effects of
early voting at the local level.
This project asks a simple, but overlooked question: Does in-person early voting impact
voter turnout in municipal elections? While studies on in-person early voting suggest that early
voting does not increase turnout (Stein 1998; Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997; Neeley and
Richardson 2001), these studies are on state and national elections. Research on early voting that
include municipal elections indicate that early voting increases turnout in local elections (Karp and
Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007). Similarly, I hypothesize that in-person early voting
has a significant positive impact on voter turnout in municipal elections. If empirical evidence
supports my hypothesis, it would suggest that local democracies benefit the most from the early
voting laws. Conversely, if the results of this study do not support my hypothesis, it suggests that
in-person early voting may not be the best method of early voting to increases voter turnout. As
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other studies on in-person early voting indicate, it does not increase voter turnout in state or
national elections. This is not surprising since statewide and national elections tend to be highstimulus elections which, by their nature, attract a greater number of voters to the polls. On the
other hand, most municipal elections tend to be low-stimulus elections thereby often having lower
turnout rates than national and statewide elections. The positive effect of early voting may be more
pronounced in these low-stimulus elections, which is why I hypothesize a positive relationship
between in-person early voting and municipal voter turnout.
Data and Methods
To assess the impact of in-person early voting on voter turnout in municipal elections, I
use individual level data to conduct a cross-sectional time series analysis to examine turnout in
mayoral elections among the 938 municipalities in Ohio. The data for this project will come from
a variety of sources: the Ohio voter file; U.S. Census data; the Ohio Municipal, Township, and
School Board Roster; the Ohio Municipal League, and election results from the County Board of
Elections.
I collect a variety of information on municipalities for this study. I obtain election results
for all mayoral elections within my specified time period. I also collect the number of registered
voters in each municipality for each election year in this study. These pieces of information are
collected from the 88 County Boards of Elections within the State of Ohio. The U.S. Census data
is downloaded from the Census Bureau’s website and used to determine the localities’
demographic make-up, such as city size. Information obtained from the Ohio Municipal,
Township, and School Board Roster, includes a list of all the cities in the State of Ohio as well as
their government structure (e.g. mayor-council or council-manager).
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Implications
This study has implications in two main areas of scholarship: public policy and the study
of local elections. This study examines the impact of a statewide public policy on its subunits of
government. Studying early voting at the municipal level will provide an understanding of the
effects of state public policies on municipal governments. Because early voting laws impact local
governments in the same manner and the dynamics of local elections are similar among localities,
the results can be generalized to other local governments as well. This analysis will provide a better
understanding of the impact of early voting policies on municipalities and municipal elections in
particular, and local elections in general, even if the results suggest early voting has no influence,
or a negative influence, on voter turnout.
Public Policy
Early voting laws significantly alter the costs and benefits of voting. This has important
consequences for who votes, the manner that votes are translated into legislative seats, and the
overall direction of public policy (Marschall 2010). Understanding the impact early voting policies
have on local elections is, therefore, essential.
Recently, many states have reexamined their early voting laws. These states have either
attempted to or were successful at scaling back the number of days individuals could cast an early
vote. For example, two key swing states, Florida and Ohio, have attempted such action. Florida
successfully decreased the number of days voters could cast their ballot early from 14 to eight.1 In
2012, Ohio’s Secretary of State Jon Husted attempted to prohibit early voting 72 hours before
Election Day expect for military personnel.2

1

FL HB 1355 passed in 2011 and signed by Gov. Rick Scott
US Supreme Court denied hearing the case, and Husted ordered the 88 County Boards of Elections to hold hours
for the 72 hours before Election Day (Sat, Sun, Mon).
2
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It has been just over 20 years since the first state introduced early voting. Yet scholars have
not assessed the impact of early voting laws for all types of elections. The majority of early voting
research has focused on national and statewide elections. While there have been a few studies on
municipal elections in vote by mail systems, the impact of the other forms of early voting on
municipal, school board, township, and other local elections has yet to be determined. Since early
voting is a controversial public policy, understanding its impact at all levels is necessary, especially
if early voting policies are being altered. This study advances the knowledge of early voting
policies by examining its effects on voter turnout in local elections.
Local Elections
A specific study within the field of urban politics is that of local elections and political
participation. While studies of local participation far and few between, studies specifically on
municipal elections are even more uncommon (Marschall 2010; Clark and Krebs 2012).
Additionally, Sapotichne et al (2007) found that studies on voting behavior are underrepresented
in citations in urban journals. Given the close proximity of local governments to their citizens and
the myriad of research opportunities that local elections present, it is surprising that local elections
have been largely overlooked by scholars.
Studies on local elections that focus on turnout have concentrated on three explanatory
factors. Those factors include 1) electoral and institutional arrangements, 2) candidate
characteristics, and 3) local context (Marschall 2010). This study examines two of the three
explanatory factors: electoral and institutional arrangements and local context. Electoral and
intuitional arrangements focus on the rules that govern elections (e.g. timing of elections) and the
forms of government (e.g. manager versus mayor systems) respectively. Local context investigates
how variables, such as the population or size of the local entity being studied, affect voter turnout.
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In addition, this study is a macro-level study; the municipality is the unit of analysis. This
is unique as many of the studies on early voting have not had this focus. Previous studies on early
voting and local elections have used the precinct as the unit of analysis and included municipal
elections as variables (see Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007). Since I have
municipalities as the unit of analysis, it will provide a unique insight on how election laws
influence voter turnout within the municipal settings and will contribute to a better understanding
of voter turnout in municipal elections specifically. However, the findings of this study can be
generalized to other forms of local government and local elections overall.
Overview of Chapters
In Chapters 2 and 3, I provide a literature review on municipal governments and
participation and early voting respectively. In particular, Chapter 2 gives a detailed discussion on
the importance of local governments and local elections in American democracy. I then discuss
the impact of local governments’ administrative and electoral structures on political participation.
I conclude this chapter with an analysis of the characteristics of local governments that scholars
have found to influence voter turnout in local elections. Chapter 3 provides an overview of early
voting and its impact on voter turnout in elections, and particularly municipal elections. Chapter 4
provides a thorough discussion on the methodology and data collection procedures used for this
study.
In Chapter 5, I develop and test my model. Using the data I have collected and controlling
for the key municipal variables indicated in the literature, I examine my hypothesis by employing
a cross-sectional time series analysis for the years 2001-2013. Since the State of Ohio implemented
early voting in 2006, this will be the interruption year. The observations will be aggregated to the
municipal level. I contend that while in-person early voting laws have not increased turnout in
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national or statewide elections, it has a significant positive impact on turnout in municipal elections
suggesting that municipalities have benefited the most from early voting laws.
Chapter 6 will summarize the findings and discuss their implications. I expect in-person
early voting to have a positive effect on voter turnout in municipal elections. These local
democracies are likely to be the greatest beneficiary of early voting laws. Identifying what
contextual factors of municipalities contribute to early voting in municipal elections will give
scholars a deeper understanding of how institutional and local contextual factors impact turnout in
municipal elections. Gaining a better understanding of how in-person early voting in particular
affects turnout in municipal elections is essential. As Election Day continuously transforms, it is
imperative we understand what impact election reforms have on political participation at all levels
of government.
In this introduction, I have illustrated the importance of local governments to the American
political system as well as the significance of local elections. In the next chapter, I provide a
comprehensive analysis on local governments and local elections in the United States. I pay
particular attention to the structures of local governments and how they impact political
participation. I further ground this work in the theories on local governments discussed above.
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CHAPTER 2
STRUCTURE MATTERS:
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES AND VOTER TURNOUT
Localities typically are thought of as ‘creatures of the state,’3 but in practice, they exercise
a significant amount of autonomy. That autonomy is a defining feature of the American political
system, and permits localities to make public policy choices that impact the daily lives of their
citizens. They determine where homes can be built, where and what businesses can operate within
their borders, as well as what services they provide to their residents. In turn, citizens participate
in local elections to hold elected officials accountable for their policy choices.
Local governments, since their inception, have been an avenues for individuals to practice
self-government and participate politics. This invites two assumptions: individuals have the right
to self-govern - an assumption that has broad support - and participation at the local level should
be promoted.
Promoting participation at the local level encompasses two streams of philosophical
debate: disagreement over what characteristic of local government create an optimal environment
for participation, and disagreement over who should participate at the local level. Which
characteristics of local government facilitate participation? One group argues that small,
homogenous republics are best. Another contends that large heterogeneous populations are more
effective. This debate continues today among scholars who study urban/local politics.

3

Justice Dillon in Atkins v. Kansas (1903) declared municipalities as “creatures of the state”
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At the local level, political participation is largely tied to their geographical environment4
(see Marschall 2010; Baybeck 2014). Huckfeldt (1979) theorized that participation was linked to
the status of one’s neighborhood. He found evidence supporting his claim. While Huckfeldt
empirically tested his theoretical claim, he was not the first to theorize that geographical
environment affects participation. During the nation’s founding, the Anti-Federalists and
Federalists quarreled over the optimal size for the newly created nation. Likewise Tocqueville
wrote about the relationship between local governments’ structure and participation among its
citizens. Early in America’s history, theories surrounding the importance of geographical context
and environment were present.
Exactly how geographical context influences participation is a debate that has yet to be
settled among scholars. Geographical context can be broken down into two sub-categories: local
context and institutional (or structural) context. Scholars who study local politics typically agree
that local context matters.5 Local contexts refers to the characteristics of localities, such as their
size and demographic composition. The philosophical disagreement among scholars is over what
characteristics create the optimal environment for political participation at the local level.
Jeffersonians contend that small, homogenous republics are best at cultivating participation.
Alternatively, others maintain that large, heterogeneous populations are better suited to promote
participation. Both schools of thought, however, signify that local context is important and does
influence political participation. Scholars have found statistically significant correlations between
local context and political participation (see Oliver 1999, 2000, 2001; Oliver and Ha 2007).

4

Individual factors, such as socioeconomic status, or mobilization also play a role in an individual participating in
politics, however, local context is an additional factor taken into account when examining local participation.
5
Some don’t necessarily agree that context matters. See King 1996.
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However, this centuries old debate continues today among scholars who study urban and/or local
politics (see Kelleher and Lowery 2004).
Much like local context, the importance of a local government’s institutional context is not
without contention. The disagreement here is over the impact of local government structures on
participation. These institutional structures include the type of government (i.e. mayor-council
versus council-manager) and the electoral structures (i.e. the timing of the election and method of
selection). As mentioned, Tocqueville, early in America’s history, commented on how local
government structure influenced local participation.
Who should participate at the local level? During the Progressive Era, reformers sought to
change the political, institutional, and electoral structures of local governments so that politics and
administration would be separate. The reformers claimed that only the elites should participate and
govern localities. Opponents of the reformers argued that there should be mass participation at the
local level. Yet, both sides believed that the structure of local government impacted who
participated (Welsh and Bledsoe 1988).
Scholars who study local and urban politics recognize the impact institutional structures
have on local participation. Local governments that adopted aspects of the reform measures, and
subsequently de-politicized local government, typically have lower turnout than localities that did
not adopt these measures (see Caren 2007; Wood 2002; Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Empirical
research demonstrates that these structures matter since they influence who participates. In turn,
who participates can effect which public policies are adopted and the overall direction of local
government. The political institutions of local governments have a profound impact on political
participation (Milner 2002).

29
Should local governments promote participation? Should there be mass participation or
participation by a select few? What form of local government best promotes participation? How
do the institutional and electoral structures of localities impact participation? In this chapter, I
address these questions. I begin by discussing the philosophies of local government focusing on
the debates over local and institutional contexts of localities. I examine the implications that both
the size and institutional structures have on local voter turnout. I then move to an overview of local
participation, focusing on why it is an important feature of American democracy. I conclude with
a discussion on how the structure of localities matter with regards to voter turnout. In future
chapters, I apply these concepts to my data. The purpose here is to give a comprehensive overview
of local governments and how their structures impact participation.
Philosophies of Local Government
The doctrine of the sovereignty of the people asserts that the people are the ultimate
authority. Therefore, the government derives its powers from the people. The Federalist Papers
support this distinction. In Federalist #46, the authors state that “the federal and state governments
are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people.” Even Jefferson (1993), an AntiFederalist, wrote, “I consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source of all
authority in that nation” (294). The sovereign, then, is the person, or a body of people. There is no
entity politically superior as the “people are the source of legal power and authority in the United
States” (Eaton 1900, 442). Thus, powers are reserved for the people unless they are delegated to
some other government entity.
Localism, advocated by Jefferson, underscores the right of localities to self-govern “as an
expression of the sovereignty of the individual, derived from the doctrine of the sovereignty of the
people” (Syed 1966, 5). People are the “only source of power” and this is most noticeable at the
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local level because it has the most “immediate effect” (Tocqueville 2003, 74). For Tocqueville,
this was an identifying feature of the American political system.
The autonomous nature of localities expects citizens to share in local policy decisions and
to participate in selecting decision makers through elections. For example, citizens should have
direct influence on determining public policy issues, such as park locations, trash collection, and
the quality of public schools. Citizens can participate and advance their policy stances on any of
these issues by attending meetings, voting, contacting their elected officials, etc. Arguably,
participation at the local level fosters an attachment to their community.
While advocates for both small and large local governments agree that the people are the
ultimate sovereign and have the right to self-govern, they disagree on the both the size and
composition of governments. Aristotle, the Anti-Federalists, and in particular, Thomas Jefferson,
argue that democracy would be most advantageous in small units of government. The Federalists,
and James Madison specifically, suggest that large, heterogeneous republics are better because
they protect public interest. The philosophical differences between these two sides are over the
features or characteristics of national government systems, yet have application to local
governments. While seemingly unimportant, these features have profound effects on political
participation at the local level.
Size and Demographic Composition of Local Government
The ideal size and composition of governmental units is a centuries old debate. Aristotle
suggests that governments should be comprised of small republics. These city-states should be
large enough for self-sufficiency, but small enough to foster a feeling of closeness between the
citizen and the government. This bond between the citizen and the government is created because
man holds office and takes part in the affairs of government. Holding elected positions, for
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Aristotle, was an essential aspect of citizenship. As an active participant in political affairs, men
would develop a deep attachment to the government system he is associated with.
When establishing the government system for the United States, the Anti-Federalists
reasoned that self-government should consist of a patchwork of small, limited, homogenous units.
In this type of government system, consensus could be reached more efficiently and conflict
avoided because the citizens would have common and shared interests. This was the means to good
governance. It was only through small, limited government that they could ensure self-government
and preserve liberty.
Conversely, the Federalists maintained that only in large republics with a strong
government could the evils that plagued governments (man’s own self-interest and factions) be
curtailed. Self-interest could only be prevented by establishing a system that could check it.
Factions were created when groups of men with the same interest united. A large republic could
overcome these ills because interests would be more varied, a larger number of individuals would
be represented, and it would extend over a geographically large territory. Through large
governments, both majority and minority rights could be secured and justice obtained.
The arguments between the Anti-Federalist and Federalists of the late 18th Century
predominately focused on national government systems. However, their normative arguments
have important implications for local governments. Do size and composition of a unit of
government influence participation? Should local governments be large and heterogeneous? Or
small and homogenous? While the arguments asserted by the Anti-Federalists and Federalists are
normative in nature, they continue to be debated, and empirically tested, by urban and local
government scholars. This section takes a deeper look at both of these philosophies and the
empirical evidence supporting each claim.
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Small, Homogeneous Localities Promote Participation
Building off of the Anti-Federalist arguments, Thomas Jefferson asserts that America
should be comprised of small, homogenous wards with yeoman farmers-the “chosen people of
God”-working the land and achieving their own destiny (Jefferson 1993, 259). The wards would
be small and numerous so that every citizen could participate in the affairs of that neighborhood.
Jefferson (1993) reasoned that every county should be divided into hundreds of wards because it
was the “little republics [that] would be the main strength of the great one” (Jefferson 1993, 554).
This, for Jefferson, was the only way the new country would survive.
Jefferson advocated for small ward republics because he believed they were the best way
to promote participation. For Jefferson, the principal role of government was to citizens could
participate “directly and personally” (Syed 1966). The ward system Jefferson idealized allowed
for maximum participation by citizens because it provided an opportunity for direct democracy,
which was the essence of republicanism (Syed 1966). For Jefferson, government became more
pure as it grew closer to the people; the ward system exemplified this (Syed 1966).
During his visit to the United States, Tocqueville observed town governments in New
England that promoted maximum participation and were a forum for direct democracy. Town
meetings were the primary way which Americans participated in governing their localities. The
freemen of the community would gather to discuss local affairs. A moderator would preside over
the meetings. Here, the townsmen would pass resolutions and elect or appoint individuals to their
governing boards. In doing so, they exercised democratic principles.
Tocqueville (2003) indicates that citizens participated in their local government because
they feel responsible for governing their community, thereby suggesting that the ideas of
participation and citizenship are closely related. When an individual becomes involved in local
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politics, they develop a sense of attachment to their community. Rousseau also indicates that
participation “increases the feeling among individual citizens that they ‘belong’ in their
community” (Pateman 1970, 27). Participation - a vital aspect of citizenship – creates a bond
between citizens and their community. This attachment is the basis of localism.
The Jeffersonian ideal has become part of American political tradition (Rourke 1964; Syed
1966). This can be seen two ways: normatively and empirically. Localism suggests ‘small is
beautiful.’ These beliefs suggests that small, homogenous government entities are better at
developing a meaningful understanding of citizenship, promote participation, increase interest in
politics, and increase political efficacy. In essence, "small localities facilitate participation because
of the shared values they foster in the ease of participation they afford" (Kelleher and Lowery
2004, 721-722).
Scholars have examined normative assumptions of small local governments. One of their
major claims is that small governments promote participation. Verba and Nie (1972), and more
recently Oliver (2000, 2001), found that participation is higher in smaller localities than large ones.
Oliver reasons that large local governments make civic action more difficult, which leads to a
decrease in civic activity.
Oliver’s findings provide empirical support as well as normative. Using data from the 1990
American Citizen Participation Study and the 1990 Census, Oliver (2000) discovered that the size
of a municipality has a profound effect on political participation. In particular, he found that
“people in smaller places are more civically involved" (Oliver 2000, 371). He attributes this to the
differences in social relationships and psychological orientations of citizens in larger and smaller
municipalities. He suggests that in larger localities there is less attachment because citizens are
less likely to know their neighbors, and be less socially connected. In essence, Oliver suggests that
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the lack of attachments within larger municipalities has an overall negative impact on political
participation.
By contrast, it has also been shown that the small localities promote civic attitudes, increase
interest in politics, and have higher levels of political efficacy. For instance, in their analysis,
Finifter and Abramson (1975) observed that small municipalities promote civic attitudes.
Similarly, Oliver and Ha (2007), when studying suburban communities, noticed individuals in
small suburbs are more engaged in local politics. Individuals in smaller localities also have a
greater sense of political efficacy because they have more in common with their neighbors (Oliver
2000).
Fittingly, Jefferson argued that large republics were not capable of offering the same
benefits that smaller republics could. He believed cities were akin to “sores” on the human body.
Like sores, cities weaken the Union. He reasoned that the smaller the locality, the more likely it
was to be democratic (Syed 1966). In short, smaller units of government were more effective at
addressing the needs and demands of its citizens, thereby making them more efficient at managing
local affairs and encouraging participation.
Large, Heterogeneous Localities Promote Participation
While never distinctly discussing localities, James Madison does assert that large,
heterogeneous populations are better at promoting democracy. In Federalist 10, Madison argues
that large republics are the only way to ensure that the will of the people will be protected. Large
republics offer more, and better, options for electing representatives of “fit” character because
there would be more candidates from which to choose. Because there would be more citizens
choosing representatives in large republics, it would be difficult for an “unworthy” candidate to
win would undergo greater scrutiny by a larger electorate. Large republics contain a greater variety
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of interests making it less probable for a majority to invalidate the rights of the minority. Simply
put, large republics curtail factions; and safeguard public interests and individual liberties.
Unlike Jefferson, Madison opposed ward republics. In Madison’s view of government,
representation is the epitome of republicanism not direct democracy (Syed 1966). Ward republics
permit factions because citizens have the same interests thereby creating local majorities. These
local majorities threatened the very essence of republicanism. For Madison, government should
separate itself from citizens through representation (Syed 1966). The more removed citizens were
from government, the more pure it became (Syed 1966).
While Madison’s writings focused on the national government, his arguments have found
a home in urban and local literature. It has been argued that larger is better because large,
heterogeneous municipalities foster participation (Kelleher and Lowery 2004). Normatively,
large, heterogeneous localities also often have more conflict over political issues because the
demographic composition is more diverse, therefore, interests are more varied. This conflict within
a community spurs citizens to mobilize either in support of or against the issue at hand. It is because
of this conflict, that large, heterogeneous localities have higher rates of political mobilization
(Kelleher & Lowery 2004).
Empirical evidence that supports this normative claim indicates a positive relationship
between large localities and participation. Milbrath (1965) suggests that the larger the community,
the higher the rate of political participation. Similarly, Fischer (1975) found that residents of larger
cities have a higher interest in politics. In relationship to turnout and the size of localities,
Kesselman (1966) observed that as the size of the community increases, turnout for national
elections increases.
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By contrast, Oliver (2000, 2001) finds a negative relationship between large local
governments and participation. However, scholars offer two primary reasons for this disparate
finding. The first reason is the complexity of large governments. Finifter and Abramson (1975)
suggest that lower participation occurs in larger municipalities because of the complex
bureaucracy associated with larger local governments. If the system is complex, the costs of
participation are high. If costs are high, participation tends to be low (Downs 1957).
The second reason for low participation in large localities is associated with the attachment
individuals establish with their locality. Fisher, (1975) and Verba and Nie (1972), suggest that in
large municipalities there is greater physical and psychological distance between citizens and
political officials. In a similar vein, Oliver (2000) states that “as cities size increases, people are
less likely to know their neighbors and less likely to have social contacts that are geographically
proximate" (370). Essentially Fisher, Verba, Nie, and Oliver all suggest that the size of the locality
shapes the connection citizens develop for their community.
Institutional Structures and Participation
Size and composition of governments while important are not the only points of contention
regarding local governments and participation. The institutional context of local governments
plays a key role in understanding local participation. Institutional contexts refers to “specific
institutional structures, rules and procedures, that formally or informally define relationships
among individuals and in turn influence individual behavior” (Johnson, Shively and Stein, 1999,
3). At the local level, this includes the structure of the locality (e.g. council-manager versus mayorcouncil) and the electoral rules that govern it (e.g. method of representation).
In his analysis of democracy in the United States, Tocqueville (2003) admired the high
levels of participation at the local level. He observed how the institutional structure of local
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governments influenced participation. Public duties of local governments were “numerous” and
“divided” among the citizens (Tocqueville 2003, Chapter 5). He reasoned that individuals were
aware of local matters and would partake in the decision-making process to address them.
Tocqueville (2003) believed that individuals were devoted to their local government because they
help run it (82). Local governments and the participation of their citizens were, for Tocqueville,
the reason democracy in America was so remarkable.
Local governments have undergone many changes since Tocqueville’s visit to the United
States. The reforms that transpired during the Progressive Reform Movement of the early 20th
Century had a sizable impact on local participation. Fittingly, during this movement, there was a
debate over the institutional, political, and electoral structures of local governments. Echoing
Tocqueville, both supporters and opponents of the reforms believed that institutional and electoral
structures of local government impacted political participation (Welsh and Bledsoe 1988, xiv). As
research indicates, the structure of governing institutions is a key factor in local electoral
participation (Sharp 2003; Hajnal and Lewis 2003).
The Reform Movement
The reform movement began between 1890 and 1930 and was closely linked to the
Progressive Movement. Largely due to the influx of immigrants, the population of the cities were
growing. Municipal governments were unable or opted not to provide basic services, which offered
an opportunity for political parties to intervene and fill the void. The result was the genesis of the
party machine and ultimately corruption-both in and out of local government.
Party machines controlled many local governments. The goal of the party machine was
simple: secure votes, win elections, and control local government. They achieved their goal by
offering social services, patronage, and favors to the urban residents, mainly the poor and new
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immigrants (Welch and Bledsoe 1988, Chapter 1; Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). These
services and favors could be offered because the party machine used their government connections
to obtain police protection, government contracts, and special privileges for businesses (Welch
and Bledsoe 1988, Chapter 1; Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). In turn, the recipients would
‘pay back’ the party by voting for those on the party ticket. The party machine included ethnic
groups, organized labor, blue-collar workers, and immigrants who were traditionally excluded
from the political process (Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). Many immigrants used their
involvement with the party machine to climb up the social ladder.
At the local level, the reformers sought to improve municipal government under the guise
of curtailing government corruption and creating a more efficient government. Their political ethos
focused on the idea that “public interest should prevail,” ‘politics’ was unacceptable, and that
municipal government should be run by those who were best qualified to manage public affairs
(Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). Supporters for local government reforms included
liberals, reporters, professors, and predominately upper-class, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant individuals
who sought to regain control of local government (Dye and MacManus 2012).
To achieve their goals, proponents of the reforms pushed for changes in the electoral and
institutional structures of local governments. They recruited educated, upper-class, typically
successful business owners to seek office and pushed for city managers (Dye and MacManus 2012,
Chapter 11). By having a council-manager form of government, reformers argued, localities could
separate the business of government from the politics of government, which would make it more
honest and less corrupt.
To ensure public interest would prevail, reformers aimed on altering the electoral system
in two ways. First, they proposed the elimination of political parties from the political process via
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a nonpartisan ballot (Dye and MacManus 2012, Chapter 11). A nonpartisan ballot removes any
form of party identification. Without party identification on the ballot, they reasoned, voters would
be able to make better decisions because they would think about the interests of the city as a whole
and not just the political interests asserted by the party machine. The second change to the electoral
system included at-large elections instead of district (or ward) elections (Dye and MacManus 2012,
Chapter 11). The reformers believed candidates in an at-large elections would appeal to the needs
of the entire city and not just the needs of a single district.
Opponents maintained that the changes to local government proposed by the reformers
were actually created to exclude certain groups from the political system. They claimed that the
structural changes professed by the reformers were a mechanism to decrease political power
among the groups traditionally excluded, but were included by the party machines (Burnham
1982). In particular, they claimed these reforms reduced the political power of immigrants and the
working class and increased political power among the elite (Burnham 1982; Welch and Bledsoe
1988).
“Both supporters and opponents to the reforms obviously believed that structures impact
the kinds of people elected to office, the way the political process works when decisions are being
made, and the nature of those decisions” (Welch and Bledsoe 1988, xiv). While opponents claimed
the reforms would, in essence, alienate certain groups from the political system, the reformers
maintained that the changes to the political, institutional, and electoral structures of localities
would produce a more honest, efficient, and effective government (Welch and Bledsoe 1988, xiii).
And, this would promote good governance and public policies that benefited the public as a whole.
The proposed structural changes to local governments artfully redefined who was included
in the electorate at the local level. Broadly speaking, the adoption of the reforms had a devastating
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effect on turnout in local elections. Scholars have consistently found that turnout is depressed in
localities that adopted the reforms (see Lineberry & Folwer 1967; Alford & Lee 1968; Bridges
1997; Karnig and Walter 1983; Wood 2002; Caren 2007). As Teixeira (1987) indicates, turnout
never reached the levels attained before the reforms. The lack of interest in politics and political
participation was directly related to the institutional structures put in place by reformers (Bridges
1997). A result of the reforms is a government system that is less responsive to elections (Lineberry
and Fowler 1967). The reform structures also diminish the ability for citizens to maintain
accountability of government (Sharp 2003).
According to Bridges (1997), reform governments create barriers to voting and
participation and insulate politicians and government from the demands of lower income and
ethnic groups. The findings produced by scholars who examine the effect of the reforms on
participation illustrate the importance of institutional structures. "It is clear that institutional
arrangements associated with "reform" government, such as at-large election of city council
members, nonpartisan elections, and the replacement of directly elected mayors with
professionally credentialed, appointed city managers, have come at a price” (Sharp 2003, 71).
It should be noted that not every local government adopted the structures advocated by the
reformers. These localities are commonly referred to as unreform cities. The local governments
that adopted reform policies often did so in a piecemeal fashion-adopting some policies but not
others. These localities are known as reform cities. Table 2.1 illustrates the diversity of municipal
administrative and electoral system as a result of the reforms. Today, these reforms are the
principal reason for the variation of local institutional and electoral structures found among
localities.
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The institutional structures of reform cities tend to have weak political organization
because they have adopted at least one of the following measures: nonpartisan elections, non
concurrent elections, at-large districts, and/or a council-manager form of government. Aside from
the lack of political organization by having a manager, there is likely an absence of a mayoral
candidate on the ballot. Therefore, it is difficult for citizens to ‘blame’ government failures on a
specific elected individual. In at-large district elections, voters are often selecting between
candidates they don’t know and/or have less knowledge about compared to candidates from their
own neighborhood or district. These factors coupled together minimize the ‘excitement’ of the
electoral process and negatively impact voter turnout.
On the other hand, unreform cities embrace features where political organization can occur
more easily. Features of unreform cities include partisan elections, single district elections, and/or
a mayor-council form of government. In contrast to reform cities, the electoral process in an
unreform city often is filled with excitement. Their elections include a mayor candidate, thereby
creating a high-profile race. Council member candidates tend to be from a single district, thus from
the neighborhood of the voters electing them. This creates higher levels of name recognition and
knowledge about the candidate. And, the party label is typically present in these elections as they
tend to be partisan elections. These factors increase the excitement of the electoral process, and in
so doing, increasing turnout at the polls.
These two types of local government structures tend to dominate the American landscape
and are the primary focus of this project. However, more recently, scholars have suggested that
local governments may be more dynamic than these two legal descriptions reveal. Frederickson,
Johnson, and Wood (2004) suggest that there has been an emergence of the adaptive city. There
are three types of adaptive cities: adaptive political, conciliated/fully adaptive, and adaptive
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Table 2.1 Percent Break Down of Municipal Forms of Government
Administrative Structure
Council-Manager
59%
Mayor-Council
33%
Other
8%
Electoral Structure
Partisan Elections
Non-Partisan Elections
At-Large Elections
District/Ward Elections
Combination of At-Large and District/Ward Elections

21%
80%
66%
17%
17%

* Source: IMCA 2011 Municipal Form of Government Survey

administrative (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004a; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood
2004b). Adaptive political municipalities have government structures that resemble mayor-council
municipalities, but have adopted various reforms that include structural characteristics of councilmanager municipalities (Frederickson and Johnson 2001; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood
2004a). Likewise, council-manager municipalities that have adopted some structural
characteristics of mayor-council municipalities are referred to as adapted administrative
municipalities (Frederickson and Johnson 2001; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004a). Finally
there is conciliated or fully adapted city, which is defined as having neither an exclusive separation
of powers model (i.e. mayor-council structure) nor a unity of powers model (i.e. council-manager
structure) (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004b). These conciliated or fully adapted
municipalities have a chief administrative officer, directly elected mayor, both district and at-large
council elections, and the mayor serves on council and either is full time or part time (Frederickson
and Johnson 2001; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004a, Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood
2004b).
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The Impact of the Reforms on Local Participation
As mentioned, research indicates that cities with reform structures have comparatively
lower voter turnout (Caren 2007; Welch & Bledsoe 1988; Bridges 1997; Oliver 2001; Oliver &
Ha 2007; Wood 2002). Among the various aspects of the reforms, three key features have been
shown to negatively affect voter turnout in municipal elections: nonpartisan elections, councilmanager form of government, and non concurrent elections (Wood 2002; Hajnal & Lewis 2003;
Karning and Walters 1983; Alford & Lee 1968).
Nonpartisan elections eliminated the party machine. By having a nonpartisan ballot, the
party affiliation is removed. Candidates running for office in a nonpartisan election run without a
party label for voters to identify with. For instance, the City of Oklahoma, both the mayor and city
council candidates run on a nonpartisan ballot. The primary election for mayor is held in March.
If no candidate receives a majority vote, then the top two vote getters run in a general election in
April. The general election would then declare the winner for the mayoral race. For the voter,
moving to a nonpartisan ballot means the party cue is removed, thereby increasing the costs of
voting (Karning and Walter 1983). When the costs of voting are high, turnout tends to be low
(Downs 1957).
Examining the impact of a nonpartisan ballot on turnout has mixed results. Early research
by Karning and Walter (1983) and Alford and Lee (1968) finds that nonpartisan elections have
lower turnout rates. More recently, scholars have found no significant difference in turnout rates
between partisan and nonpartisan ballots (Lublin and Tate 1995; Wood 2002) expect when the
elections are close (Caren 2007). The difference in findings is likely do to the statistical techniques
utilized by the authors; the latter scholars use regression analysis while the former group does not.
The more recent findings are also in line with research suggesting that party affiliation is not salient
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in local elections (Peterson 1981; Kaufmann 2007) and politics at the local level are more
allocative in nature (Kaufmann 2007).
Much like the nonpartisan ballot, holding non concurrent elections (elections held in odd
numbered years) increases the cost of voting. When local elections are prohibited from coinciding
with other major elections, such as a presidential election, they don’t receive as much attention
and have few resourced dedicated to voter turnout (Wood 2002; Hajnal and Lewis 2003). This in
turn results in lower voter turnout compared to local elections held concurrently with major
elections (i.e. presidential elections). If local elections were held at the same time as presidential
elections, it is estimated that turnout would increase by as much as 36 percent (Hajnal and Lewis
2003).
However, unlike research on the nonpartisan ballot, there is consensus on the impact of
non concurrent elections. Holding a local election non concurrently has consistently been shown
to reduce turnout (Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Caren 2007; Wood 2002). “Cities that hold elections
concurrently with state and national elections have about a 29 percent higher voter turnout than
cities who do not hold concurrent city elections” (Wood 2002, 228). The timing of an election,
more than any other institutional factor, has the largest negative impact on voter turnout (Caren
2007; Wood 2002).
Another aspect of the reforms was the introduction of council-manager form of
government. Research has frequently shown that the council-manager form of government
decreases turnout (Karning and Walter 1983; Alford and Lee 1968; Wood 2002; Hajnal and Lewis
2003). And, municipalities with a mayor-council form of government have higher turnout rates
(Caren 2007; Oliver 2001).
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Previous scholarship has indicated that the laws governing local governments’ institutional
and electoral structures impact participation, specifically voter turnout. Table 2.2 provides a
summary of local government structures and their influence local voter turnout. Typically, reform
cities have a lower turnout than unreform cities suggesting that institutional and electoral structures
play a meaningful role in local participation. Participants influence the direction of local public
policies, the composition of governing bodies, and who benefits from the public policies.
The debate over the reforms focused on two important features of democracy:
representation and participation. The question of representation centered on who should be
represented and which method of representation should be utilized (Welch and Bledsoe1988;
Hayes 1964). With regards to participation, and more imperative to this project, the question
became who should participate in local affairs? Should the local political system encourage mass
participation? Or should it only encourage those who were educated and had a stake in local
government to participate? In short, should electoral participation encompass the masses or a select
few? This debate continues among scholars today and is the subject of the next section.
Local Participation-Does It Really Matter?
As Tocqueville (2003) indicates, high participation in local affairs is a distinctive and
important aspect of the American political system. He applauded the high rates of participation
found among localities. Key aspects of a democracy are the concepts of consent and legitimacy.
Tocqueville reasoned that individuals participated in the decision-making process of local
government because it was a way to consent and provide legitimacy to the local governing entity.
In the New England towns, Tocqueville observers how the townsmen came together to discuss
local matters. Being an active participant in the decision making process, an individual exerts their
right to be heard. Since those affected by the decision have been given a chance to be heard, the
outcome of the decision is perceived as legitimate.
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Table 2.2 Local Government Structures and Expectations of Local Voter Turnout
Low Voter Turnout Expected When:
High Voter Turnout Expected When:
Nonpartisan electoral system is used

Partisan
elections,
competitive

Council-Manager from of Government

Mayor-Council from of Government

especially

when

Conduct Elections in Odd Numbered Years Conduct Elections in Even Numbered Years
Homogenous Population

Heterogeneous Population

*Adopted from Dye and MacManus 2012

While Tocqueville paints a splendid picture of participation at the local level, not all
scholars agree that high participation is necessary for a healthy democracy. What level of
participation should be desired is a reoccurring debate. How much participation is necessary? In a
democracy, are high levels of turnout needed? Or is it acceptable for a democracy to have low
levels of turnout?
Lower Participation is Best
Some scholars argue that low levels of participation is an indicator for satisfaction and
stability in a democracy (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Weisberg and Grofman 1981).
Low levels of participation creates stability within the political system and limits conflict. It
indicates that citizens are content with public policies and elected officials. In their study of voter
alienation, satisfaction and indifference, Weisberg and Grofman (1981) found that voters abstain
from voting if they like both candidates. In other words, candidate satisfaction suppresses overall
turnout (Weisberg and Grofman 1981).
In a local political context, voters can use either exit or voice (Hirschman 1970). Exit is
escaping from the undesired condition while voice involves an attempt to change the condition
(Hirschman 1970). At the local level, an individual could opt to exit thereby moving to a new
locality for better services, such as a better school system. However, the ability for individuals to
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exit one locality in favor for another is typically not a feasible option. Moving costs money, which
not everyone has. If one cannot utilize exit, they turn to voice (Hirschman 1970).
If a voter becomes dissatisfied, they can use their ‘voice’ and vote against policies and
candidates with whom they disagree (Hirschman 1970; Hirschman 1980). Voice can mean
individual voice, such as calling a local official and complaining, or collective voice, where voters
as a whole can participate by voting, marching, protesting, etc. (Dowding and John 2008).
Unsatisfied voters can utilize the collective voice and engage in protests, marches or riots.
These are “political explosions” that are sudden and occur when there is an intense preference for
a certain public policy (Hirschman 1980). In Dowding and John’s (2008) study of UK residents
and public service satisfaction, they found that dissatisfied individuals were more likely to vote
and engage in other collective participation forms (i.e. marches). “The discontented customers or
members could become so harassing that their protests would at some point hinder rather than
help” (Hirschman 1980, 31) suggesting that sharp increase in participation may lead to more
conflict than a democracy can handle.
Accordingly, some citizens are highly active, some are not, and some fall somewhere in
the middle (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954). This distribution of political activity works
because the political system is threatened when too many individuals participate. If individuals do
not participate normally, they may not have a commitment to democratic values, therefore, when
these individuals participate, they may be prone to support more authoritarian solutions to societal
problems (Hudson 2010). Thus, political apathy and inactivity make the political system more
stable since high levels of participation would collapse the political system (Berelson, Lazarsfeld
and McPhee 1954).
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Higher Participation is Best
Alternatively, low participation can also be a sign of an unhealthy democracy. This school
of thought claims high levels of participation are needed because it confers legitimacy of a political
system, provides a mandate to govern, offers control over and accountability of elected officials,
and reduces the bias in policy outcomes. Voter turnout is a widely used approach of establishing
the legitimacy of the political system (Clark and Krebs 2012).
High levels of participation signify that the newly elected governing body has a mandate
to govern and provides legitimacy to the political system (Dahl 1956). If voter turnout is low, it
may call into question the legitimacy of a given political system. For instance, Wilks-Heeg and
Blick (2009) suggest that turnout in local elections is too low to offer adequate legitimacy to their
political systems. By having low turnout, it is difficult to argue that citizens have a reasonable
degree of accountability over their elected officials. Additionally, low voter turnout creates
difficulty in declaring that election results are an indicator of the citizens’ policy preferences.
Low voter turnout also makes it harder to ensure accountability of elected officials.
Newton’s (1976) study illustrates just how sensitive elected officials are to constituents’
preferences. In an English city, local officials kept rent down due to fear of being voted out of
office when housing was a local campaign issue (Newton 1976). The threat of being voted out
helps ensure that elected officials adhere to their campaign mandates (Powell 2000) and thereby
making the elected official more responsive to constituents’ preferences (Clark and Krebs 2012).
High participation ensures that public policies will reflect the will of the people and not the
interests of a select few (Hudson 2010). As Lijphart (1997) points out, “unequal participation spells
unequal influence” (1). Voters and non-voters are different: voters tend to be better educated and
have higher incomes than non-voters (Clark and Krebs 2012). If only a select few are participating,
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policies tend to favor the participating groups, which subsequently forms a bias in public policies.
Those who don’t (or can’t) participate fail to have their voices heard. “When disadvantage groups
fail to vote, local officials are more likely to be unresponsive to their concerns” (Hajnal 2010, 139).
Berry, Portney, and Thomson (1993) found that citizens in cities with citywide programs designed
to give neighborhood organizations a role in the local policy process were more likely to feel that
government was responsive to their needs. Participation, then, is the vehicle to obtain the outcomes
desired from government. Scholars have found that with high turnout, the bias of public policies
are fairly low (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Mahler 2008).
This view of democracy also argues that participation teaches individuals how to be good
citizens. If individuals practice democracy through voting, it allows them to learn about the
political system, the issues and matters affecting society, and creates awareness of their fellow
man’s concerns. Through participation, individuals can understand what the public good is. Local
governments provide a forum for individuals to learn these democratic values. This idea is
discussed further in the next section.
Participation at the Local Level
Engaging in participation at the local level has three principal consequences. As Mill and
others note, participation at the local level is paramount because it is where the individual learns
about democracy and democratic values. Mill (1971) suggests that local governments are “schools
of democracy.” Localities provide a myriad of opportunities for participation and foster an
understanding of democratic values. Practicing participation at the local level, Mill (1963) argues,
is the only way “the people will ever learn how to exercise it on a larger scale” (186).
As citizens participate more frequently at the local level, they gain a democratic education that
makes it easier to participate in the future and at other levels. “Participation develops and fosters
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the very qualities necessary for it; the more individuals participate, the better able they become to
do so” (Pateman 1970, 42-43). Participation is expected, according to Bentham and Mill, since
citizens are assumed to be “interested in politics because it was in his best interest to be so”
(Pateman 1970, 19).
For Mill, understanding democracy and participation are instrumental for a healthy
democracy. The democratic education citizens receive through participation at the local level helps
prevent tyranny. Conventional wisdom acknowledges that the Founders believed individuals
would seek their own self-interest both in and out of government. To prevent tyranny, they
decentralized power. The decentralization found in the American political system provides citizens
the opportunity to practice democracy at many levels, beginning primarily at the local level. The
independence granted to local governments prevents despotism because “a people who had not
learned to use freedom in small concerns would not know how to use it in great affairs of the State”
(Syed 1966, 31). Through participation in local government, citizens learn about democracy,
practice it on a small scale, and are then able to exercise it at the state and federal levels. The
outcome is a nation that practices democracy at all government levels.
Second, Mill and Bentham argue that participation at the local level is the key to good
governance. Mill and Bentham maintain that “participation of the people has a very narrow
function; it ensures that good government… is achieved through the sanction of loss of office”
(Pateman 1970, 19). Elections are the mechanisms employed by citizens to ensure that the will of
the people is attained. By participating in elections, Mill and Bentham reason, the “private interests
of each citizen [are] protected” (Pateman 1970, 20). Similarly, Rousseau views participation as the
means to ensuring “freedom to the individual by enabling him to be (and remain) his own master”
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(Pateman 1970, 26). Because of the equality6 in participation and the ability to be governed, man
“remains master of his own affairs” and only surrenders that ability when his actions cause
“damage” to “society” (Tocqueville 2003, 78). “The participatory process ensures that although
no man, or group, is master of another, all are equally dependent on each other and equally subject
to the law” (Pateman 1970, 27).
Mill, Bentham, Rousseau, and Tocqueville suggest there is a protective function in
participation. It protects individual freedom and curtails individual self-interest. The power
conferred to local governments is decentralized among its institutions. Localities “diversify the
duties” of government (Tocqueville 2003, 81). In doing so, they “share” local “authority among a
large number of citizens” (Tocqueville 2003, 81). When individuals participate at the local level,
they do so to protect their own private interests (Tocqueville 2003). However, these interests are
reduced because “he [man] views the township as a strong, free social body of which he is part
and which merits the care he devotes to its management” (Tocqueville 2003, 80). Citizens do what
is best for the community as a whole because their survival depends on it. The decentralization of
power within local government ensures that individual freedom is maintained and self-interests
are minimized.
Finally, participation at the local level creates a sense of belonging or attachment to their
community. Rousseau indicates that participation “increases the feeling among individual citizens
that they ‘belong’ in their community” (Pateman 1970, 27). There is equality in participation: one
man, one vote. Voting booths do not differentiate between a rich person’s vote and a poor person’s
vote. At the voting booth, all citizens of the community are equal. The experience of participating

6

Equality here means one man, one vote
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in the decision-making process of the locality, by any means, attaches the individual to the
community.
Governing Localities: Local Elections and Participation
The impact of decisions made by government varies depending on the level of government
making the decision. Decisions made by the national government do not necessarily have the same
immediate impact compared to decision made at the local level. For example, national and even
state policy on abortion only becomes applicable to an individual’s daily life if they or their partner
are pregnant. FDA regulations impact pharmaceutical companies and other food and drug
manufactures directly; a secondary impact might be felt by the individual if they are a consumer
of a product offered by a manufacture that must comply with FDA regulations.
On the other hand, decisions made at the local level directly impact the daily lives of
citizens. Tocqueville (2003) suggests this is because decisions made by local governments are “at
the center of everyday affairs” (81). Issues such as trash collection, library and park locations,
water and sewer maintenance, property tax rates, mosquito abatement, and the quality of public
schools are all matters that are debated and decided at the local level. The impact of these decisions
has a more immediate effect. For instance, citizens know when their trash has not been picked up
or if their school district eliminates teaching positions.
Additionally, the nature of policy decision making of localities is “often a zero-sum game”
(Kaufmann 2007) meaning a gain for one group/project/entity is a loss for another. Since local
politics tends to be a zero-sum game, the trade-offs of policies tend to be more apparent (Kaufmann
2007). For example, if a tax levy for a public school fails, it could mean a layoff of teachers,
reduced extra-circular activities, and/or have no buses running for that school year. A failed
property tax increase could lead to less police and fire protection or the closing of parks and/or
libraries. For that reason, the ability to influence local government decision making is paramount.
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The American Electoral System: An Overview
A primary way to participate and influence government is through elections. Elections
ensure that elected officials are held accountable and authorize citizens to remain in control of
their government. Elected officials are those who are directly elected by the eligible voters. In the
United States, voters elect 513,658 individuals to public office (U.S. Department of Commerce
1992). The vast majority of these elected officials, however, are not elected to federal or even state
office. Ninety-six percent of all elected officials are elected to local offices (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1992). Table 2.3 illustrates just how many elected officials there are within the United
States, and in particular, local governments.
Table 2.3 Number of Elected Officials in U.S. by Government Unit
Government Unit
Total Number of Elected Officials
United States
513,200
Federal Government
542
State Governments
18,828
Local Governments
493,830
General-Purpose
Governments
County
Sub-County
Municipal
Town/Township

58,818
262,489
135,531
126,958

Special-Purpose
School District
Special District

88,434
84,089

*Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 1992 Census of Governments

The sheer number of local elected officials suggests that there are a considerable number
of elections to fill these positions. Broadly speaking, local elections include elections for counties,
municipalities, towns/townships, school boards, and special districts7. Overall, there are 89,527

7

This is not a compressive list of all local elections.
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government entities within the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). Collectively, local
governments comprise 89,476, or 99 percent, of those governmental entities. These local
government entities tend to hold elections for their respective governing bodies. Table 2.4 breaks
down the number of local government entities found in the United States. Since local elections
tend to be held often, there is a larger number of observations for scholars to better understand
political behavior at the local level. Nonetheless local elections have been overlooked by scholars
(Clark and Krebs 2012; Marschall 2010).
More specifically for this project, local governments refers to municipal governments.
Recall that municipal governments are sub-governments under the broader classification of
general-purpose governments. Of the 89,476 local governments found in the United States, 19,492,
or 21 percent, are municipalities (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The number of municipal
governments found within a state range from 1 to 1,299 (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). At least one
municipality can be found in every state.
Table 2.4 Number of Local Governments in U.S. by Category
General Purpose Governments
Special Purpose Governments
Counties
3,031 Special Districts
Municipalities
19,522 School Districts
Towns/Townships
16,364
Total
38,917 Total

37,203
12,884
50,087

* Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2012

Municipal governments have an elected governing body to administer services and make
decisions on local matters. In the State of Ohio, there are 938 municipal governments (U.S. Census
Bureau 2012). Municipal boards or councils in Ohio have at least six elected members but no more
than 17 elected members (Ohio Revised Code 731.01 and 731.09)8. Do the math, the State of Ohio

8

The number is dependent on the size of the municipality. Municipalities can also alter their number of elected
councilmen per a ballot initiative.
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has anywhere from 5,628 to 15,946 elected officials just to manage the 938 municipal
governments.
Types of Elections
There are different types of elections within the United States. First there are general
elections-where the person that is elected holds office. General elections are conducted for federal,
state, and local offices. Presidential elections occur every four years in November and falling on
even numbered years. Midterm elections are held every two years after the quadrennial election of
president also in the month of November. State elections include statewide offices, such as
governor, secretary of state, and state legislators. Only four states hold elections for their state
assemblies in odd years (National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)).9 And, just six states
hold their gubernatorial elections in odd years (National Governors Association)10. The majority
of state elections are held in even numbered years thereby falling concurrently with either
presidential or midterm elections. Local elections broadly encompasses all sub-state elections
including but not limited to city councils, county commissions, mayors, school boards, township
officials, and special district officials. Unlike federal and most state elections, local elections tend
to take place in odd numbered years (non-concurrent). The International City/County Management
Association (ICMA) (2002), indicates that 77 percent of municipalities hold their elections nonconcurrently.
In addition to general elections, there are also primary and special elections. Primary
elections are held to determine which candidate will represent each political party in a general
election. It is not uncommon to have a primary election for president, U.S. Senators, U.S.
Representatives, mayors, governors, etc. There are also special elections that can occur within a

9

New Jersey, Virginia, Louisiana, Mississippi
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, West Virginia, New Jersey, Virginia

10
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state or locality. Special elections can be held to fill a vacant seat, or for ballot issues, such as
mileage proposals. In 2013, there were 16 special elections to fill state legislative vacancies
(NCSL). Primary and special elections add to the sheer number of elections conducted in the
United States.
Given the large quantity of elections held in the United States, some voters have the
opportunity to cast a ballot every year, such as voters in the State of Ohio. Voters in Ohio, like
those in other states, elect a president every four years and a congressman every two years. Both
of these federal general elections occur in even numbered years and in November, the traditional
month to hold elections. In addition to federal elections, Ohioans elect statewide officers- governor
and lieutenant governor, secretary of state, auditor of state, treasurer of state, and attorney generaland county officers in even years that fall non-concurrently with presidential election years (e.g.
2010, 2014, and 2018). In odd numbered years, voters in Ohio elect municipal officers, including
city councilmen and mayors, school board officials, special district officers, and township officers.
For voters living in the State of Ohio, every year they have the opportunity to cast a ballot in a
general election.
Local Elections Are Different
To this point, the discussion has highlighted the nuances of the American electoral system.
But, there are fundamental differences between federal and local elections.
The most notable difference is the timing of local elections. Unlike the federal government,
where the time of the election is set for all federal elections, local governments have no set time
or method that applies to all localities. Local elections are often held at different times of the year
than national or statewide elections. As Marschall (2010) explains, only 22.6 percent of municipal
governments held elections concurrently leaving 77.4 percent of municipal government to hold
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elections non-currently.11 For instance, voters in the cities of Birmingham, Alabama; Apache
Junction Arizona; and North Miami, Florida all elected their mayors in odd numbered years.12
This difference has a significant impact on voter turnout. Holding elections nonconcurrently is a primary reason for low voter turnout at the local level (Wood 2002; Hajnal and
Lewis 2003). If local elections are held concurrently with presidential elections, it is estimated that
turnout in local elections would increase by as much as 29 percent (Wood 2002). "Participation
in local elections depends critically on the timing of those elections" (Hajnal and Lewis 2003,
656).
Additionally, there are differences in the method of selection are different between federal
and local elections. First is whether candidates have their party identification on the ballot. In nonpartisan elections, candidates seek office without a party label on the ballot whereas partisan
elections provide candidates with a party label on the ballot. In federal elections, the candidate
runs with a party label-Republican, Democrat, Independent, etc. During a federal election, political
parties mobilize voters, provide the candidate with a party label, and align themselves government
services and programs that appeal to their base. In many local elections, the party label is absent.
For instance, 77 percent of municipalities and 89 percent of school boards have non-partisan
elections (ICMA 2002; Hess 2002). Recent scholarship indicates that there is no significant
difference in turnout rates between partisan and nonpartisan ballots (Lublin and Tate 1995; Wood
2002) expect when the elections are close (Caren 2007) These findings are in line with research
suggesting that party affiliation is not salient in local elections (Peterson 1981; Kaufmann 2007)
and politics at the local level are more allocative in nature (Kaufmann 2007).

11

This also includes municipalities that hold elections in both odd and even years
City of Birmingham, Alabama who elected their mayor in October of 2013. In March of 2013, voters in Apache
Junction, Arizona elected their mayor. The City of North Miami held its election for mayor in May of 2011.
12
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Secondly, the type of district is different between local and federal elections. At the local
level, municipalities have either single member district or an at-large district. Single member
districts are similar to Congressional districts in that the candidates are elected by voters of
particular district or ward, and the candidate represents that district or ward while in office. In atlarge districts, voters across the municipality as a whole elect candidates who will represent the
entire city, not a particular district. As noted in Table 2.1, 66 percent of localities elect their
governing boards through at-large elections while 17 percent hold single-district elections. This is
a unique feature of local governments. Using an at-large system of electing public officials versus
a single-member district has also been shown to have a negative impact on voter turnout in
municipal elections (Hajnal and Lewis 2003), however, this finding should be used with caution
as the number of single member districts in the study was small.
Finally, the institutional structure of local governments are different from those found at
the state and national level. All fifty states have an executive (governor) and a legislative body.
The national government has an executive (president) and a legislative body. When political
systems have an executive, voters have someone to blame when times are tough and reward when
times are good. In municipal governments, the executive (mayor) is often absent since the majority
of municipalities have council-manager systems. In a council-manager form of government, the
municipal government has a manager to handle administrative matters. Alternatively, in a mayorcouncil form of government, the municipal government has a mayor, which generally makes
executive decisions. Research has consistently shown that the council-manager form of
government decreases turnout (Karning and Walter 1983; Alford and Lee 1968; Wood 2002;
Hajnal and Lewis 2003) while municipalities with a mayor-council form of government have
higher turnout rates (Caren 2007; Oliver 2001). In council-manager systems, voters have a difficult
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time determining who to blame for poor performance or who to reward for good performance. The
lack of an executive in many localities creates a distinctive election dynamic.
Participation in Local Elections
For Tocqueville (2003), local elections were significant because it was where citizens
learned to govern by seeking opportunities to help run local government (82). Tocqueville suggests
that local elections are essential to American democracy for two reasons. First, local elections
involve citizens because they provide many participatory opportunities. Local elections are held
regularly and frequently. As a result, local elections are a mechanism utilized by citizens to manage
those who are elected. Casting a ballot in a local election is one method for citizens to assert their
policy preferences and allow their voices to be heard.
Second, local elections are the way in which citizens govern their locality. It is at the ballot
box that citizens hold elected officials accountable for their decisions while in office.
Consequently, who wins at the ballot box directly alters or sustains the composition of local
governing boards and what public policies are pursued. In a local setting, this has substantial
consequences as the public policies determine what services are provided as well as the quality of
those services. These service choices have a direct effect on a citizen’s daily life. The act of voting,
then, is the primary method of influencing local government.
Local Campaigns
Most municipal elections tend to be low-stimulus elections thereby often having lower
turnout rates than national and statewide elections. Local campaigns tend not to receive the same
amount of media coverage as state or national elections. The media acts as an intermediary between
the people and politics. It can be used, for instance, to discuss issues and increase name recognition
of candidates. Media buys are expensive and candidates would need to have the necessary funds
to run a media campaign. At the local level, even if the candidate had enough in his war chest to

60
launch a media campaign, it would be fruitless since media markets often cross the geographical
boundaries of a locality (Welsh and Bledsoe 1988). In local elections, especially those with singlemember districts, the media buy would be large compared to the district (Welsh and Bledsoe 1988).
For national elections, votes do not necessarily need to be abreast of the national issues,
they can use the candidates’ party affiliation as a cue to determine who they vote for. This dynamic
is not the same in local elections. The party affiliation for candidates is often absent in local
elections, and issues tend to matter more. The issues at the local level are “smaller in number, less
complicated, and more proximate than are issues at the national level” (Kaufmann 2007, 19). For
Americans, “the role of their local government is to maintain or enhance their immediate quality
of life, to provide necessary services” (Kaufmann 2007, 18-19). Consequently, local campaigns
tend to focus on the ‘who gets what’ and at the expense of whom. The emphasis of local campaigns
is on the outputs of local government decisions. Debates in local campaigns are over parks, police
and fire protection, garbage collection, and misquote abatement. The distribution of these services
(or lack thereof) and the benefits they entail can create conflict during an election making the
issues more salient than other more typical factors, such as party affiliation.
This, coupled with the zero-sum nature of local politics makes the allocation of local
resources more relevant in local campaigns. It also makes the politics of “place” more common. It
is not unusual for there to be divisions in the electorate between the east or west side of a locality
or between the business community and residents. This makes electoral coalitions an important
part in winning local elections.
Turnout in Local Elections
Scholars, when examining local elections, have consistently concluded that turnout in local
elections is low (Bullock 1990; Verba et al 1995; Sharp 2003). At the national level, 55-60 percent
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of eligible voters will cast a ballot while only 25-35 percent cast a ballot in local elections (Dye
and MacManus 2012). In Caren’s (2007) analysis, the average turnout for municipal elections is
27 percent. This begs the question: why is turnout in local elections so low?
In the previous sections, I have offered some explanations for this. I have illustrated how
local elections are different than national elections. In local elections, eligible voters are inundated
with a variety of additional complexities in order to cast a ballot. These difficulties - existing only
at the local level - consequently increase the cost of voting and the burden placed on the voter.
I have indicated that the institutional structure of local governments influences turnout.
There are three particular electoral structures that are unique to localities that greatly impact
elections. First is the timing of elections. The timing of elections is the main reason for low voter
turnout (Wood 2002; Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Hajnal and Lewis (2003) argue that by holding
local elections concurrently, it would “essentially double voter turnout” (661). Turnout is low
when held non concurrently because the public tends to pay less attention to it and fewer resources
are dedicated to turnout efforts (Hajnal and Lewis 2003).
Second is the method of selection-using at-large districts or single member districts to elect
council members. The method of selection has been found to impact minority representation in
local legislative bodies (Marschall 2010). Using a nonpartisan ballot also affects local elections.
Conducting nonpartisan elections appears to diminish voter turnout when the elections are close
(Caren 2007). The electoral structures of localities are important because they alter the costs and
benefits of voting. Changing the costs and benefits of voting has significant repercussions with
respect to who votes and who wins.
Aside from the electoral structures of local elections, the institutional structure of local
governments can negatively impact voter turnout. There is consensus in urban literature that
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localities with a council-manager form of government have lower turnout (Karning and Walter
1983; Alford and Lee 1968; Wood 2002; Hajnal and Lewis 2003). This is especially prevalent in
non concurrent elections (Hajnal & Lewis 2003).
It is apparent that the structures of local governments influence participation within them.
In particular, the electoral structures of localities have a negative impact on voter turnout. The
electoral structures of the reforms are a primary area of study among scholars. However, local
governments have another electoral structure that has yet to be full examined. Early voting laws
are an electoral reform. They were primarily adopted as a tool to increase turnout. While early
voting is a state policy, localities must adhere to it. How has this electoral reform impacted local
participation? What are the implications of early voting laws on voter turnout?
In the following chapter, I discuss the impact of electoral reforms on political participation.
I focus mainly on early voting laws and its effect on voter turnout. However, these analyses are
limited to primarily national and statewide elections as research on the impact of early voting laws
on local governments has been understudied. In future chapters, I examine the influence of early
voting laws on voter turnout in local elections.
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CHAPTER 3
ELECTION LAWS AND VOTER TURNOUT

American elections are legendary for low voter turnout. In presidential elections, turnout
exceeds just half of the voting age population (Martinez 2010; Franklin and Weber 2010), and in
midterm elections, turnout is far worse. Local elections, such as but not limited to elections for
county commissioners, city councilmen, mayors, school boards, special districts, and/or township
boards, have awful voter turnout (Bullock 1990; Verba et al. 1995; Sharp 2003).
Scholars have spent decades trying to understand why American elections have such low
voter turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira 1987;
Franklin 2002). The literature on voter turnout offers a few explanations, one of which is that the
legal rules, or election laws, governing elections have a significant influence on voter turnout13
(Rusk 1970; Converse 1972, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira
1987). Altering those legal rules can have a positive or negative impact on turnout. This chapter
focuses on how the legal rules, or elections laws, influence turnout in American elections.
Election laws are policy interventions that governments can adopt to increase, or decrease,
voter turnout. This chapter is not exhaustive, but rather highlights the impact of recent federal and
state election laws on voter turnout. In particular, I discuss early voting, a specific type of election
law, which alters the timing of elections by extending the number of days a voter can cast a ballot.
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Four factors have been identified that significantly affect voter turnout in American elections: 1) legal factors
(Rusk 1970; Converse 1972, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira 1987) 2)
psychological factors (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Campbell 1979; Clotfelter and Prysby 1980),
3) personal/demographic factors (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba and Nie 1972; Rosenstone and Hansen
1993; Brody 1978; Cassel and Hill 1981; Abramson and Aldrich 82), and 4) mobilization (Burnham 1982;
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).
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Assuming high participation in American elections is good and desired in a democracy, low voter
turnout in local elections is particularly concerning. Early voting laws may be a public policy
solution that can increase voter turnout in local elections by alleviating the burdens of voting.
While there are a variety of early voting laws, I focus on in-person early voting laws. I hypothesize
that in-person early voting has a significant positive influence on voter turnout in municipal
elections. This suggests early voting laws benefit local democracies the most.
Election Laws
Election laws regulate how elections are administered and define the structures of the
electoral system. Electoral structures influence who votes (turnout), when they vote (timing of
elections), how they vote (method of voting), how the votes cast are translated into legislative seats
(method of selection), and, in the end, the overall direction of public policies. Since the voting
process in the United States is twofold14, election laws also include registration laws, as they have
a substantial impact on who votes.
The federal and state governments share the responsibility of elections in the United States.
The Constitution sets the date for federal offices (the President and Congress). Both the president
and members of Congress are elected the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of even
years. States have the authority to determine the time, place, and manner of elections for federal
offices. This produces different rules (laws) for governing elections. For instance, each state has
the power to determine residency requirements, the time period for both registration and voting,
and the location of polling stations. The result is an assortment of election laws adopted by the
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The first step is to register to vote. The second is to actually vote.
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states creating a mixture of rules and regulations to govern elections. Table 3.1 illustrates the
diversity of election laws found among the states.
There are three components of state elections laws: year, place and manner. The year (odd
or even numbered) includes the month the election is held and the length of the voting period.
Place refers to the location(s) where an individual can cast a ballot (i.e. location of polling station).
The manner of elections often refers to how the elections will be conducted (i.e. type of ballots).
State laws regarding time, place, and manner of elections have a significant effect on voter
turnout. For example, with regards to the timing of elections, those held non-concurrently with
higher offices have lower turnout (Berry and Gerson 2010). Polling stations located in
nontraditional places, such as supermarkets, marginally increase turnout (Stein and Garcia-Monet
1997). Likewise, proximity to the voting site matters. The further away a voter lives from a polling
station or early voting site, the more likely the individual will become a nonvoter (Dyck and
Gimpel 2005). However, the manner of elections can have a positive impact on turnout, as is the
case with an all-mail system. Conducting elections with an all-mail system increases turnout by as
much as 10 percent (Southwell and Burchett 2000). While place and manner of elections are
important, this project focuses on the election laws that determine the timing of elections.
Timing of Local Elections
The timing of federal elections is set and does not vary across the states. According to the
Constitution, federal elections are held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November.
This creates consistency for federal elections across states. For local elections, states have the
authority to determine what day and what month elections are held. The result is a variety of
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Table 3.1 Elections Laws and Number of State Adoptions
Election Law
Number of States with Law
Photo ID Law (requires picture ID)
18
Photo ID Law (photo not required, just ID) 19
Early Voting Law*
33
No Excuse Absentee Law*
28
Excuse Required Absentee Law
21
Permanent Absentee Law*
8
Vote by Mail
2
Pre-registration (for those under 18)*
23
Same Day Registration*
12
Online Voter Registration
19
Limited Online Voter Registration
5
Straight Ticket Voting
14
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 2013 * Includes the District of Columbia in Totals

days and months which local elections are held across the country. Since localities are “creatures
of the state,” the states determine when localities can conduct their elections. For instance, the
State of Connecticut gives localities two options: the first Monday in May or the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in November (Berry and Gerson 2010). In Ohio, state law requires all
general elections to be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November (R.C. 3501).
Louisiana’s municipal and ward general elections not held concurrently with a gubernatorial or
congressional election are conducted on the fourth Saturday in February or the fourth Saturday in
April (Berry and Gersen 2010)15. In California, municipal elections are held primarily in March,
April or June (Berry and Gersen 2010). The variation in the timing of local elections emphasizes
the piecemeal policies that govern timing of local elections.
The majority of states conduct their elections in even numbered years. Only New Jersey,
Virginia, Louisiana, and Mississippi hold election for state offices, such as governor and state
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The month of the general election depends on when the primary was held. If the primary was in February, then
general election is also in February; primaries held in April have their general elections held in April

67
legislative bodies, in odd numbered years (non concurrently) (National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL)).
Since there is no central database for local elections in the United States, it is difficult to
determine exactly how many localities conduct elections in odd versus even years. A survey by
International City/Council Management Association (ICMA) (2002) indicates that only 22.6
percent of municipalities hold their elections in even years (concurrently with federal offices)
while 77.4 percent conduct their elections in either odd years or in both odd and even years. For
instance, the State of Connecticut mandates that local officers be elected in odd numbered years
(Berry and Gerson 2010) while the State of Ohio law splits the timing of local elections with county
officials being elected in even numbered years and all other municipal officers are elected in odd
numbered years (Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3501). Of the 19,135 local elected officials in Ohio,
8,829 (46.1%) are elected in non-concurrent years (US Department of Commerce 1992). California
and Montana also divide local elections between even and odd numbered years (Berry and Gerson
2010). The end result is great variation in the year local elections are conducted.
Does Changing Election Laws Increase Turnout?
Altering election laws occurs with somewhat regular frequency at the national and state
levels. At the national level, amendments to the Constitution have expanded the electorate to
include women, African Americans, and 18 year olds. States have required individuals to pay poll
taxes, pass literacy tests, and own property in order to vote. While none of these former practices
are used today, states require photo identification, determine voter registration periods, and decide
residency requirements. At the local level, municipalities that adopted aspects of the reforms, such
as nonpartisan elections, also altered their electoral systems (Welsh and Bledsoe 1988; Bridges
1997). Therefore, election laws become an important component of electoral systems because they
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can have a direct influence on voter turnout since they determine who is able to cast a ballot (Rusk
1970; Converse 1972, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Powell 1980; Powell 1986; Teixeira
1987).
In the examples above, the changes made to the national, state, or local electoral system
redefined who could vote. This can have significant consequences as voters and nonvoters tend to
be different. Voters tend to be older, more educated, and have higher incomes than nonvoters
(Clark and Krebs 2012; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). This is concerning, since who votes
shapes the policy outcomes of the government system. Like the adage “the squeaky wheel gets the
grease,” those who are able to vote and do so have the ear of their elected officials (Clark and
Krebs 2012; Lijphart 1997).
This section reviews national, state, and local policies that have been used to increase, or
decrease, voter turnout. For this project, I assume high participation is desirable in a democracy.
Recall from Chapter 2 that higher voter turnout reduces potential policy bias, provides legitimacy,
and ensures accountability. Election laws can be policy prescriptions that alleviate the burden of
casting a ballot. That is not to say election laws do not have a negative impact on voter turnout,
they sometimes do. As past U.S. history reveals, some policies adopted by the states, such as
literacy tests, had a devastating impact on the black vote.16 But, the goal of an election law in
American democracy should be to increase voter turnout. Democracy cannot be sustained with
zero voters. And, low voter turnout can call into question the legitimacy of the system and the
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Literacy tests, poll taxes, registration systems, and white primaries were all means to disenfranchise the black
voters. These laws had a severe impact on the number of blacks registered to vote. According to the Smithsonian
National Museum of American History, in Mississippi, fewer than 9,000 of the 147,000 voting-age African
Americans were registered after 1890. In 1989, Louisiana had more than 130,000 black voters registered. The
number dwindled to 1,342 by 1904. http://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/1-segregated/white-only-1.html
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mandate of those elected. By changing the legal context that shapes the electoral system, there can
be a positive influence on voter turnout.
In Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) seminal piece, Who Votes?, the authors primarily
examine the demographic composition of voters in the United States. More importantly for this
project, they also study the influence of state election laws - registration laws specifically - on
voter turnout. Voter registration is the legal means to vote; without registering to vote, one cannot
cast a ballot on Election Day. While voter registration was originally a mechanism used to combat
voter fraud, it is now often perceived as a barrier to the voting booth (Brown 2010).
Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) found that registration laws correlated with turnout rates.
Four conditions in particular had a negative impact on turnout: early registration deadlines,
irregular office hours, no Saturday registration, and no absentee registration. The negative
relationship between voter registration laws and turnout, they theorize, is because these laws
increase the costs of voting “above the threshold of many people” (Wolfinger and Rosenstone
1980, 79). In order to register, a potential voter must navigate the bureaucratic red tape, such as
knowing the registration deadlines and the location of the registration facility, therefore the costs
of registering are not equal for everyone (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Education is a factor
that can help reduce the costs associated with registration. A higher education voter can overcome
the obstacles associated with voter registration better since education increases their ability to
manage the bureaucratic hurdles that come with registering to vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone
1980).
Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) work laid the foundation for future research on voter
registration laws and turnout. Scholars have consistently found that strict voter registration
requirements negatively impact turnout; this finding is consistent across all electoral contexts
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(Brown 2012). Registering to vote often has many procedural steps. Additionally, an individual
must make the decision to register long before the election has gained momentum. The costs of
voting are increased by registration requirements because it asks the individual to be aware of the
registration process and register to vote before interest in the campaign occurs. Registration has
information costs, such as knowing registration deadlines and the location of registration offices,
as well as physical costs, such as time away from work, to register.
Analyzing voter turnout from a cost and benefit perspective stems from the rational choice
framework. In An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs’ (1957) model of voting hypothesized
that an individual’s decision to vote is a function of the costs and benefits of voting. In a perfect
world, with no information costs, a voter would decide which candidate to vote for by comparing
the expected utility from the incumbent while in office to the expected utility from the challenger
had he won office (Downs 1957, Chapter 3). This allows the voter to find his current party utility
differentials, which would then determine his vote choice. Since the world is not perfect, a rational
voter seeks to increase his efficiency and does so by spending no more time or money on obtaining
information than his potential benefits warrant (Downs 1957, Chapter 12). A rational voter will
vote if the benefits of voting outweigh the costs; “if not, he abstains” (Downs 1957, 260).
Downs suggests that there are two primary costs of voting: information costs and physical
costs. Information costs refer to the resources utilized to obtain information about the candidates
and/or parties. Physical costs include the resources, such as time and money, needed to register to
vote and then vote, as well as the time taken off work in order to complete these tasks. While
information costs are important in calculating who to vote for, physical costs can be lessened by
election laws. For instance, election laws can alter the hours a polling station is open or the duration
of the voting or registration period. The longer hours reduce the cost of voting (or registering)
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because they create more opportunities for the individual to complete these tasks. The benefits of
voting include the value the voter places on democracy and the concern the voter has on the
outcome of the election. Since the probability for one vote to make a difference in election
outcomes is low, Downs reasons that voting is irrational if the costs outweigh the benefits.
Using his model,17 Downs’ work predicts a much lower turnout than what actually occurs.
Since a democracy cannot survive with zero voters, he suggests that individuals may be motivated
to vote so that democracy is sustained even when there are no personal gains from voting (Downs
1957, Chapter 14). Much like the probability of an individual’s vote deciding the out of an election
is slim, there is relatively little chance that one vote would determine the success (or failure) of a
democracy.
The rational choice perspective of voting offered by Downs asks an important question:
why do people vote? Expanding on Downs’ theory, Riker and Ordeshook (1970) include a civic
duty variable in Downs’ equation. Akin to Downs’ notion that individuals may vote to support
democracy, Riker and Ordeshook’s civic duty variable aims to capture the satisfaction one receives
from voting, affirming allegiance to their political party, and being part of the political system
(Riker and Ordeshook 1970, 28). With the inclusion of a civic duty variable in the calculation of
voting, their findings support the theory that an individuals’ voting behavior can be explained by
rational decision-making (Riker and Ordeshook 1970).
The model used by Riker and Ordeshook (1970) indicates that the probability of an
individual’s vote mattering (P), the benefits received from voting (B), the costs associated with
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The expected utility hypothesis states the calculus of voting is: R= (BP)-C where R= individual rewards from
voting, B= the individual’s differential benefit between the candidates, P= the probability that voting will bring the
expected benefit, C= individual costs of voting (See Downs 1957, Riker and Ordeshook 1970).
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voting (C), and civic duty (D) all have marginal effects on voter turnout. According to their model,
a change in any of these variables would create a change in voter turnout. Election laws affect the
costs (C) of voting. Using their model,18 if there is a decrease in the costs of voting (C), then there
should be an increase in turnout. This model has been the foundation for later scholarship that
examines the impact of election laws on voter turnout.
Much of the literature on election laws and voter turnout has been done under the rational
choice framework, which suggests that if the costs of voting were lowered, participation would
increase (Downs 1954; Riker and Ordeshook 1969). Election laws are the primary means to
altering these costs as they can make it easier, or harder, for individuals to access the ballot.
Returning to voter registration as an example, costs of registering are high because of the resources
(e.g. time) used to navigate the registration process, learn the registration deadlines, locate the
registration office, etc. Most registration deadlines are 10 to 30 days prior to Election Day. 19 These
early registration deadlines have a negative effect on voter turnout because they occur before the
campaign has built momentum (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).
How significant is the impact of voter registration laws on turnout? Wolfinger and
Rosenstone (1980) found registration laws decrease voter turnout by nine percent. Others have
estimated an eight percent reduction in turnout due to the barriers presented by the registration
process (Teixeira 1992). If voter registration laws were liberalized, meaning less costly to the
voter, it would increase voter turnout by about eight percent (Mitchell and Wlezien 1995).
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Their model and others, such as Downs, who have also used the calculus of voting formula.
Exceptions are states with Election Day registration. There are six states who practice Election Day registration
and one state that does not require voters to register (Brown 2010).
19
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In an effort to ease the burden of registration on potential voters, Congress enacted the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (a.k.a. Motor Voter law). A key feature of the NVRA
allows an individual to register to vote when renewing their driver’s license. This was largely
viewed as a potential means to reduce the burden of the registration process. The central
anticipation after the passage of the NVRA was that voter turnout would increase since the costs
of registering were decreased. This speculation assumes that once registered, voting would follow.
As empirical evidence points out, lessening registration costs does not necessarily mean voter
turnout increases. Registering to vote and casting a ballot are two separate political acts. In theory,
the NVRA should increase registration rates since it reduced the costs associated with registration.
Empirical evidence indicates that by decreasing the burdens associated with registration, the
numbers of those registered has increased. In examining the NVRA, Martinez and Hill (1999)
found that registration increased, but not turnout. Others have found registration has increased
among groups traditionally less likely to register (Hill 2003; Brown and Wedeking 2006). While
the NVRA creates an easier registration process and expands the electorate, it has not increased
turnout in American elections.
The NVRA is an example of a national law that has been implemented to reduce the costs
of voting by making the registration process easier for the potential voter. But, states have also
adopted policies that alter the registration and voting process. A long line of research has been
conducted on state election laws (Larocca and Dlemanski 2011; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and
Miller 2007; Berinsky 2005; Fitzgerald 2005; Wolfinger, Highton, and Mullin 2005; Gronke 2004;
Karp and Banducci 2000, 2001; Knack 2001; Stein 1998; Southwell and Burchett 1997; Stein and
Garcia-Monet 1997). Some of these election laws have had a positive impact on voter turnout (e.g.
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vote by mail elections, Election Day registration) while others have produced the opposite (e.g. inperson early voting).
At the state level, there are two types of laws that ease the registration process: same day
registration and Election Day registration. These two laws are similar as they both offer a one-stop
shop that allows individuals to register and vote simultaneously. Logically, if potential voters can
incur the costs of registration and voting at the same time, and do so closer to Election Day when
campaign momentum is higher, the perceived benefit of voting may be greater. This should have
a positive effect on turnout as the costs (C) are decreased and the perceived benefits (B) are
increased. The difference between same day registration and Election Day registration lies in when
a voter is able both register and vote. Same day registration permits a voter to register and vote on
the same day prior to Election Day whereas Election Day registration allows voters to both register
and vote on Election Day.
Same day registration (SDR) allows an individual to go to a voting site, such as the election
office, register to vote, and then vote. With SDR, the costs associated with registering to vote and
actually voting are incurred at the same time. SDR should have a positive impact on voter turnout
because the costs of voting are reduced. In her study of SDR and NVRA, Rhine (1996) found a
positive relationship between SDR and voter turnout. She estimates SDR increases turnout
between 10-14 percent.
Likewise, Election Day registration (EDR) allows potential voters to register at their voting
site, such as their polling location, on Election Day. On Election Day, they register, then proceed
to the polling booth to cast their ballot. EDR in particular allows voters to register and vote at the
last moment of an election cycle when voter interest is highest and the campaign has the most
momentum (Burden et al 2009). With EDR, the costs of registering and voting are lessened
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because they are experienced simultaneously and the perceived benefit of voting is greater since
the campaign is at its peak. It is not surprising then that EDR has a positive impact on voter turnout
(Burden et al 2009). States that adopt EDR had higher turnout rates in midterm elections (Knack
1998; Fenster 1994). Turnout in midterm elections increased by six percent in states that had EDR
(Fester 1994). In presidential elections, states with EDR also had higher turnout rates compared to
states without EDR (Brians and Grofman 2001; Knack 1998; Fenster 1994). Interestingly, Larocca
and Dlemanski (2011), who examined turnout in presidential elections (2000, 2004, and 2008),
found EDR increased the probability of new residents voting. This finding supports Squire,
Wolfinger, and Glass’ (1987) hypothesis that low turnout among movers is due to the burden of
re-registering to vote. In presidential elections, EDR increased turnout by as little as three percent
(Knack 1998) and as much as seven percent (Brians and Grofman 2001). It is estimated that a
national EDR law would increase turnout by five percent (Fenster 1994).
Other proposals for registration reform include mail-in registration and easing the
requirements of registration (often re-registration) for movers. Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass (1987)
suggest that low turnout among movers is due to the burden of re-registering to vote. If this burden
of registering was reduced for those who move, turnout would increase by nine percent (Squire,
Wolfinger, and Glass 1987).
Additionally, states could adopt policies that do more to facilitate access to the ballot. Some
suggestions include having accessible polling locations, mailing sample ballots and polling
information to voters, and have the polling stations stay open longer. When a voting location is
less accessible, the costs to get there could be higher than any benefit the voter receives from
casting a ballot (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003). Gimpel and Schuknecht (2003) found that
accessibility does make a significant difference in turnout with distance imposing the heaviest
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burden. States that mail sample ballots to voters prior to Election Day, mail information about
polling locations, and have polls open for longer periods of time, have higher turnout rates
(Wolfinger, Hughton, and Mullin 2005). Wolfinger, Hughton, and Mullin (2005) indicate that if
states adopt these aforementioned practices, it would increase turnout by three percent.
Early Voting
Another state policy that has been touted as an approach to increasing voter turnout is early
voting. Early voting is a means to vote outside of the traditional voting booth while still preserving
the integrity and fairness of an election (Rosenfield 1994). Advocates of early voting claimed it
would attract marginal voters - those who would vote if they could get to the polls on Election Day
(Rosenfield 1994). Therefore, voter turnout should increase. Election Day voters are confined to
the hours and assigned polling location determined by the government. Those who opt to vote
early travel to an early voting site at their convenience to cast a ballot. Early voting extends the
number of days in which a person can cast a ballot and increases the number and type of voting
locations (Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997).
Texas introduced early voting in 1988. Because of early voting’s popularity among voters,
a number of states have adopted similar policies. Currently, 34 states utilize some form of early
voting. The rapid adoption of early voting among the states is not surprising as it is common
practice for a state to adopt policies of neighboring states (Walker 1969; Katz, Levin, and Hamilton
1963; Berry and Berry 1990; Mooney and Lee 1995; Mintrom and Vergari 1998). However, early
voting laws vary among the states. These variations primarily include the method of early voting
and the features of in-person early voting.
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Methods of Early Voting
There are four primary methods of early voting: no-excuse absentee voting, permanent
absentee voting, vote-by-mail, and in-person early voting. It is common to refer to any of these
methods as early voting, even though they are vastly different in practice. Each type of early voting
law attempts to reduce the costs of voting borne by individual by expanding the number of days
an individual can cast a ballot. However, some early voting laws are more liberalized than others.
In other words, if the early voting law is liberalized, the state government bears most of the burden
associated with voting rather than the individual. The methods of early voting can placed on a
spectrum from most liberal to least liberal (most restrictive). See figure 3.1. Using the cost - benefit
approach, liberalized early voting laws would have less individual costs associated with them.
Therefore, participation should increase.
Figure 3.1: Continuum of Early Voting

Vote By Mail

In Person Early Voting

Permanent Absentee No-Excuse Absentee

MOST
LIBERAL

LEAST
LIBERAL

No-Excuse Absentee Voting and Permanent Absentee Voting
No-excuse absentee voting allows voters to request an absentee ballot without providing
an excuse. Twenty-eight states have implemented no-excuse absentee voting; twenty-six have both
no-excuse absentee voting and in-person early voting (NCSL). Unlike the other methods of early
voting, with no-excuse absentee voting the voter still needs to request a ballot from the
government. Therefore, the costs of voting are still borne by the voter. States with no excuse
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absentee voting have higher rates of absentee voters than states that require an excuse to vote
absentee (US Election Assistance Commission 2006 (US EAC)).
A caveat to no-excuse absentee voting is permanent absentee status. In seven states, voters
can request to be placed on a permanent absentee ballot list (NCSL). Upon doing so, these
permanent absentee voters are mailed an absentee ballot every election without the need to request
an absentee ballot. With permanent absentee voting, the costs of voting shift from the voter to the
state since the state becomes responsible for mailing the ballot to the voter without a request from
the voter.
Vote By Mail
The vote by mail (VBM) system has been used in Oregon since 1998. Currently two states,
Oregon and Washington, practice this method of early voting. In VBM elections, voters receive
their voter pamphlets in the mail, followed by their ballots, which they return via the mail.
Vote by mail laws, by their nature, require state governments to play a more active role in
the voting process. In a vote by mail system, the state government mails all registered voters their
ballot for each election. This occurs even if the voter has decided not to vote in that particular
election. If the voter opts to vote, it is up to the voter to complete the ballot and return it via mail.
In-person early voting
In-person early voting is akin to absentee voting in that both can be done prior to Election
Day. However, there are clear differences. In absentee voting, the voter requests the ballot, which
is then mailed to them. And in some cases, absentee voting requires an excuse be provided.20 Inperson early voting allows voters cast a ballot at an election center and/or a satellite location before
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According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, 20 states require an excuse to vote absentee.
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Election Day without an excuse. Election centers are located in places such as the clerk’s or
election officials’ office. Satellite locations are typically determined by the state or local clerks
and include places such as government buildings, firehouses, shopping malls, and/or grocery stores
(Stein and Vonnahme 2010). When voters arrive at the voting site, they cast a ballot using the same
equipment that is used on Election Day.
The burden to vote remains completely upon the individual in states with in-person early
voting. While in-person early voting laws allow one to cast a ballot prior to Election Day, the voter
must still make the decision to vote, locate the early voting center, and then travel to the early
voting center to cast a ballot. The costs of voting are much higher in in-person early voting states
than states that have VBM elections or permanent absentee ballot systems.
Features of In-Person Early Voting
Since in-person early voting is a state law, its characteristics differ among the states. These
differences include the period of early voting, the location of voting sites, the type of voting sites
used, and the hours voting sites are open.
Early voting laws lengthen the time period a person can cast a ballot. States like Michigan,
which has not adopted any method of early voting, only permit their voters to vote during specified
hours on Election Day. Alternatively, in-person early voting allows voters to cast a ballot at a
voting site as early as 45 days prior to Election Day (NCSL). The start dates for in-person early
voting fluctuate by state. For example, in the State of Ohio, voters can cast a ballot at early voting
sites 35 days before Election Day. Vermont21 and Florida22, which have similar in-person early
voting laws to Ohio, permit voters to cast a ballot 45 days and 10 days prior to Election Day
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http://vermont-elections.org/elections1/absentee_overview.html
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/voting/early.shtml
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respectively. On average, states open the early voting process 22 days before Election Day
(NCSL).
Much like the start dates of in-person early voting, the end dates also differ between the
states. Early voting can remain open as late as the day before Election Day (NCSL). In three states,
in-person early voting closes the Thursday prior to Election Day (NCSL). Nine states end inperson early voting the Friday before Election Day (NCSL). In five states, early voting concludes
the Saturday before Election Day whereas 11 states end it on the Monday prior to Election Day
(NCSL). The average voting period is 19 days among the states with in-person early voting
(NCSL).
The hours and days that voting sites are open for in-person early voting vary by state. In
many cases, states with in-person early voting have locations open on weekend days.23 For
instance, in Texas, during the last week of early voting, the most populous counties’ early voting
sites are required to stay open 12 hours a day (Rosenfield 1994).Twelve states require that voting
centers remain open on weekends (NCSL). In the remaining 20 states, either the county or local
officials determine the hours of early voting sites (NCSL).
The locations where voters can travel to cast a ballot early are known as voting sites, and
voting sites differ by state. Stein and Garcia-Monet (1997) point out that voting sites can be
traditional or non-traditional. Traditional voting sites include election offices and government
facilities, such as libraries and courthouses. Non-traditional voting sites include satellite locations,
such as grocery stores and shopping malls. The State of Ohio uses traditional voting sites, typically
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Weekend days are Saturday and Sunday

81
county board of elections offices.24 On the other hand, Texas has both non-traditional and
traditional voting sites, including city halls, libraries, churches, and rec centers.25
Early Voting and Turnout
Theoretically, states with early voting policies should have higher rates of voter turnout
than states without early voting policies, ceteris paribus. However, to presume that early voting
laws (broadly speaking) increase turnout assumes all methods of early voting are synonymous. As
the preceding section indicates, early voting laws are not equivalent. Each method of early voting
has different costs associated with it. Recall that in vote by mail elections, the government bears a
substantial portion of the costs. On the other hand, in in-person early voting elections, the
individual still carries the majority of the costs. This theoretical assumption also presumes that all
elections are equal. Federal elections tend to be high-stimulus, which by their nature produce
higher turnout rates than low-stimulus elections (e.g. local elections).
The relationship between early voting and turnout is more complex than the theoretical
assertion assumes. The effect early voting laws have on voter turnout is in large part dependent on
two factors: the method of early voting and the type of election. For example, vote by mail has had
a positive impact on voter turnout while in-person early voting has not seen similar results. In state
elections, vote by mail appears to have a positive effect on turnout whereas in-person early voting
only has a marginal effect on turnout in state elections. Two methods of early voting that have
received a considerable amount of attention in the literature: vote by mail and in-person early
voting. The next section discusses the influence of these two methods of early voting on turnout.
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http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/Voters/absentee/inperson.aspx
http://www.dallascountyvotes.org/early-voting-information/early-voting-locations-3/
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Vote By Mail Systems and Turnout
The literature on vote by mail (VBM) elections and voter turnout appears to provide
conflicting findings. In aggregate level studies, scholars have found that vote by mail increases
voter turnout (Southwell and Burchett 2000; Karp and Banducci 2000). Although an individual
level examination reveals that vote by mail does not significantly increase turnout (Berinsky et al
2001). Yet, the mixed results are negated when election type is teased out and examined
independently.
Overall, studies indicate that at the national level, VBM doesn’t significantly increase voter
turnout and may lower it. Studies indicate that national elections have not seen the increase in voter
turnout that is expected with VBM systems. In their examination of U.S. Senate races, Berinksey
and Traugott (2001) found that VBM increases turnout marginally and does not make the
electorate descriptively representative of the voting population. Kousser and Mullin’s (2007)
findings are much graver. Their analysis of VBM in presidential elections shows that VBM
decreases turnout in national elections by two percent.
The impact of VBM on state elections is much more mixed. Southwell and Burchett (2000)
found that VBM increased turnout by 10 percent. Similarly, Karp and Banducci (2000) found
VBM had a 2.9 percent increase in turnout in midterm elections. More recently, Kousser and
Mullin (2007) found that VBM decreases turnout in gubernatorial elections. This difference could
be due to the location of study. Southwell and Burchett (2000) and Karp and Banducci (2000)
studied VBM in the State of Oregon while Kousser and Mullin (2007) studied VBM in counties
within California. The different findings could also be due to the type of methods used. Kousser
and Mullin (2007) took advantage of a natural experiment where voter in precincts with less than
250 voters received mail ballots and voters in larger precincts used traditional polling locations

83
during two elections (2000 and 2002). Southwell and Burchett (2000) examined 48 elections
between 1960 and 1996. Similarly, Karp and Banducci (2000) studied six elections between 1986
and 2000. Southwell and Burchett (2000) and Karp and Banducci (2000) also use the same measure
for voter turnout, which may be a reason for their similar findings.
Local elections appear to have benefited the most from VBM elections. Studies have
consistently found that VBM increases turnout in local elections. David B. Magleby (1987) found
a 19 percent increase in turnout at the local level. In their study of Oregon’s VBM system, Karp
and Banducci (2000) found that while VBM increased turnout across all elections, local elections
saw the largest increase, 26.5 percent. In California, Kousser and Mullin (2007) found VBM
increases turnout in local elections by 7.6 percent.
In-person early voting and Voter Turnout
Both aggregate and individual level studies on in-person early voting and voter turnout
have similar findings. They have consistently demonstrated that in-person early voting has no
significant impact on turnout (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein 1998; Stein and Garcia-Monet
1997; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Neeley and Richardson 2001). However,
the findings from in-person early voting become more conflicting when broken down by election
type.
The type of election studied seems to be important in determining if in-person early voting
affects turnout. In presidential and midterm elections, Gronke and Toffey (2008) found in-person
early voting increased turnout. But, others who have examined national elections have found
insignificant or marginal effect on turnout (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein and Garcia-Monet
1997; Neeley and Richardson 2001) or no effect at all (Gronke Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller
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2007). Gronke et al (2007) assert that only when in-person early voting and no excuse absentee
voting are combined, and then only in midterm elections, is there an increase in voter turnout.
In state elections, in-person early voting appears to have a marginal effect on turnout. Stein
(1998) found that in-person early voting increased in voter turnout in gubernatorial elections, but
only marginally. Stein, Owens, and Leighley (1993) indicate that in-person early voting increases
turnout when the parties and campaigns incorporate early voting into their campaigns. Similarly,
J. Eric Oliver (1996) notes that early voting along with strong mobilization efforts increase voter
turnout.
Scholars also indicate that early voting may increase turnout at first, but over time, this
effect fades. Gronke and Miller (2007) argue that the increase in voter turnout found by others is
a “novelty effect.” Voters utilize the new laws at first, which leads to an immediate increase in
voter turnout. With time, the novelty wears off and voter turnout returns to its previous rate.
Likewise, Giammo and Brox (2010) found that early voting produced a short-lived increase in
turnout. Voter turnout increased until the second presidential election after implementation after
which voter turnout declined by two to three percent (Giammo and Brox 2010), supporting Gronke
and Miller’s novelty effect hypothesis.
Others suggest that increases in voter turnout due to early voting can be attributed to party
loyalists who are encouraged to vote in low profile elections in which they traditionally would not
have voted (Harris 1999; Hillygus 2005; Holbrook and McClurg 2005).
It is important to note that unlike VBM systems, in-person early voting has not been fully
examined at the local level. Richardson and Neeley (1996) conducted a study in Tennessee to
examine the impact of in-person early voting implementation and voter turnout. They found that
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in-person early voting increased countywide turnout. Their findings also suggest that having
municipal elections on the ballot is an important factor in early voting participation. However,
their study focused on implementation factors that influence early voting. Thus, these results do
not necessarily explain the relationship between in-person early voting and voter turnout. The
present study helps fill this void in the literature by examining in-person early voting and voter
turnout in municipal elections.
Unanswered Questions about Early Voting and Turnout in Local Elections
While there has been considerable research on early voting and its effect on voter turnout,
the question of early voting’s substantive impact on voter turnout at the local level is unanswered
in the participation and urban studies literature. With Election Day is slowly becoming obsolete,
advancing early voting scholarship by determining how in-person early voting influences political
participation at all levels of government is increasingly important.
I hypothesize that early voting, in-person early voting in particular, has a significant
positive impact on voter turnout in municipal elections. As findings from previous vote by mail
studies indicate, local democracies likely benefit the most from early voting laws (David B.
Magleby 1987; Dubin and Kalsow 1996; Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007).
What is left unanswered is the impact of in-person early voting on local elections. Does in-person
early voting increase participation at the local level? The following chapters answer this question.
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CHAPTER 4
Data and Methods
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the sources of the data, the construction of the
data set, the statistical model, the statistical methods used for this study, and the variable measures.
The data set for this study is unique as it is a compilation of data from a variety of sources. What
sets this study apart is the application of the independent variable - in-person early voting - to local
elections. Having a locality26 as the unit of analysis provides insight on how early voting affects
local elections. Many localities hold their election in non concurrent years (or odd numbered
years). Examining non concurrent election years allows me to isolate the effects of early voting at
the local level because the only elections occurring are local elections. By having municipalities
as the unit of analysis, my study fills an existing gap in both urban and early voting research. I ask
a simple, but overlooked question: Does in-person early voting impact voter turnout in municipal
elections?
The chapter begins with a discussion of the unit of analysis - municipalities - and then
moves to a discussion on the decision to use the State of Ohio. The second section addresses the
data sources and the approach of data collection. I then proceed to a discussion of the statistical
method used to examine the impact of in-person early voting on municipal voter turnout. I
conclude this chapter with an overview of the statistical model, variables, and how those variables
are operationalized to test the concepts of interest, and hypothesis that is tested in the subsequent
chapter.

26

I use the term locality and municipality interchangeably.
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Why Municipalities?
I chose municipalities because they are convenient, understudied, and a unique political
unit within the United States. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, municipalities are an important
and fundamental component of American democracy. Municipalities can be thought of as smallscale democracies where citizens debate and resolve local issues and matters. Additionally,
scholarship on early voting studies tends to focus on the individual voter rather than a political
unit, such as a municipality. Such research asks: Do early voting laws impact individual behavior?
Who utilizes early voting? How are early voters and Election Day voters different? While these
are important questions that warrant study, it is not the only question researchers and policymakers
should examine.
Proponents of early voting laws contend that these laws should increase turnout in
elections. Recall from Chapter 3 that in-person early voting has no significant impact on turnout
in state and national elections (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein 1998; Stein and Garcia-Monet
1997; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Neeley and Richardson 2001). Vote by Mail
(VBM) studies have consistently found that VBM increases turnout in local elections (Karp and
Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007). 27 These studies provide some knowledge on how local
elections are affected by a VBM laws, a specific type of early voting law. But, how does in-person
early voting, which 32 states use, impact local elections? This study begins to address this question.
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It can be problematic to use individual-level data to analyze a social or political unit if the researcher makes
inferences about individuals that are deduced from the social or political unit being studied (Singleton and Straits
2010). Since we often don’t know how individuals vote, researchers often use other ways to capture it, such as
percent of votes cast, percent vote share, etc. The problem is not the use of such proxies, but occurs in the
interpretation of the results. An ecological fallacy occurs when researchers use aggregate or group data, such as data
on cities, to infer individual behavior. For instance, let’s say the results indicate that cities with higher percentages of
whites have higher turnout. An ecological fallacy is committed if one infers from this that whites are more likely to
vote. While my study uses individual-level data that are tabulated to describe political units, municipalities, my
focus is on the policy of early voting. I seek to determine how voter turnout in municipal elections are impacted by
in-person early voting, not individual behaviors.
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Municipalities are the unit of analysis of this dissertation. The definition for municipalities,
especially Ohio municipalities, is relatively straightforward. Using the U.S. Census Bureau’s
definition, a municipal government is defined as
political subdivisions within which a municipal corporation has been established to provide
general local government for a specific population concentration in a defined area, and
includes all active government units officially designated as cities, boroughs (except in
Alaska), towns (except in the six New England states, and in Minnesota, New York, and
Wisconsin), and villages (2012).
For the State of Ohio, a municipal government would then be municipal corporations that have
been designated as cities and villages.28 According to the Ohio Constitution, cities are defined as
municipal corporations having a population of 5,000 or more while villages are defined as
municipal corporations having a population less than 5,000 (OH Constitution Article XVIII). Since
both cities and villages in Ohio are defined as municipal corporations, both will be included in this
analysis, and will be henceforth referred to as municipalities. Using this definition, there are 938
municipalities in the State of Ohio.
The decision to include both cities and villages for this study raises an important question:
do cities and villages have the same functions, powers, and authority? The Ohio Revised Code
grants both cities and villages the same general powers, they both provide similar services, and
they both have the same function (R.C. 715.01, 717.01).29 For instance, both have the power to
police, erect buildings, collect taxes, sue and be sued, acquire property, and maintain municipal
roads. Both provide sanitation services, street cleaning services, street lighting, and clean water,
power, and heat to their residents. Both have the authority to govern taverns, determine fencing
ordinances, enter into contracts for the provision of services, and regulate the impoundment and
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The State of Ohio does not have boroughs or towns.
For a complete list of powers see Ohio Revised Code 715.01 and 717.01.
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sale of animals.
The cities and villages organize under one of three plans outlined by the Ohio Constitution
and the Ohio Revised Code. Those plans are commission, manager, and mayor30 (R.C. 705, OH
Constitution Article VXIII). Commission plans only elect commission members to sit on the
municipal commission (R.C. 705.41). Manager plans have an elected council while the manager
is appointed/hired by the council.31 For mayor plans, voters elect both the mayor and the council.
Unless otherwise stated in a municipal charter, mayoral elections occur every four years.32
Statutory cities and villages are to hold nonpartisan elections unless the city or village has adopted
partisan elections in accordance with the Ohio Constitution and Revised Code. See Table 4.1 for
a breakdown of the municipal organization plans found in Ohio.
The main difference between a city and a village in Ohio is the population (Ohio
Constitution Article XVIII, §1).33 Classification of a municipality as a city or village depends on
its population and/or the number of registered voters residing within the municipality’s borders. 34
While a municipality’s classification can change (city to village or vice versa), it is important to
note that the duties, powers, and responsibilities of municipalities do not.
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Ohio calls the mayor-council government plan the federal plan.
The exception to this is Ashtabula which elects its manager.
32
Exception being a vacancy, which they are required by law to fill.
33
There are other differences, such as but not limited to the governing boards and administrative personnel,
however, for the purposes of this dissertation, the population difference is of primary interest.
34
There are two ways a municipality can have its classification changed: after the last federal census or an increase
or decrease in the number of registered voters 34 (R.C. 703). After the federal census is completed, city and village
classifications are reevaluated. A village that saw an increase in population to more than 5,000 residents is
reclassified to a city. Likewise, a city that experiences a decline in population and has less than 5,000 residents is
classified as a village. When a change from village to city or city to village occurs, the Secretary of State issues a
proclamation indicating the change. Copies of the proclamation are sent to the mayor and municipal legislative
body. After 30 days, the change takes effect. Similarly, changes can be made by an increase or decrease in the
number of electors in a municipality. If a municipality’s electors increase to more than 5,000, it is changed to a city.
If a municipality’s electors decrease to under 5,000, it is changed to a village. When the number of electors changes,
the County Board of Elections is responsible for notifying the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State, upon
certifying the change in the number of electors, issues a proclamation indicating the change in classification. The
mayor and municipal legislative body receives copies of the proclamation. Thirty days later the change takes effect.
31
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Why Ohio?
Currently, there are 19,522 municipalities within the U.S. (U.S. Census 2012). To collect
information on all of the municipalities would be time consuming, tedious, and likely impossible.
Instead, I opted to focus on municipalities found in the State of Ohio. Using a single state permits
me to collect information on smaller municipalities as well as larger ones. It is common for
scholars to focus on larger, more populated municipalities when examining municipal voter
turnout.35 By limiting my analysis to Ohio, I can, and do, include smaller, less populated
municipalities. Since municipal elections in Ohio are conducted in odd numbered (non concurrent)
years, I can isolate the affects in-person early voting has on turnout in municipal elections while
holding other factors constant (e.g. implementation and administration of early voting, registration
rules, etc.).
Additionally, Ohio has distinctive characteristics that are useful for this analysis. Ohio is a
microcosm of the United States. In 2004, CNN describes this best when they discusses how the
“Five Ohios-”36 Democratic northeast, conservative and traditional Southwest, the farming belt,
Appalachia region, and central suburban Ohio- make Ohio a microcosm of the United States.37
The adoption and implementation of in-person early voting in Ohio provides a unique opportunity
to study the impact of early voting on turnout in municipal elections. Finally, it is convenient
because most of the data necessary for this study was available online or obtained by an email
request.
Ohio is best thought of as a microcosm of the United States because of its heterogeneity
and diversity. Geographically, Ohio borders five states: Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Indiana,

35

See Caren (2007), Alfred and Lee (1968), Wood (2002), Hajnal and Trounstine (2005)
The Five Ohios was first discussed in the Plain Dealer, a newspaper in Cleveland, Ohio.
37
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/30/quest.ohio/index.html?iref=newssearch
36
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Table 4.1 Ohio Municipal Organization Plans
Commission
Manager
Voters Elect
Commissioners
Councilmen*

Appointments
Made By
Appointments

Municipal
Government
Supervision

Commission

Council

Clerk, Treasurer,
Auditor,
Solicitor
(villages only),
Director of Law
(cities only)

Manager, Clerk,
Treasurer,
Auditor,
Solicitor
(villages only),
Director of Law
(cities only)

Commission as a
whole, or
departments may
be assigned to
individual
commissioners

Manager

Source: Ohio Revised Code Chapter 705 *Ashtabula the city manager is

Mayor
Mayor and
Council
members
Mayor
Director of
Public Safety,
Director of
Public Service,
Treasurer,
Solicitor
(villages only),
Director of Law
(cities only)
Mayor

elected

Michigan, and West Virginia. These neighboring states have a profound influence on Ohio. For
example, the counties in Ohio that share a border with another state share similar demographic
composition and political identity as their neighboring state (see Table 1 in Appendix A). This
makes Ohio relatively unique because the state as a whole is not largely comprised of one political
identity, industry, or demographic group. Because of this, Ohio is like a small-scale version of
United States as a whole. Ohio encompasses a similar demographic composition and political
identity to that of the United States (see Table 2 in Appendix A).
Within the borders of Ohio, one can find a bit of everything, such as large cities, suburbs,
and small rural communities, liberal urban centers, and Bible belt communities just to name a few.
The municipalities in Ohio have institutional variation and political diversity. They range in size,
demographic composition, and political identity. See Table 4.2 for a description of the
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municipalities. The municipalities found in Ohio are not fundamentally different than other
municipalities within the United States. Therefore, the results should be generalizable to other
municipalities.
Table 4.2 Summary of Ohio Municipalities
2001
2003
2005
Administrative
System
Mayor-Council 87.9%
87.9%
87.9%
Council7.8%
7.8%
7.8%
Manager
Electoral
System
Partisan
1.1%
Elections
Non
Partisan 9.8%
Elections
Demographics
Population
Percent
Bachelor
Degree
Percent White
Median Income
Percent Female
Age

2007

2009

2011

2013

87.9%
7.8%

87.9%
7.8%

87.9%
7.8%

87.9%
7.8%

7.5%

0.6%

5.9%

1.3%

5.1%

0.8%

46.2%

9.8%

60.9%

11.9%

62.7%

12.8%

8,005
9.77%

7,991
10.01%

7,991
10.26%

7,962
10.51%

7,998
10.75%

7,959
11.01%

7,909
11.29%

94.1%
49,945
51.7%
36.9

93.7%
54,028
51.7%
37.5

93.4%
58,111
51.7%
38.0

93.1%
62,194
51.8%
38.5

92.8%
66,277
51.8%
39.1

92.5%
29,531
51.8%
39.6

92.2%
33,614
51.8%
40.1

Numbers are rounded (N=6,566; n= 938, T=7), where N=n*T

While this study is not a true natural experiment, it has elements of a natural experiment
that are beneficial to studying in-person early voting and turnout in municipal elections. Ohio
offers an opportunity to assess a naturally occurring political phenomenon over a substantial time
period. In 2005, the Ohio General Assembly passed a law offering voters to the opportunity to cast
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a ballot via in-person early voting.38 In January 2006, the law went into effect. Since 2006, Ohio
voters have been allowed to cast a ballot 35 days prior to Election Day at their County Board of
Elections (CBoE).39 The hours for in-person early voting are typically uniform throughout the state
and are open during the weekends and evenings.40 This means that individuals residing in different
municipalities in different counties had relatively the same opportunity to utilize early voting. For
example, voters in Toledo, Ohio (Lucas County) have a similar time period to vote early as voters
in Columbus, Ohio (Franklin County). Consistency of voting hours across municipalities is
important as the length of time an individual has to vote influences turnout (Wolfinger, Hughton,
and Mullin 2005).
It is convenient to use Ohio municipalities as much of the necessary data needed to
complete the study was available online. This creates a savings on research costs. Since the
information I collected was in the public record, most of the agencies’ websites had this
information available. Any information that wasn’t available online was obtained via an email
request. Conducting a survey, an alternative to using available data, would be costly especially if
I sought to have a similar size sample.
Data Collection and Sources
Since the United States does not have a centralized database containing information about
local elections or local governments, I constructed my own data set. The data for this project came
from a variety of government agencies: the U.S. Census Bureau, Ohio Department of
Development, the Ohio Secretary of State Office, the Ohio Municipal League, and the Ohio

38

HB 234 was passed in 2005. Ohio law states that a bill will become effective 91 days after being signed. It
became effective in January 2006. The 2006 elections was the first year of implementation.
39
In June 2014, this law was altered. It now allows early voting to occur 30 days before Election Day.
40
The new law, effective in June 2014, reduces the hours voting sites are open. Weekdays, voting sites will be open
until 5 pm. No voting site can be open on Sundays. And the last two Saturdays of early voting, voting sites can only
be open until 4 pm.
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County Board of Elections. Each agency and what information I obtained from them will be
discussed in more detail below. From these sources, I acquired a variety of information on Ohio
municipalities. I also collected information on mayoral elections from 2001 to 2013. According to
Ohio law, voters elect municipal officers, including mayors, in odd numbered years. This provides
me with seven municipal elections for study - three prior to the implementation of early voting and
four after it. This time period, discussed in the next section, is an important aspect of this study.
The information on the municipalities’ population and demographics came from the U.S.
Census Bureau and the Ohio Department of Development. For the years 2000 and 2010, the U.S.
Census was used to acquire population and demographic data on the municipalities. The 2000 and
2010 census were downloaded from the U.S. Census Bureau’s website. The population estimates
for the years 2001 to 2009 and 2011 to 2013 were obtained from the Ohio Department of
Development. They publish the U.S. Census Bureau’s population estimates for non-census years
for municipalities in Ohio. The more recent years were downloaded from the Ohio Department of
Development website. The other years were obtained via an email request to the agency.
The Ohio Secretary of State’s office publishes the Ohio Municipal, Township, and School
Board Roster. This handbook contains information on all the municipalities in the State of Ohio
and is released every two years. It contains information about their government structure (e.g.
mayor-council or council-manager), the type of municipality (charter or statutory), and the year of
incorporation. I also collected similar information from the Ohio Municipal League. Their website
provides a list of municipalities in Ohio along with their government structure and type of
municipality. I used these two agencies’ records to check the information for errors.
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There are 88 County Boards of Elections (CBoE) within the State of Ohio. I visited and/or
contacted all 88 CBoEs to obtain mayoral election results, precinct lists, and registered voter totals.
Each of these are discussed in more detail below.
The CBoE are responsible for maintaining records of municipal elections and registered
voter files for their respective counties. Many of the CBoEs had mayoral election results available
on their respective websites. If the data was available online, I downloaded the summary or
cumulative file to acquire the election results for mayoral races for each year of this study. The
summary or cumulative file lists each race and the number of votes each candidate received in that
particular election. I sent an email request to the CBoE asking for the summary or cumulative files
for the elections not found on their website.
I use two different documents to obtain the number of registered voters for each
municipality: the turnout report or the official statements of votes cast. These two documents are
similar since they both contain information about registered voters and election results. Both
documents are used to obtain the number of registered voters because the CBoEs do not use the
same document to report election results. Some of the CBoEs use turnout reports, while others use
the official statements of votes cast. The turnout report contains a list of each locality, including
municipalities, within that respective county. For each locality it lists the number of registered
voters and the overall number of ballots cast in that election. If the turnout reports were
unavailable, I obtained general election results by precinct, or the official statement of votes cast
(SOVC) report, from each CBoE. The general election results by precinct, or the SOVC report,
lists the number of registered voters and election results for precinct in that respective county.
In addition, the CBoE are responsible for providing precinct maps and lists. Typically,
precinct maps are used to determine what precincts are assigned to various districts. For example,
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a precinct map shows which precincts are included in a U.S. House district. However, this was
unavailable online for municipalities. Since I needed to identify which precincts are assigned to
each municipality in my study, I contacted the CBoEs and requested this information. The list of
precinct assignments were used for identifying precincts assigned to a municipality for election
purposes.
Of the 88 CBoE, I was able to obtain records from 82 of them. I first went to the CBoEs’
websites to obtain election results and the number of registered voters in each municipality. In
most cases, this data was available online. For example, Lucas County Board of Elections had all
the necessary records for this study available online. Other CBoEs had some data, but did not have
all the data necessary for this study. For instance, Ashland County Board of Elections did not have
the registered voter numbers for the 2003 general election, but had information for all the other
elections while Wyandot only had information for the 2013 election.
If these documents were not available online, sent a request to the CBoEs to obtain this
information. Some CBoEs fulfilled this request quickly. While some of the CBoEs did fulfill my
requests, some did not. 41 The reasons for not fulfilling my request varied, but included reasons
such as missing the records, inability to locate the records, not enough people in the department to
handle the request, and/or they were in the midst of conducting an election. A few CBoEs, like
Sandusky County Board of Elections, did not have any records available online nor did they
provide them upon request. From these records, I collected pieces of election information on 789
of the 938 municipalities.

41

The CBoEs that received an email request either did not respond to it, in which case another request was sent
again. In the case of Sandusky, I never heard back even after multiple requests were sent. In other cases, the CBoEs
did not fulfill it because they were administering an election, they did not have the data available in electronic
format, they no longer had the files, or the files could not be located. In the case of the data not being available in
electronic format, I requested the files be copied and mailed to me. This was fulfilled in each request.
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Why Interrupted Time Series?
I want to determine if in-person early voting increases voter turnout at the municipal level.
In order to accomplish this, I need a data set that contains information about several municipalities
collected over a substantial period of time. Since I am interested in the relationship between inperson early voting and voter turnout, the temporal period needs to include municipal elections
both before and after the implementation of in-person early voting.
A credible technique to disentangle the effects of in-person early voting on voter turnout
is to employ an interrupted time series model. An interrupted time series model allows me to
examin the impact of a law or public policy.42 The year of implementation serves as an interruption,
breaking the data into a pre and post implementation groups. By comparing the pre and post
implementation groups, I can test the statistical significance of a shift in voter turnout that occurs
after the implementation of the law.43
There have been many interrupted time series studies done to examine the impact of a law.
Likely the most famous interrupted time series analysis is that of Campbell and Ross’ (1968) traffic
study. They sought to determine if the new traffic law for speeding reduced the number of traffic
deaths. Others have used interrupted time series analysis to examine other policies such as traffic
laws (Glass 1968; Ross et al 1970), gun control laws (Deutsch and Alt 1977), hotel taxes (Bonham,
Fugi, Im, and Mak 1992), and anti-drunk driving campaigns (Murry, Stam and Lastovicka 1993).
In interrupted time series analysis, the impact refers to the shift that occurs after
implementation. An impact has two characteristics: onset and duration (Mc Dowall, Mc Cleary,
Meidinger, and Hay 1980). The onset can be gradual or abrupt and the duration can be permanent

42

In particular, I am using a single interrupted time series model. In a single interrupted time series model,
researchers take repeated observations of the same subjects at regular time intervals for a specified period of time. I
my case, I have taken repeated observation of municipalities every two years for 14 years.
43
See Mc Dowall, Mc Cleary, Meidinger and Hay 1980 for a detailed explanation.
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or temporary (Mc Dowall, Mc Cleary, Meidinger, and Hay 1980). After the implementation of inperson early voting, did the shift in turnout occur gradually or abruptly? And, was the shift in
turnout temporary or was it permanent? In this study, I hypothesize that after the implementation
of in-person early voting, the shift in turnout will be abrupt and permanent.44 A statistically
significant upwards shift in voter turnout would indicate that the law had a positive impact on voter
turnout in municipal elections. Conversely, a statistically significant downwards shift in voter
turnout would indicate that the law had a negative impact on voter turnout in municipal elections.
Interrupted Time Series Design
For my study, the implementation of in-person early voting, in 2006, serves as the
interruption or the treatment to the sample. It divides the sample into a control group (pre) and
treatment group (post) similar to true experiments. In true experiments, the treatment is
administered by the experimenter. However, in my study, the treatment is a policy adoption and
its implementation. Since the treatment is not controlled by the experimenter, it is considered a
quasi-experiment. In this case, the control group consists of the 2001, 2003 and 2005 elections
while the treatment group consists of the 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013 elections. Odd numbered
years were used because municipal elections in Ohio are only held in odd numbered years. Using
an interrupted time series model, I can determine if the policy (in-person early voting) had an
impact on voter turnout. If an impact occurs, voter turnout should be different after the treatment
than before the treatment. The quasi-experimental design is diagramed below.
𝑂1 𝑂2 𝑂3 𝑋 𝑂4 𝑂5 𝑂6 𝑂7

44

The novelty hypothesis proposed by Gronke and Miller (2007) would suggest an abrupt and temporary shift in
turnout after the implementation of in-person early voting. This is discussed in more detail when addressing the time
period of the study.
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In general, interrupted time series models have strong internal validity but weak external
validity. As Campbell and Stanley (1966) and Britt, Kleck, and Bordua (1996) point out, the
biggest threat to internal validity is history - an alternative explanation or reason for the shift after
impact. A plausible alternative explanation for higher turnout in my analysis, for example, is that
turnout increased because of local ballot issues, such as a millage. If there were highly salient
issues on a municipality’s ballot after the implementation of early voting, but not before the
implementation of early voting, then this would be an alternative explanation for the increase in
voter turnout after early voting was implemented.
With regards to external validity in an interrupted time series analysis, it is often the case
that the results cannot be generalized beyond the subjects being studied. This is because the
subjects being studied usually are not randomly selected. In many cases, subjects are selected after
the policy intervention occurs (Britt, Kleck and Bordua 1996). Generally, the policy intervention
is not randomly administered to subjects, but occurs because of a historical or social change (Britt,
Kleck and Bordua 1996). If randomization were to have occurred, the results can be generalizable
to a broader population.
One way to increase external validity and generalize beyond the subjects being studied is
to conduct similar interrupted time series designs on additional municipalities with in-person early
voting laws. My study will provide some insight on the impact of in-person early voting on
municipal elections, however, it remains a single study of in-person early voting and municipal
elections. As Campbell and Stanley (1966) state, a single study is never enough to be completely
conclusive (42). Repeating this quasi-experiment on other municipalities and/or localities will help
establish results that can be generalizable.
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Panel Data
Panel data usually has both a temporal and a spatial component. As a result, using linear
regression with panel data is often problematic since the procedures assumptions are likely
violated. For example, linear regression assumes that the disturbance terms/errors are spherical 45
(Beck and Katz 1995; Kennedy 1979). Data sets with temporal and spatial components are often
nonspherical; they contain autocorrelated and heteroskedastic errors (Beck and Katz 1995).46 For
instance, an OLS regression assumes that the errors are independent of one another. In time series,
it is assumed that the errors are related to errors at different time points.47 If the data contains
autocorrelated and heteroskedastic errors, the standard errors of a linear or ordinary least squares
regression are not guaranteed to be accurate or unbiased (Beck and Katz 1995).
Linear regression also assumes that the observations of the independent variable can be
considered fixed in repeated samples (Kennedy 1979). However, in panel data, it is often the case
that the value of the dependent variable at time t is dependent on a past value of itself (t-1). This
may be the case with turnout- the dependent variable in my study. For instance, turnout rates in
the 2003 election could be influenced by turnout rates in the 2001 election. To capture this, the
lagged value of the dependent variable (turnout) is an independent variable, or regressor ( 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 ).
The result is autoregression, which violates this assumption of linear regression. Time series
models corrects for autoregression.

45

Disturbances/errors are spherical if they are homoskedastic and are not correlated with one another.
To account for this, it is common to use feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) (see Beck and Katz 1995). For
instance, Southwell and Burchett (2000) use FGLS to examine VBM elections over time. However, as Beck and
Katz (1995) point out, using FGLS often leads to inaccurate standard errors and suggest using panel-corrected
standard errors. Using panel-corrected errors, OLS regressions can be run with time series data. The standard errors
are accurate even with heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation of the errors (see pages 640-41).
47
This is known as contemporaneously correlated errors. See Cook and Campbell 1979 Chapters 6 for a complete
discussion or Kennedy 2008.
46

101
As Beck and Katz (1995) point out, using OLS with time series data leads to “incorrect
standard errors,” which lead to overconfidence or inadequate confidence in our statistical results
(636).48 An interrupted time series analysis uses techniques designed to address the assumption
violations of OLS and permit unbiased errors in a time series, specifically, this is called the
autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model (Cook and Campbell 1979).
Time Period
The time period of this study warrants a quick discussion. Specifically, data were collected
on the 938 municipalities for odd numbered years between 2001 and 2013. The intervention year
is 2006. This time period provides seven election years for study; three election years before the
implementation of in-person early voting and four after.
In Chapter 3, I discuss the early voting novelty effect found by Gronke and Miller. They
contend that increases in voter turnout after the implementation of early voting are due to novelty
effects (Gronke and Miller 2007). The literature on early voting studies suggest that three election
cycles after implementation voter turnout declines because the novelty wears off (Giammo and
Brox 2010; Gronke and Miller 2007). The time period of this study contains four elections after
the implementation of early voting, addressing this issue.49 If the novelty effect applies to
municipal elections, the turnout in the third and fourth elections after implementation (2011 and
2013 elections respectively) should be lower than turnout in the preceding elections. In other
words, the result of the impact should be an abrupt and temporary increase in voter turnout. If this
occurs, it suggests that early voting affects municipal elections in a similar manner as national and

48

Beck and Katz argue that the generalized least squares (GLS) approach with time series data leads to
overconfidence in the standard errors. Instead, they suggest using a panel-corrected standard errors model.
49
The last election I include is 2013. Thus, I have every odd numbered year election that has occurred to date in my
study.
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state elections. Voters utilize the new laws at first, which leads to an immediate increase in voter
turnout, but with time, the novelty wears off and voter turnout returns to its previous rate. However,
if voter turnout does not decline, I can rule out the alternative hypothesis that the increase was due
to the novelty effect.
It should be noted that the implementation of in-person early voting in Ohio created a five
day window for same day registration to occur. From 2006 until 2014, Ohio had a window for
same day voter registration and in-person early voting.50 As noted in Chapter 3, same day
registration and in-person early voting are different. Burden et al (2009) suggest that it is important
to break down type of early voting (e.g. absentee, in-person early voting, same day registration,
Election Day registration) when examining the impact on turnout. While it would be valuable to
study both in-person early voting and same day voter registration as Burden et al (2009) suggest,
disentangling in-person early voting from same day registration is essentially impossible. The
available data for elections in Ohio does not differentiate between the two; while many records
note if a person voted early, they do not denote if they voted and registered during the window of
same day registration. However, disentangling the two is not necessarily important for this study.
The research question at hand asks about the overall impact of early voting. Both same day
registration and in-person early voting are considered to be forms of early voting. Future research
may want to consider examining each independently as their properties are different. But, for this
study, I focus on how early voting overall has impacted turnout at the municipal level.

50

In 2014, the Ohio General Assembly passed SB 238. On June 1, 2014 it will become effective. The measure
shortens the early voting period, effectively eliminating the window for same day voter registration.
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Modeling the Relationship between Early Voting and Municipal Voter Turnout
The purpose of this project is to highlight the impact in-person early voting has on voter
turnout in municipal elections. I assume high voter turnout is desired in elections, particularly local
elections. I also assume that all elections are not synonymous. For example, state and national
elections tend to be high stimulus elections while local elections are often low stimulus elections.
Thus, while scholars have found that in-person early voting has not increased voter turnout in
national or state elections, I don’t assume the same holds true for local elections. By their nature,
local elections are different than state or national elections. For instance, in vote by mail elections,
local/municipal elections have been the greatest beneficiary. Local elections using vote by mail
systems have seen an increase in voter turnout by as little as 7.6 percent to as high as 26.5 percent
(Kousser and Mullin 2007; Karp and Banducci 2000). While vote by mail systems and in-person
early voting are different, as noted in Chapter 3, these findings suggest local democracies may
benefit the most from early voting laws.
The research question for this study is as follows: Does in-person early voting increase
voter turnout in municipal elections? I hypothesize that in-person early voting has a significant
positive impact on voter turnout in municipal elections. Below is the theoretical model I will be
testing.

In-Person
Early Voting

→

Voter Turnout in
Municipal Elections

While a more complex model could be developed, I adopt the principle of parsimony. This
model captures the theory I propose in the simplest manner. The model is simple and useful.
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According to Feldstein, a useful model is one that is “parsimonious, plausible, and informative”
(Feldstein quoted in Kennedy 2008, 71). My model has all three of these features.
However, there are other factors that may lead to increases in voter turnout at the municipal
level, and these need to be controlled for in order to rule out alternative hypotheses. Previous
research indicates that the electoral structure (partisan versus nonpartisan), the form of government
(mayor-council versus council-manager), and the competitiveness of the election influence turnout
in municipal elections (Caren 2007; Wood 2002; Hajnal & Lewis 2003; Karning and Walters 1983;
Alford & Lee 1968). In the following section, I discuss how these concepts are measured.
Measurement of the Variables
In order to assess the impact in person early voting has on municipal elections, I examine
its impact on overall turnout in mayoral elections. Mayoral elections are used because it is the
highest executive position in municipal government. This section defines the variables, and
outlines the measures of the variables. I begin with the dependent variable: municipal voter
turnout. Next, I discuss the independent variable: early voting. Finally, I move to a discussion of
the control variables. Table 4.3 gives a summary of all the variables, their definitions, and the
operationalization of them.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this model is municipal voter turnout. It is measured as the
percent of registered voters casting a ballot in mayoral elections. It is calculated by taking the total
number of votes cast for all mayoral candidates, and dividing by the number of registered voters
in the municipality. This is then transformed into a percentage. To calculate the dependent variable,
I need two pieces of information: 1) the total number of votes cast in each mayoral election and 2)
the number of registered voters in each municipality in each election year. As previously

105
mentioned, I obtained the mayoral election results for each election year of the study from the
CBoEs.
The second part of the dependent variable, the number of registered voters, was much more
complicated to calculate. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, I used two different documents to
obtain the number of registered voters for each municipality. The turnout report was easier to use
since it listed the number of registered voters by locality, including municipality. This number was
then entered into the data set. The SOVC report was more complicated to use since it listed the
number of registered voters by precinct instead of municipality. I first had to determine which
precincts were assigned to each municipality. Using the list of precinct assignments from the
CBoEs, I could decipher which precincts were assigned to each municipality. The number of
registered voters for each precinct assigned to a municipality were then added together to obtain
the overall number of registered voters for each municipality within that county. For example,
Yellow Springs Village has four precincts. The number of registered voters in each precinct were
added together to obtain the overall number of registered voters in Yellow Springs Village.
One concern with using registered voters involves the maintenance of the lists. With the
passage of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, the maintenance of the registered voter
file has been standardized. According to the Department of Justice, voters cannot be removed from
the registered voter file for nonvoting.51 Moreover, maintenance programs must “incorporate
specific safeguards, e.g., that they be uniform, non-discriminatory, in compliance with the Voting
Rights Act, and not be undertaken within 90 days of a federal election” (Department of Justice).

51

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/nvra/activ_nvra.php
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Table 4.3 Summary of Variable Measures
Variable Name
Voter Turnout

Variable Description
Dependent
Variable:
The
percent of registered voters
casting a ballot in mayoral
elections.
Early Voting
Independent Variable: Presence
of in-person early voting in
election year.
Partisan Election
Control Variable: Elections
where the mayoral candidate has
a political affiliation that
appears on the ballot.
Mayor
Administrative Control
Variable:
MayorStructure
council form of government is
defined
as
municipal
governments where there is a
mayor but no manager.
Manager
Administrative Control Variable: CouncilStructure
manager forms of government
are municipal governments
where there is a manager.
Municipal Size
Percent White

Takes the value of 1 for
election years with in-person
early voting, 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable: partisan
elections were coded 1, 0
otherwise.
Dummy
variable:
Municipalities with mayorcouncil government systems
were coded 1, 0 otherwise.

Dummy
variable:
Municipalities with councilmanager government systems
were coded 1, 0 otherwise.
Control Variable: The total A numeric value that ranges
population of the municipality.
from 27 to 792,499
Control Variable: Percent of the A percentage value that
municipality that has self- ranges from 0 to 100%.

identified as white in the
Census.
Median Income
Control Variable: the median
value of a municipality’s income
as reported in the Census.
Percent Bachelor Degree
Control Variable: Percent of the
municipality that has selfidentified as having at least
Bachelor Degree in the Census.
Closeness
of
Mayoral Control
Variable:
The
Election
percentage of victory of the
winning candidate over all other
candidates.
Ballot Measures

Operationalization
A percentage value that
ranges from 0 to 100%.

A numeric value that ranges
from 7,427.5 to 326,001.80
A percentage value that
ranges from 0 to 100%.

A percent value ranging from
0 to 100%. As the percent
increases, the closeness of the
mayoral race increases
Control Variable: Elections Dummy variable: election
years where a highly salient years with ballot measures
statewide
ballot
initiative were coded 1, 0 otherwise.
appears on the ballot.
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This data set contains only elections held after the National Voter Registration Act was
implemented in 1995, and therefore it provides uniformity in the data set.
In addition, the measure chosen for the dependent variable has been used by scholars. For
example, Hajnal and Lewis (2003) and Caren (2007) both use mayoral elections for their
dependent variable when studying municipal voter turnout. Both early voting and urban/local
scholars use registered voters as their denominator (Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Wood 2002;
Southwell and Burchett 2000; Richardson and Neeley 1996). Thus, this measure has been
established as having both reliability and validity.
Independent Variable
The independent variable is the availability of in-person early voting. Elections prior to
2006 did not have in-person early voting. These elections were coded 0. Elections after 2006 had
the option of in-person early voting and were coded 1. This is consistent with the literature on
quasi-experiments involving interrupted time series (Cook and Campbell 1979, Chapter 6).
Control Variables
The control variables for this study include the institutional and local contextual factors
that previous research has indicated influence voter turnout (see Baybeck 2013; Marschall 2010;
Kelleher & Lowery 2004; Oliver and Ha 2007) and campaign factors that influence turnout in
municipal elections (Caren 2007). Each of these factors will be defined and controlled for in this
study.
Recall from Chapter 2 that institutional factors include non-concurrent and concurrent
elections; partisan and nonpartisan elections; and mayor-council and council-manager forms of
government. Each of these influence voter turnout in municipal elections (Wood 2002; Hajnal &
Lewis 2003; Karning and Walters 1983; Alford & Lee 1968).
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The electoral structure of a municipality may influence voter turnout. Therefore, I include
an electoral structure variable in my study. Partisan elections are elections where the mayoral
candidate has a political affiliation that appears on the ballot. Nonpartisan elections are elections
where the mayoral candidate does not have a political affiliation on the ballot. Municipalities that
held partisan elections were coded 1. Municipalities that conducted nonpartisan elections were
coded 0.
Since a municipality’s administrative structure can impact voter turnout, I include an
administrative structure variable. Mayor-council form of government is defined as municipal
governments where there is a mayor but no manager; and council-manager forms of government
are municipal governments where there is a manager. In Ohio, there are four types of government
systems municipalities can have: mayor-council, council-manager, commission-manager, or
mayor-council-administrator/manager. The latter two types of government systems are similar to
adaptive cities. I combine these two types (commission-manager, or mayor-counciladministrator/manager) into one category, adaptive city structure.52 From these three categories, I
created two dummy variables: one for mayor-council government systems and one for councilmanager government systems. Municipalities with mayor-council government systems, were
labeled Mayor Administrative Structure, and were coded 1, all others were coded 0. Municipalities
with council-manager government systems were labeled Manager Administrative Structure and
coded 1, all others were coded 0.
The local contextual factors of a municipality include municipality’s size, municipalitylevel measures of socioeconomic status (SES), and the racial composition of the municipality.
Table 4.2 from a previous section in this chapter notes the average composition of an Ohio

52

34 municipalities fell into this combined category of adaptive city structure.
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municipality. Table 4.4 details the range of the demographic data for each of the variables
discussed here. Empirical research on a municipality’s size indicates that there is no clear
consensus on the direction of influence of municipality size on voter turnout (see Kelleher and
Lowery 2004). Regardless of the direction of influence size has on voter turnout, it is important to
control for municipal size since it may influence voter turnout. The size of the municipality is
defined as the total population of the municipality and is a continuous variable.
In Chapter 2, I discuss Madison and Jefferson’s arguments about government size
composition as it relates to participation. Madison, admittedly indirectly, advocates for large,
heterogeneous municipalities while Jefferson supports small, homogeneous municipalities. While
municipal size is discussed above, here I focus on the demographic composition of the
municipality. A municipality’s demographic composition is important because it reveals the
degree of heterogeneity of the municipality. Oliver (1999) suggests heterogeneous cities have
higher rates of participation because there is more competition for resources (186). The
heterogeneity of a municipality can be measured by demographic characteristics, such as racial
composition, education, and income. Alfred and Lee (1968) suggest six different demographic
characteristics that can be used to measure the heterogeneity of a municipality: ethnicity, religion,
education, occupation, neighborhood, and race (62). I use U.S. Census data to capture the
demographic variables that have been shown in the literature to influence municipal turnout: these
variables are percent white, median income, and median education.
The U.S. Census data contains a percent white measure for each municipality in 2000 and
2010. However, I need the percent white for years both in between and after the census years. One
technique to deal with missing data is to mathematically interpolate data. By doing so, I am
creating new data points from a set of known data points. Specifically, I am constructing new data
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points for percent white for the years 2001 to 2009 using the known data points of percent white
in 2000 and 2010.53 For the years between 2000 and 2010, I obtain estimates on percent white
from interpolating the variables. I take the difference between percent white in 2010 an percent
white in 2000 and divide it by 10. For years after 2001 and before 2010, I add this number to the
previous year.
For example, Conneaut City, OH in 2000 was 96.3 percent white and in 2010, it was 89.8
percent white. To find the percent white for 2001 I did the following:
1)

89.8−96.3
10

= −.65

Then added -.65 to the value in 2000 (96.3)
2) 96.3 + −.65 = 95.65
The value of percent white for the Conneaut City in 2001 is 95.65 percent. For 2002, I added -.65
to 95.65. This was done for each year between 2000 and 2010.
Similarly, data points are missing for percent white for the years of 2011 to 2013. Much
like interpolating the data for percent white for the years 2001 to 2009, I extrapolate the data for
percent white for years 2011 to 2013. I use the percent change between 2010 and 2000 and add it
to the preceding year. By extrapolating the variable, percent white, I assume the municipality is
continuing to increase or decrease at the same rate as it did between 2000 and 2010. Returning to
the Conneaut City example, the city decreased in its percent white by -.65 each year. In 2010, the
percent white for the Conneaut City was 89.8 percent. Thus for 2011, the percent white was
calculated by adding -.65 to 89.8, which is 89.15 percent. For 2012, the percent white is 89.15
(2011’s value) plus -.65, which is 88.50 percent. I did this for every year through 2013.

53

The percent white variable is restricted to 100 percent-meaning by interpolating or extrapolating the data, values
over 100 percent were reduced to an even 100 percent.

Table 4.4 Range of Demographics of Ohio Municipalities
2001
2003
2005
Population 29 -710,016
28 -716,825
28 -718,752
Percent
0 - 44.84%
0 - 44.92 %
0 - 45 %
Bachelor
Degree
Percent
7.9 - 99.9%
14.4 - 9.8%
20.9 - 99.8%
White
Median
20,875 - 214,001 18,875 - 242,001 16875 - 270,001
Income
Percent
8.4 - 93.1%
18.5 - 87.8%
28.6 - 82.5%
Female
Median
21.8 - 71.7
23.3 - 63.1
22.7 - 54.4
Age

2007
28 -736,359
0 - 45.08%

2009
27 - 757,435
0 - 45.73%

2011
36 -780,288
0 - 48.27%

2013
36 - 792,499
0 - 50.81%

27.5 - 99.9%

11.4 - 99.9%

0 - 100%

0 - 100%

14,875 - 298,001

12,875 - 26,001

7,428 - 5,575

12,259 - 14,193

29.4 - 85.7%

23.3 - 94.7%

17.3 - 100%

11.2 -100%

22.1- 54.6

21.5 - 57.1

19.2 - 61.6

15.6 - 66.3

Numbers are rounded (N=6,566; n= 938, T=7), where N=n*T
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Previous research has found municipal income to have interesting effects on voter turnout.
Oliver (1999) examines a community’s economic heterogeneity, finding that homogenous,
affluent cities have the lowest turnout while heterogeneous middle class cities have the highest
turnout. I obtain median income of each municipality from the 2000 and 2010 Census. For the
years between 2000 and 2010, I obtain estimates on median income from interpolating the
variables just as I did for the percent white variable above. I take the difference between median
income in 2010 and median income in 2000 and divide it by 10. For years after 2001 and before
2010, I add this number to the previous year. For the years after 2010, I obtain estimates by
extrapolating the variables, just as I did for the percent white variable above. By extrapolating the
variable, median income, I assume the municipality is continuing to increase or decrease at the
same rate as it did between 2000 and 2010. I use the percent change between 2010 and 2000 and
add it to the preceding year. To obtain the 2011 median income variable, I take the percent change
between 2010 and 2000 and add it to 2010 median income variable. For 2012, the percent change
between 2010 and 2000 is added to the 2011 median income, and so on for each year through
2013.
The last demographic variable to capture the heterogeneity of a municipality is education.
Education is measured as the percent of a municipality’s population over 18 with at least a bachelor
degree. The U.S. Census provides the percentage of a municipality that has self-reported
completion of a bachelor degree in 2000 and 2010. I interpolate this variable to obtain values for
the years 2001 to 2009, just as I did for median income and percent white. To obtain values for
percent bachelor degree for 2011 to 2013, I extrapolate the variable as I did with median income
and percent white. Like median income and percent white, by extrapolating the variable, I assume
percent bachelor degree increases or decreases at the same rate as it did between 2000 and 2010.
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Since campaigns can affect voter turnout, I also control for these dynamics. When elections
are close, there tends to be higher turnout (Hill and Leighley 1999). To control for this, I use a
competitiveness variable from the election data collected. The competitiveness of the election is
determined by taking the absolute value of the percentage of victory of the winning candidate over
all other candidates. The calculation is as follows:

(

|𝑊 − 𝑂|
) ∗ 100
𝑇

Where W is the total number of votes the winning candidate received
O is the total number of votes all other candidates received, and
T is the total number of votes cast.
Using this calculation, the results can range from 0 to 100 percent. As the percentage of
victory increase, closeness in the election increases. In other words, if the percentage is 100, then
the mayoral election was very close. If the percentage is 0, then the mayoral race was not close.
Therefore, if the result is 5 percent, it would indicate that there was only one candidate on the
ballot or one candidate received all votes cast. Likewise, a result of 99 percent suggests that the
mayoral race was extremely close.
Ballot initiatives have been shown to increase voter turnout in midterm and presidential
elections (Grummel 2008; Tolbert, Grummel and Smith 2001). There were two election cycles
where highly salient state ballot initiatives were on the ballot after early voting. Both the 2009 and
2011 had statewide initiatives that likely contributed to the high turnout for these two election
cycles. In 2009, there was a casino initiative that would allow for casinos to be built in Ohio. In
2011, there was a labor initiative that would repeal a measure passed by the state general assembly
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that would limit collective bargaining for public employees. Since there were highly salient issues
on the municipal ballot after the implementation of early voting, but not before the implementation
of early voting, then this could be an alternative explanation for the increase in voter turnout after
early voting was implemented.54 To control for the statewide ballot issues, I created a ballot
measure dummy variable. If there was a highly salient ballot measure in that election, it was coded
1, 0 otherwise. The 2009 and 2011 election years both received 1. The other election years received
0.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented the hypothesis for this study as well as the theoretical model
and variable measures. I also described the data set being used in this study. Using the hypothesis
discussed above, the next chapter examines the relationship between in-person early voting and
voter turnout in municipal elections. If in-person early voting has a positive influence on voter
turnout in municipal elections, it may provide a solution to the low voter turnout problem that is
common in local elections.

54

This alternative explanation assumes that ballot initiatives increase turnout in a similar manner as they do in
midterm and presidential elections.
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CHAPTER 5
FINDINGS:
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IN-PERSON EARLY VOTING AND TURNOUT IN
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

In the previous chapter, I discussed the methodology and the application of interrupted time
series models to assess the impact of in-person early voting on turnout in municipal elections. I
hypothesized that in-person early voting will have a positive effect on voter turnout in municipal
elections. In this chapter, I present the results.
I perform an interrupted time series model to assess the impact in-person early voting has
on turnout in municipal elections. The model was sketched out in Chapter 4 and is reprinted below.
Specifically, I expect in-person early voting to have an abrupt and permanent impact on voter
turnout in municipal elections. The following section assesses this claim.
In-Person
Early Voting

→

Voter Turnout in
Municipal Elections

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent, and control variables over all the years
in this study are presented in Table 5.1.
Municipal Voter Turnout, Dependent Variable
The average turnout for municipalities for all time periods, is 35 percent. The 2013 election
year has the lowest average turnout among the municipalities (28%) while voter turnout in 2011
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables (N=6,566; n=938, T=7)
Variable
N
Mean Std Dev.
Voter Turnout All
1,911
35.41
14.46
Voter Turnout 2001
86
36.04
15.65
Voter Turnout 2003
394
36.12
15.13
Voter Turnout 2005
84
37.21
12.13
Voter Turnout 2007
564
31.67
13.63
Voter Turnout 2009
107
35.36
13.43
Voter Turnout 2011
573
39.58
14.18
Voter Turnout 2013
103
27.90
11.46

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.34
1.02

Max
80.09
71.19
70.62
65.97
80.09
63.91
79.21
65.05

Early Voting All
Early Voting 2001, 2003, 2005
Early Voting 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013

6,566
938
938

0.57
0
1

0.49
0
0

0
0
1

1
0
1

Institutional Structure Variables
Mayor Administrative Systems All*

6,566

0.88

0.33

0

1

Manger Administrative Systems All*

6,566

0.78

0.27

0

1

Partisan Elections All
Partisan Elections 2001
Partisan Elections 2003
Partisan Elections 2005
Partisan Elections 2007
Partisan Elections 2009
Partisan Elections 2011
Partisan Elections 2013

6,566
938
938
938
938
938
938
938

0.03
0.01
0.75
0.01
0.59
0.13
0.51
0.01

0.18
0.10
0.26
0.08
0.24
0.11
0.22
0.09

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Local Context Variables
Percent Bachelor Degree All
Percent Bachelor Degree 2001
Percent Bachelor Degree 2003
Percent Bachelor Degree 2005
Percent Bachelor Degree 2007
Percent Bachelor Degree 2009
Percent Bachelor Degree 2011
Percent Bachelor Degree 2013

6,552
936
936
936
936
936
936
936

10.51
9.77
10.01
10.26
10.51
10.75
11.01
11.29

8.49
8.17
8.15
8.21
8.34
8.54
8.80
9.09

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

50.81
44.84
44.92
45.00
45.08
45.73
48.27
50.81

Results are rounded, *These variables are time invariant, so only the overall statistics are presented.
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Continued
Variable
N
Mean
Median Income All
6,552
50,528.71
Median Income 2001
936
49,945.46
Median Income 2003
936
54,028.26
Median Income 2005
936
58,111.06
Median Income 2007
936
62,193.86
Median Income 2009
936
66,276.67
Median Income 2011
936
29,531.44
Median Income 2013
936
33,614.25

Std Dev.
24,785.52
19,170.38
21,511.21
23,894.22
26,307.94
28,744.65
9,270.95
10,784.97

Min
7,427.50
20,875.00
18,875.00
16,875.00
14,875.00
12,875.00
7,427.50
12,258.50

Max
326,001.80
214,001.10
242,001.30
270,001.50
298,001.70
326,001.80
95,575.00
114,193.00

Percent White All
Percent White 2001
Percent White 2003
Percent White 2005
Percent White 2007
Percent White 2009
Percent White 2011
Percent White 2013

6,559
937
937
937
937
937
937
937

93.26
94.37
94.00
93.63
93.26
92.90
92.52
92.14

11.77
10.77
11.03
11.33
11.66
12.04
12.44
12.86

0.98
0.98
1.14
1.30
1.46
1.62
1.78
1.94

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Municipal Population All
Municipal Population 2001
Municipal Population 2003
Municipal Population 2005
Municipal Population 2007
Municipal Population 2009
Municipal Population 2011
Municipal Population 2013

6,562
938
938
935
938
938
938
937

7,982.63
8,005.02
7,991.41
7,991.23
7,962.54
7,998.35
7,958.52
7,971.35

33,931.68
33,988.86
33,925.93
33,750.91
33,815.27
34,404.48
33,7400.03
33,999.75

27
29
28
28
28
27
36
36

782,498.60
710,016.00
716,825.00
718,752.00
736,359.00
757,435.00
780,288.00
792,498.60

Campaign Variables
Closeness All
Closeness 2001
Closeness 2003
Closeness 2005
Closeness 2007
Closeness 2009
Closeness 2011
Closeness 2013

2,219
102
503
98
628
124
648
116

37.86
40.23
42.13
42.00
35.32
40.67
35.79
35.95

40.53
39.95
41.61
40.63
39.82
41.48
39.82
41.77

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

0.29
0

0.45
0

0
0

1
0

1

0

1

1

Ballot Measures All
6,566
Ballot Measures 2001, 2003, 2005, 938
2007, 2013
Ballot Measures 2009, 2011
938

Results are rounded, *These variables are time invariant, so only the overall statistics are presented.
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election has the highest average voter turnout among the municipalities (40%). The large turnout
in 2011 election is not surprising since there was a highly salient ballot initiative on the ballot.55
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the variables that includes the between and within
components specific for panel data. Examining municipal voter turnout, the average voter turnout
for each municipality varied between zero and 69 percent. The ‘within’ numbers refers to the
standard deviation around each municipality’s average. This number is added into the overall
mean. As stated above, the overall mean for municipal voter turnout is 35 percent. Some
municipalities deviated from their average by 5 percent, or had 30 percent voter turnout.
Table 5.2 Summary of Variables
Variable
Turnout
Overall
Between
Within
Early Voting
Overall
Between
Within

55

Mean

Std Dev.

Min

Max

T-bar

1911
732

35.41

14.462
12.191
8.878

0
0
5.148

80.09
69.27
77.49

2.61

0.495
0
0.495

0
0.571
0

1
0.571
1

7

0.327
0.327
0

0
0
0.878

1
1
0.878

7

6566
938

Institutional Structure Variables
Mayor Admin Systems
Overall
Between
Within
Manger Admin Systems
Overall
Between
Within

N

6566
938

6566
938

0.571

0.878

0.078

0.268
0.268
0

0
0
0.078

1
1
0.078

7

In 2009, there was a statewide gaming initiative on the ballot. If passed, it would allow for casinos to be built in
Ohio. Going into the 2011 election, the Ohio General Assembly passed a bill that would limit the collective
bargaining rights of public employees. Citizens collected enough signatures to place a repeal of the law on the ballot
(knows as SB5). If passed, the law that limited collective bargaining rights of public employees would be repealed.
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Table 5.2 Summary of Variables Continued
Variable
N
Mean
Partisan Elections
Overall
6566 0.0317
Between
938
Within
Local Context Variables
Percent Bachelor Degree
Overall
Between
Within

6552
936

Median Income
Overall
Between
Within

6552
936

Percent White
Overall
Between
Within

6559
937

Population
Overall
Between
Within

6562
938

Campaign Variables
Closeness
Overall
Between
Within
Ballot Measures
Overall
Between
Within

2,219
780

6,566
938

10.514

50528.71

93.259

7,982.629

37.86

0.29

Std Dev.

Min

Max

T-bar

0.175
0.102
0.142

0
0
-0.825

1
0.857
0.889

7

8.488
8.328
1.656

0
0
-8.62

50.81
45.08
29.85

7

24785.52
19501.62
15308.74

7427.5
20589.29
-93472.29

326001.80
218001.10
158529.40

7

11.772
11.663
1.633

0.98
1.46
70.879

100
100
115.639

7

33931.68
33891.40
1762.346

27
32.286
-35312.14

792498.60
744596.20
55884.97

6.99

40.53
29.83
28.75

0
0
-34.07

100
100
112.86

2.84

0.45
0
0.45

0
0.29
0

1
0.29
1

7

Results are rounded

The large differences between minimum and maximum values of turnout suggest there are
differences in turnout across municipalities and over time. The minimum values of turnout stay
roughly the same until 2011 and 2013, then there is a slight increase. The 2007 election, one
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municipality had 80 percent turnout. A close second, was the 2011 election with at least one
municipality having 79 percent turnout. The maximum values suggest that some municipalities
may have substantially higher turnout in mayoral elections than other municipalities. Overall,
municipal voter turnout in Ohio over the years of this study is normally distributed, as
demonstrated by Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1 Histogram of Municipalities by Voter Turnout
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Source: Ohio’s County Boards of Elections

Early Voting, Independent Variable
The mean municipal voter turnout for elections both before and after the implementation
of early voting provides interesting and useful insight to the influence it has on voter turnout in
municipal elections. As indicated by Table 5.3, prior to early voting, the mean municipal voter
turnout for elections was 36 percent. After the implementation of early voting, the mean municipal
voter turnout for elections was 35 percent. Municipal voter turnout is lower after the
implementation of early voting by one percent. This suggests that early voting has a negative
impact on voter turnout in municipal elections, which is contrary to what I hypothesized.
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Table 5.3 Voter Turnout Averages Before and After Early Voting
N
Mean
Std Dev Min Max
Before Early Voting 564
36.29
14.79
0
71.19
After Early Voting
1,347 35.04
14.31
0
80.09
Results are rounded

Control Variables
The average Ohio municipality has a population of 7,982 and a median income of $50,529.
The majority of municipalities have highly homogenous populations with regard to race. On
average, 93 percent of the municipal population was white while 11 percent of the municipal
population over 18 held at least a bachelor degree.
The majority of the municipalities have mayor-council systems (approximately 87
percent). The second largest administrative structure is the council-manager system
(approximately 8 percent). The remaining 5 percent are the adaptive administrative systems. On
average, only three percent of municipalities conducted partisan elections during the years of this
study. This is not surprising since Ohio law requires municipalities to conduct nonpartisan
elections.56
Often there was only one mayoral candidate on the ballot. Over all the seven elections
included in this study, there were 1,123 mayoral races where a candidate ran unopposed. The
closeness of mayoral races averaged 38 percent. Since the percentage is relatively low, it means
that on average the mayoral races were not extremely competitive. In this study, there were 96
mayoral races where victor won by less than three percent, meaning the mayoral race was
extremely competitive and the winning candidate won by a slim margin. The large differences
between minimum and maximum values of competition (0 to 100) suggest that there are large
differences in competitiveness of mayoral races across municipalities and over time.

56

The exception is a change in the municipal charter.
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Missing Data
The overall number of observations in the population is 6,566. 57 However, the number of
observations include in the sample is 1,806. The difference is due to the inability to collect voter
turnout data form some CBoEs. In the analysis, the observations without turnout data are dropped.
This can be problematic if the missing data is not missing at random.
In this case, the data is not missing at random. There is a systematic bias in the missing
data. Municipalities with missing turnout data and municipalities without missing turnout data
were significantly different in population, the percent of municipality’s population that is white,
and percent of a municipality’s population over 18 with at least a bachelor degree.58 Municipalities
with missing turnout data are smaller, less educated, and are more white. Less populated, less
sophisticated, more homogenous areas of Ohio were more difficult to obtain data from. The CBoEs
in these areas often had less staff, limited resources, lack of electronic files, inability to have files
on their website, etc. This may be a cause for concern for the generalizability of the results.
However, this is the first cut at such an analysis. In other words, the data in this study provides a
starting point to assess the impact of in-person early voting on voter turnout in municipal elections.
There are methods to for handling missing data, and these will be taken into account in future
analyses.
Modeling Strategy
I employ a fixed effects regression model. By doing so, I can examine panel data as a before
and after experiment - where the “before” is the control group and the “after” is the treatment
group. In the fixed effect model I use, it fixes, or holds constant, the average effects of each

57
58

N=n*t. Where n=938, t=7, N=(938*7)=6,566
Appendix B contains the T-Test results
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municipality.59 It creates a dummy variable for each municipality, which controls for the average
differences across municipalities for any observed or unobserved variables, such as political
culture of a municipality. It assumes that each municipality has its own characteristics that may or
may not influence the dependent variable, municipal voter turnout. And this influence on the
dependent variable is fixed across time. By doing this, it absorbs between-group effects and leaves
within-group effects; therefore, reducing the threat of omitted variable bias.
In a panel fixed effect model, it typically drops time-invariant variables because they are
fixed over both time and observations. In my data this would include two control variables:
manager and mayor administrative systems. The effects of the dropped variables, such as mayor
and manager administrative structure, are absorbed into the residuals of the fixed effect model
thereby controlling for time-invariant differences between municipalities. While these variables
are not my main variable of interest, they are important as they influence turnout in municipal
elections. I opt to conduct a fixed effect model by using the xi: reg command in Stata versus the
xtreg, so I can include these time-invariant variables in my analysis. The xi: reg command in Stata
is much like the fixed effects panel regression that is done with the xtreg, fe command. The xtreg,
fe command suppresses the output for the municipal dummies while the xi: reg command reports
them. The xi: reg command functions much like an OLS regression (reg command) except that it
includes a dummy variable for each municipality, thereby controlling for differences between
municipalities and unobserved variables. To simply use an OLS regression, the results would likely
be biased as there would likely be omitted variables, such as the within municipal effects and/or
time effects. The xi: reg command can also control for both entity (municipalities) and time

59

Fixed effects models drop cases with only one observation, which is the case with my model as well.
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(election years) fixed effects. This is an important distinction as I can control for differences not
only between municipalities but also differences between election years.
Fixed Effects Model Diagnostics
Using the fixed effects model, I ran diagnostic tests. First, I test for heteroskedasticity. I
conduct Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test, which tests for heteroskedasticity in fixed effects
regression models. The null hypothesis is constant variance (homoscedasticity). Given the test
results, I reject the null hypothesis; there is heteroskedasticity (χ2=19.96, p=0.000). I correct for
heteroskedasticity in my fixed effect model. In Stata, this is adding robust to the end of the
regression command. To check the model for autocorrelation, I conducted a Wooldridge test. The
null hypothesis is no first order autocorrelation. The results indicate that I fail to reject the null; I
do not have first order autocorrelation (F=1.266, p=0.2658). The fixed effects models correcting
for heteroskedasticity results are in Table 5.4 below.
Results
The results of the fixed effects regression model are in Table 5.4. First, and of interest to
this study, the analysis reveals that in-person early voting has a significant negative impact on
municipal voter turnout. The direction of influence has remained the same in all models and is
consistent with the correlation matrix.60 In the election years with in-person early voting, municipal
turnout drops by 4.52 percentage points. While this is not what I hypothesized, the results are
consistent with the literature on in-person early voting and voter turnout in state and national
elections (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007). The implications of this finding, as well
as the other findings, are discussed in the following chapter.

60

See Appendix B for bivariate and OLS regressions and correlation matrix.
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Table 5.4 Results of Fixed Effects Regression Model
Variable
Coefficient
Early Voting
-4.52**

Std Error
0.62

Institutional Structure Variables
Mayor Admin. Systems
Manager Admin. Systems
Partisan Elections

19.15**
-12.55
0.69

2.11
8.56
1.05

Local Contextual Variables
Percent Bachelor Degree
Median Income
Percent White
Population

-0.01
-0.00
-0.01
0.00

0.20
0.00
0.12
0.00

Campaign Variables
Closeness
Ballot Measures

0.17**
7.83**

0.01
0.59

Cons

31.49*

12.30

Results are rounded *p<.05 **p<.001, R² = .78, n = 1,806, F=(638, 1167) = 206.63 p=0.000

In Figure 5.2, the average turnout is graphed over time. I anticipated an abrupt permanent
increase in voter turnout after the implementation of in-person early voting. It is clear from Figure
5.2, the impact of in-person early voting did not have an abrupt permanent increase in voter
turnout. Rather it appears to have a gradual permanent decrease in voter turnout. After the
implementation of early voting, turnout declined dramatically. In 2007, the first year to utilize
early voting, turnout was 6 percent lower than turnout in 2005. In 2009 and 2011, there is a sudden
increase in voter turnout. However, this increase is not likely because of early voting alone, but
due to highly salient ballot measures. In 2009, there was a gaming initiative and in 2011 there was
a labor initiative on the ballot in Ohio. Both of these measures were highly salient. As Table 5.4
indicates, early voting has a negative effect on turnout even after controlling for these ballot
measures. In 2013, there is a steep decline in turnout as well. It is 12 percent lower than turnout in
the previous municipal election and 9 percent lower than the last election before early voting.
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Percent Turout

Figure 5. 2
Average Turnout in Municipal Elections
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The only institutional structures variable that was significant was mayor administrative
systems. Mayor administrative systems have a significant positive effect on turnout. Localities
with mayor administrative systems have an increase in turnout by 19.15 percentage points.
The campaign variables are both significant and positive. The effect of closeness, or the
competitiveness of the mayoral race, is small in magnitude. As competition in mayoral races
increases, municipal voter turnout increases as well. Specifically, the model predicts that a one
percent increase in competition (increases towards 100%) increases turnout by .17 percentage
points. This is also consistent with the literature on competitive races and turnout; the more
competitive the race, the higher the turnout. Interestingly, ballot measures are large in magnitude
and significant. Highly salient ballot proposals increased turnout by 7.83 percentage points.
Summary of Findings
The purpose of the chapter was to determine if in-person early voting impacted municipal
voter turnout. Specifically, I hypothesized that in-person early voting would have a significant
positive impact on municipal voter turnout. However, the fixed effects regression results indicate
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that in-person early voting has a significant negative relationship on municipal voter turnout. This
finding is consistent with other scholarship on in-person early voting. Others have found that inperson early voting has a no significant impact on turnout (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein
1998; Stein and Garcia-Monet 1997; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Neeley and
Richardson 2001) or a negative impact on turnout (Gronke Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007).
Conclusion
This project begins to address the question: does in-person early voting impact municipal
voter turnout? By examining local elections in non concurrent years (odd numbered years), I was
able to isolate the effects of in-person early voting in local elections. The findings of my analysis
reveal that in-person early voting has a significant negative impact on municipal voter turnout,
which did not support my hypothesis. However, the results are consistent with the literature on inperson early voting in national and state elections. The following chapter summarizes my findings
and discusses their implications.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION:
DOES EARLY VOTING IMPACT VOTER TURNOUT IN MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS?

The objective of this research was to examine the effects of in-person early voting on
turnout in municipal elections. This project contributes to the understanding of election laws and
local elections. It is different from previous early voting studies because it focused on the
municipality. By doing so, I could include the features of municipalities that influence voter
turnout in municipal elections. Previous studies do not include these characteristics. The results
provide insight on the effect of early voting when focusing exclusively on turnout in municipal
elections. In this chapter, I summarize the findings from Chapter 5, discuss the implication of my
findings, and suggest directions for future research.
Summary of Findings
This research project set out to answer a simple question: does early voting impact voter
turnout in municipal elections? I hypothesized that in-person early voting would have a significant
positive impact on municipal voter turnout. However, the findings suggest that in-person early
voting has a significant negative impact on voter turnout in municipal elections.
My fixed effects model, which includes variables measuring early voting, institutional
structure, local context, and campaigns, explains 78 percent of the variation in voter turnout in
municipal elections, F (638, 1167) = 206.63, p<0.0000. Many variables have no statistically
significant effects, including manager administrative systems, partisan elections, or local context.
The two campaign variables and mayor administrative systems all have a strong, positive effect
on municipal turnout: having close mayoral races β= 19.15, p <0.001, having highly salient ballot
initiatives β = 7.83, p<0.001, and having mayor administrative systems β=0.17, p<0.001. Early
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voting has a strong negative effect on turnout in municipal elections, β = -4.52, p<0.001. This
finding is robust. The negative effect is large and could over time substantially decrease turnout in
local elections.
Turnout
Turnout in local elections is abysmal (Sharp 2003; Krebs 2014). This is concerning since
voter turnout is often used as an indicator for the overall health of a democracy. In Caren’s (2007)
analysis of turnout in big cities (populations 500,000+), he revealed that turnout in large cities
could reach lows of five percent and averaged 27 percent. Voter turnout in Ohio municipal
elections are no different. Ohio municipal elections averaged 35 percent voter turnout, slightly
higher than what Caren found in the large cities. But, in some elections, municipal voter turnout
in Ohio reached a low of less than one percent. Three times during the scope of this study a
municipality has turnout less than one percent. And, six times turnout was zero percent, meaning
there was a mayoral election held, but there were no candidates on the ballot. 61 Turnout such as
this creates serious concern over the health of local democracies.
On a more positive side, municipal voter turnout between municipalities ranged from 12
percent to 69 percent. Occasionally, municipal voter turnout reached a high of 80 percent. There
were eight mayoral elections where turnout was 70 percent or higher. In each of these eight cases,
the population of the municipality was less than 7,000. While such high turnout is not the norm,
per se, for municipal elections, it may be that smaller municipalities, which are often excluded in
local/urban studies,62 are healthier than the larger municipalities.

61

No candidates filed for the position.
When scholars study local/urban elections, there is a tendency to focus on big cities (See Caren 2007). The
studies that do include smaller municipalities, like this one, tend to me individual level analysis (see Oliver).
62
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Determinants of Turnout
I found that mayor administrative systems have significant positive impacts on turnout in
municipal elections, which is consistent with other studies on municipal structures (Caren 2007;
Wood 2002). Mayoral elections tend to be much more political and high profile. Mayors also run
campaigns like higher levels of office. So it is not surprising that turnout is higher.
Most mayors in Ohio are nonpartisan, yet the local political parties often play a large role
in disseminating information about their candidate to voters. For instance, the City of Toledo, in
Lucas County, has a mayor who is nonpartisan according to Ohio law. Yet, the City of Toledo is
a highly Democratic municipality; it is common for most mayoral candidates to claim affiliation
with the Democrat Party. As a result, the local Democratic Party will endorse a candidate. By
doing so, the local Democratic Party will make phone calls, knock on doors, air media ads, etc. to
help ensure that the endorsed Democrat mayoral candidate is elected mayor over the other
Democratic candidates. The political situation in the City of Toledo illustrates that while elections
may be nonpartisan, political parties can still play a large role in motivating individuals to the
polls. This study did not explicitly examine this phenomena, but it gives support to the findings of
mayor administrative systems. Mayor administrative systems can have a more exciting election,
more resources can be spent, and more media attention can be given to them, which only in turn
helps keep the citizens informed and later mobilizes them to vote.
These local context variables examine the long lived debate about what features are best
promote participation in local government. On the one side, it is argued that small, homogenous
municipalities are best. The other side advocates for large, heterogeneous municipalities. I used
some of the demographic variables suggested by Alfred and Lee (1968) to measure the
heterogeneity of a municipality.
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In my model, I found that none of the local contextual variables had a significant impact
on municipal voter turnout. In Caren’s (2007) study of the 38 largest cities in the U.S., when he
included a measure for competitiveness of mayoral races, the local contextual variables statistical
significance disappeared. This suggests that the campaign variables may be a better indicator of
local turnout than local contextual variables. That is likely what is happening in my model. If more
studies on localities, and municipalities in particular, are conducted that include campaign
variables, it may be that the local context variables are not as explanatory as once believed.
Few studies on voter turnout have combined measures of campaign contexts, such as
closeness of races and election laws, together (Tolbert and Franko 2014). Accounting for campaign
activity in local races is important to fully understand the implications of election laws such as
early voting. The closeness measure in my study reveals that the more competitive the race
between mayoral candidates, the higher the turnout. Others have similar findings on the
relationship between competitiveness and voter turnout (Caren 2007; Hill and Leighley 1999;
Lublin and Tate 1995). It is important to keep in mind that the campaign measures include both
closeness of a mayoral race and ballot measures. So to infer that only closeness or competition in
an election matters is not appropriate. The closeness measure had a positive significant effect on
turnout, β = 0.17. Ballot measures had a significant positive effect on municipal voter turnout, β =
7.83. This is not surprising as voter turnout studies have shown ballot initiatives increase voter
turnout elections (Grummel 2008; Tolbert, Grummel and Smith 2001).
While I control for mayoral races’ competitiveness, I do not include information on party
or candidate involvement in the election – primarily because the information at the local level is
difficult, if not almost impossible, to obtain. Stein, Owens, and Leighley (2003) indicate that inperson early voting increases turnout when the parties and campaigns incorporate early voting into
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their campaigns (22). Similarly, Oliver (1996) notes that early voting along with strong
mobilization efforts increase voter turnout (510). In- person early voting may have a positive
influence on local elections when there are competitive races coupled with mobilization efforts
form campaigns and political parties.
While my results are not what I hypothesized, it is consistent with other studies on inperson early voting. Much of the previous work on in-person early voting suggests that it has no
significant impact on turnout (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein 1998; Stein and Garcia-Monet
1997; Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Neeley and Richardson 2001). One study,
like mine, found that in-person early voting had a negative impact on turnout (Gronke GalanesRosenbaum, and Miller 2007). These studies taken collectively suggest that in-person early voting
may not be an effective approach to increase voter turnout, and in some types of elections, it may
be detrimental to voter turnout.
Interestingly, the results of my study conflict with prior studies on vote by mail systems
and turnout in local elections. I can't compare apples to oranges per se, because vote by mail is
different than in-person early voting. However, the idea that local elections are the biggest
benefactors of early voting is a shared theme among scholars. The findings from this research
suggest that 1) the type of election law may matter and 2) how we study local elections is
paramount.
Early Voting as a Public Policy
Recall that proponents of early voting claim that it should increase voter turnout primarily
because it reduces the costs of voting. However, the empirical expectation, that having early voting
will yield higher turnout in elections ceteris paribus, has not always been supported by either of
the two dominate early voting methods (Richardson and Neeley 1996; Stein and Garcia-Monet
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1997; Neeley and Richardson 2001; Gronke Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007; Kousser and
Mullin 2007). The expectation appears to be vote by mail laws as they have a positive impact on
turnout in local elections (Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser and Mullin 2007). In the same way,
I expected in-person early voting to increase turnout in municipal elections. Clearly this empirical
expectation was not met in this study.
The results of this study suggest that if the goal of early voting laws is to increase voter
turnout, then the type of early voting law matters. In-person early voting studies have found
consistent results: in-person early voting either has no effect on turnout or a negative impact on it.
I am reluctant to suggest that in-person early voting is ineffective as more studies on other local
governments should be done before such statements are made and acted on. However, if future
studies on in-person early voting continue to reveal negative impacts or no impact, then a
reevaluation of the law may need to happen.
This study taken collectively with other in-person early voting studies also suggest there is
more to elections than simply extending the duration of voting. The study of voter turnout entails
examining how administrators organize and conduct elections as well as the laws that elected
officials pass to govern them. Laws like early voting illustrate how fluid Election Day is. If inperson early voting itself is not increasing voting turnout, and higher voter turnout is a goal, then
laws that focus solely on the duration of voting period may not be effective. It might be that other
types of election laws that lessen the costs associated with voting are more effective at increasing
turnout, such as the place of polling locations (Gimple and Schuknecht 2003), or the types of places
where individuals can vote, such non-traditional places like grocery stores (Stein and GarciaMonet 1997). Or that these laws coupled with in-person early voting that extends the voting period
could create more opportunities for individuals to cast a ballot and yield higher turnout rates.

134
All in all, it underscores that there is no easy solution to the low voter turnout problem
found in municipal elections. Finding alternative ways to hold elections or better ways to organize
them may be fruitful as a policy solution. Continued research on other types of election laws that
help alleviate the costs of voting in municipal elections may yield more promising results.
The Study of Local Elections
This study illustrates that how we study local elections is essential. While vote by mail
studies have found a positive impact on voter turnout in local elections, localities were not the
focus of the study. They were merely one of many variables included in the analysis. This begs
the question: would similar results be found if localities were the unit of analysis in a vote by mail
study? While the answer to this is outside the scope of this project, it highlights my point. To only
include local elections as merely a variable ignores the importance and uniqueness of local
governments and their elections. Localities are plentiful and diverse; this diversity helps scholars
understand which contexts influence turnout in local elections. Incorporating these contextual
aspects of municipalities in a study emphasizes the value of localities as a unit of analysis. This
research takes into account the institutional and local contexts of municipalities as well as the
dynamics of mayoral campaigns to determine the impact of in-person early voting on turnout in
municipal elections. In doing so, it gives scholars, administrators, and the like, a better
understanding of the impacts in-person early voting has on all levels of government.
What Does It Mean for Local Elections?
The ‘low voter turnout problem’ has plagued American elections for decades and is most
apparent at the local level. The consistent low voter turnout in municipal elections has substantial
consequences as voting confers not only legitimacy to the governing body, but also influences who
is elected and the overall direction of public policies.
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Since early voting is a statewide policy, governmental subunits, or local governments, must
comply with it. The policy itself tends to be controversial, with many states seeking to reduce the
number of days ballots can be cast (e.g. Ohio and Florida). While no direct connection can be made
to indicate any political reasoning for changes in early voting laws, elections are nonetheless about
winning and losing. The rules that govern the election, therefore, are often used for political gain.63
Altering the laws that govern elections has consequences. For this reason, this study is essential to
understand the effect early voting has on voter turnout in municipal elections.
As the results from this study indicate, in-person early voting has a negative impact on
municipal voter turnout. While on its face, in-person early voting appears as a viable solution to
the low voter turnout problem, this may not be the case. If the goal of early voting is to increase
voter turnout, then the findings from this study, and others, on in-person early voting are troubling.
It is especially concerning for local elections in particular since they already have such low voter
turnout. It may be that in-person early voting is not an effective way to increase voter turnout or
alleviate the low voter turnout problem that plagues American elections. However, it would be
unwise to jump to such broad conclusions without conducting more studies on in-person early
voting. For instance, does in-person early voting have a similar effect on turnout in school board
elections? County Board elections? Township elections? Or even state legislative elections? It is
evident that more research should to be done. This study offers a glimpse into the effect of inperson early voting in local elections.

63

Gerrymandering and malapportionment are examples of using the election laws to gain a political advantage.
While gerrymandering is unconstitutional, it still occurs. In Texas, the 2003 Congressional redistricting was
challenged since it added 5 Republican seats and allegedly diluted the minority vote.
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Future Research
While this study does not yield positive results for in-person early voting as a means to
increase voter turnout in municipal elections, it does provide a glance into the impact early voting
has on municipal elections. Future research should continue to examine the impact of in-person
early voting, and other methods of early voting, on other local elections and in other contexts.
What this study does reveal is that how we study local elections is important. Local elections
should be the focus of these future studies, not merely a variable or measure in larger analyses on
turnout. By doing so, scholars, administrators, and the like will gain a better understanding of the
effects of early voting at all levels of government.
As previous research has illustrated, the institutional reforms put in place from the
Progressive Era have reduced voter turnout in municipal elections (Caren 2007; Wood 2002). It
would be interesting, and beneficial, to see if the impact of these reforms are mitigated by early
voting. I included variables to capture these reform measures in this study, however, to examine if
early voting offsets, per se, the impact of the reform measures was outside the scope of this study.
A future analysis like this would be valuable. If early voting lessens the effect of these reform
measures, it might be a solution for municipalities that are less political and more administrative
in nature.
Early voting extends the duration of the voting period. By doing so, the nature of political
campaigns would change to include the longer voting period. For instance, Get Out The Vote
(GOTV) programs would be extended since Election Day can last for 35 days (e.g. Ohio’s early
voting period). The natural deduction from this would entail changes in campaign strategy,
campaign spending, media campaigns, etc. for any candidate, including local mayoral candidates
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and/or council candidates. These areas of local elections are already understudied (Krebs 2014).
However, it would be interesting to explore how early voting alters local campaigns.
The title of this dissertation asks if early voting impacts local elections. The answer to this,
at least at the municipal level, is yes, but not positively. If democracy rests on the consent of the
governed, and this consent is given by casting a ballot, then this study paints a devastating picture
for local democracies in states with in-person early voting. Yet, this is one study on a particular
type of locality. I hope future research continues to investigate the effects of early voting laws so
that scholars, administrators, elected officials, and the like gain a better understanding of them and
their impacts on voter turnout in all types of elections.
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APPENDIX A

Table 1: Demographics of Ohio and the United States
%
Bachelor
Degree
24.1%
27.9%

%
White

%
Black

Median
Income

2000
Presidential
Vote
Republican
Republican

2004
Presidential
Vote
Republican
Republican

2008
Presidential
Vote
Democrat
Democrat

Ohio
83.6% 12.4% $47,358
United
78.1% 13.1% $51,914
States
* Data taken from 2010 U.S. Census, FEC Election Results, and Secretary of State Offices

2012
Presidential
Vote
Democrat
Democrat

Table 2: Demographics of Ohio Counties and Neighboring States
Data taken from 2010 U.S. Census, FEC Election Results, and Secretary of State Offices
%
%
%
Median 2000
2004
2008
Bachelor
White
Black
Income
Presidential Presidential
Presidential
Degree
Vote
Vote
Vote
Lucas County, OH
23%
76%
19.4% $42,072 Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Michigan
25%
80.2% 14.3% $48,432 Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Hamilton County, OH
32.5%
69.7% 25.8% $48,234 Republican Republican
Democrat
Kentucky
20.3%
88.9% 8%
$41,576 Republican Republican
Republican
Washington County, OH 16%
96.5% 1.2%
$41,654 Republican Republican
Republican
West Virginia
17.3%
94.1% 3.5%
$30,380 Republican Republican
Republican
Mahoning County, OH
20.4%
81.1% 16.1% $40,123 Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Pennsylvania
26.4%
83.8% 11.3% $50,398 Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Butler County, OH
25.9%
87.5% 7.7%
$54,788 Republican Republican
Republican
Indiana
22.4%
86.8% 9.4%
$47,697 Republican Republican
Democrat

2012
Presidential
Vote
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Republican
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APPENDIX B
Missing Data T-Tests
T-Test Results, Municipal Population for Missing Turnout and Non-Missing Turnout Groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF
t
p
Deviation
Missing
4,651 7388.86
441.35
30099.49
Non-Missing 1,911 9427.75
955.97
41790
6,560 -2.21
0.027
Results are rounded, Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test Results, Percent Bachelor Degree for Missing Turnout and Non-Missing Turnout Groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF
t
p
Deviation
Missing
4,644 10.14
0.12
8.40
Non-Missing 1,908 11.42
0.20
8.62
6,550 -5.54
0.000
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test Results, Percent White for Missing Turnout and Non-Missing Turnout Groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF
t
p
Deviation
Missing
4,648 93.61
0.17
11.26
Non-Missing 1,911 92.39
0.30
12.90
6,557 3.82
0.000
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test Results, Median Income for Missing Turnout and Non-Missing Turnout Groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std Deviation DF
t
p
Missing
4,641 50,747.22 356.80
23,307.14
Non-Missing 1,911 49,998.05 592.69
25,909.45
6,550 1.11
0.266
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Population in 2001 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
8690.899 1384.427 16899.09
Non-Missing 789
7875.494 1293.418 36330.99
936 0.2684 0.7884
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
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T-Test on Population in 2003 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
8694.121 1371.722 16744
Non-Missing 789
7858.703 1291.404 36274.42
936 0.2755 0.7830
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Population in 2005 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
8707.852 1355.722 16548.7
Non-Missing 786
7855.379 1287.833 36105.29
933 0.2825 0.7776
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Population in 2007 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
8862.993 1345.612 16425.29
Non-Missing 789
7792.497 1287.964 36177.81
936 0.3542 0.7232
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Population in 2009 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
8910.067 1342.802 16390.99
Non-Missing 789
7826.171 1311.37
36835.27
936 0.3525 0.7245
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Population in 2011 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
8923.537 1297.231 15834.72
Non-Missing 789
7776.284 1286.737 36143.34
936 0.3805 0.7037
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
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T-Test on Population in 2013 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
Deviation
Missing
149
8912.096 1293.706 15791.7
Non-Missing 788
7793.467 1298.058 36438.24
935 0.3681

p

0.7129

Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2001 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
10.47608 .7966591 9.691776
Non-Missing 788
9.633997 .279879
7.856578
934 1.1501 0.2504
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2003 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
10.69446 .7913029 9.626615
Non-Missing 788
9.885749 .2793946 7.84298
934 1.1077 0.2683
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2005 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
10.91284 .7905718 9.617721
Non-Missing 788
10.1375
.2818727 7.912543
934 1.0549 0.2918
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2007 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
11.13122 .7944786 9.66525
Non-Missing 788
10.38925 .2872366 8.063115
934 0.9936 0.3207
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
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T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2009 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
11.34959 .8029557 9.768378
Non-Missing 788
10.641
.2953291 8.290284
934 0.9262 0.3546
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2011 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
11.58736 .8139223 9.901792
Non-Missing 788
10.90202 .3055038 8.575901
934 0.8695 0.3848
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Percent Bachelor Degree in 2013 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
p
Deviation
Missing
149
11.84453 .8267871 10.0583
Non-Missing 788
11.18152 .3170369 8.89965
934 0.8140 0.4159
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Median Income in 2001 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
Deviation
Missing
149
51480.72 1735.655 21115.15
Non-Missing 788
49657.11 669.1249 18783.23
934 1.0619
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Median Income in 2003 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
Deviation
Missing
149
55793.31 1925.744 23427.69
Non-Missing 788
53696.75 752.776
21131.43
934 1.0880
Equal variances assumed p>0.05

p

0.2886

p

0.2769
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T-Test on Median Income in 2005 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
Deviation
Missing
149
60105.9
2119.338 25782.86
Non-Missing 788
57736.4
837.907
23521.17
934 1.1071
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Median Income in 2007 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
Deviation
Missing
149
64418.48 2315.557 28169.97
Non-Missing 788
61776.04 924.109
25940.98
934 1.1213
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Median Income in 2009 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
Deviation
Missing
149
68731.07 2513.788 30581.55
Non-Missing 788
65815.69 1011.108 28383.16
934 1.1323
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Median Income in 2011 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
Deviation
Missing
149
29917.78 916.0748 11144.53
Non-Missing 788
29458.88 316.3918 8881.541
934 0.5523
Equal variances assumed p>0.05
T-Test on Median Income in 2013 for Missing and Non-Missing groups
Group
N
Mean
Std Error Std
DF t
Deviation
Missing
149
34230.37 1048.634 12757.18
Non-Missing 788
33498.53 369.7065 10378.16
934 0.7573
Equal variances assumed p>0.05

p

0.2686

p

0.2624

p

0.2578

p

0.5809

p

0.4491
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Results of Bivariate Regression
Variable
Coefficient
Std.
P Value
Error
Early Voting
-1.249
0.725
0.085
Cons
36.289**
0.609
0.000
Results are rounded n=1,905 *p<.05 **p<.001 R²=0.0016

Results of OLS Multivariate Regression
Variable
Coefficient
Std. Error P Value
Early Voting
-4.24
0.68
0.000
Institutional Variables
Mayor Admin. Systems
Manager Admin. Systems
Partisan Elections

4.44
-0.28
-0.03

1.41
1.92
0.91

0.002
0.885
0.970

Local Contextual Variables
Percent Bachelor Degree
Median Income
Percent White
Population

0.35
-0.00
0.11
-0.00

0.04
0.00
0.02
6.69e-06

0.000
0.433
0.000
0.000

0.18
7.50

0.01
0.74

0.000
0.000

11.40

2.46

0.000

Campaign Variables
Closeness
Ballot Measures
Cons

Results are rounded n=1,806 *p<.05 **p<.001 R²=0.3566
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Turnout in the United States is low, especially in municipal elections. Early voting laws,
which have been adopted by over half of the states within the United States, offer voters a chance
to cast a ballot over a longer period of time thereby lowering the cost of voting. Early voting
includes no excuse absentee voting, in person early voting, and/or vote by mail elections. Many of
the previous studies on early voting have focused on national or statewide elections. What has
been largely understudied is the impact of early voting laws on voter turnout in municipal elections,
where voter turnout is the lowest. Previous early voting studies that have included municipal
elections in their analysis have examined vote by mail laws or only examined in person early
voting only in the year it was implemented leaving unanswered questions on the impact of in
person early voting laws on voter turnout in municipal elections over time. Additionally, many of
the studies on early voting and voter turnout in municipal elections have not included the
institutional and local contextual factors of municipalities; important features when studying
municipal elections as previous research indicates that these contextual factors impact voter
turnout. In contrast to previous studies, this project seeks to determine how early voting laws, in
particular in person early voting, influence political participation in municipal elections when
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accounting for the institutional and local contexts of municipalities. Using data collected from 938
cities in Ohio, I conduct an interrupted time series analysis to examine the impact of early voting
laws on voter turnout in municipal elections. I find that in-person early voting has a significant
negative effect on voter turnout in municipal elections. This finding is consistent with other studies
that have found in-person early voting laws have not increased voter turnout in national or
statewide elections. This suggests that early voting laws alone may not be an adequate solution to
the low voter turnout problem found in municipal elections.
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